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Introduction 

Introduction 
Introduction 
 
Every year more than 69.000 people in the Netherlands are diagnosed with 
cancer.1 With 27% of deaths every year, cancer is the second main cause of 
death, following heart and blood vessel failures.2 The most common treatment for 
cancer patients is surgery, radiation therapy, or systemic therapy (e.g., 
chemotherapy, hormonal therapy, and immunotherapy). Treating cancer patients 
can have two intentions: a curative or a palliative intention. Although prognostic 
outcomes for cancer patients have become better, still approximately 50% of 
cancer patients cannot be cured and are treated with palliative intention.3 
Decision making about adequate cancer treatment has long been an 
asymmetrical process: the physician used his or her skills and knowledge to 
choose the best optional treatments for his or her patient. In today’s health care, 
patients are more and more stimulated to play an active role in the decision-
making process and are even expected to be involved in decisions about their 
medical care.4 During the last two decades, patients have tended to move toward 
a more active role in making decisions about their medical treatment.5-8 In clinical 
oncology, most of the time, the physician provides the patient with medical 
information, he or she explains the options, and gives a treatment 
recommendation. The majority of all cancer patients accepts those recommended 
treatments. In some cases, however, a patient’s decision-making process ends up 
in refusing treatment. Refusal then means that the patient does not want to start 
treatment at all, wants to stop during treatment, or refuses a part of a 
recommended treatment but accepts another part (e.g., a woman with breast 
cancer who has been recommended to have surgery and in addition 
chemotherapy, wants to undergo surgery, but refuses chemotherapy). 
Treatment refusal and its moral applications have often been discussed 
concerning issues such as Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders,9 withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment (for example, ventilation),10 blood transfusions for Jehovah’s 
Witnesses,11,12 and coercion in psychiatry.13-15 These discussions are often made 
from the perspective of patient autonomy as conflicting with the responsibilities of 
clinicians. Patient autonomy is also the central value cited in defence of honouring 
refusals based on religious values.11,12 In psychiatry, patient autonomy is also 
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much emphasized to refer to conflicts between patients having a right to refuse 
treatment (as long as the patient does not harm others) and physicians being 
paternalistic in coercing patients.13-15 Treatment refusal in clinical oncology has not 
yet received much attention. In this thesis, an ethical exploration is given of 
patients’ and physicians’ considerations concerning treatment refusal in clinical 
oncology. 
 
Objectives and research question 
 
This thesis gives an ethical exploration of treatment refusal in clinical oncology. 
The objectives of the study are twofold: firstly, to provide insight into patients’ and 
physicians’ considerations concerning treatment refusal in clinical oncology. 
Secondly, to clarify the concept of patient autonomy in the context of cancer 
treatment refusal. The main research question of the study is: how does the 
concept of patient autonomy take shape in the decision-making process on 
oncological treatment, particularly in cases of treatment refusal? The focus is 
among others on (1) the motives of patients to refuse recommended oncological 
treatment, (2) physicians’ attitudes to treatment refusal, and (3) the position of the 
patient and the role of the physician in the decision-making process, with a special 
focus on issues of patient autonomy. 
 
Methodology 
 
The considerations of patients and physicians in the decision-making process on 
oncological treatment have been explored using qualitative research methods. The 
study is mainly based on interviews with physicians and with patients who refused 
oncological treatment. In order to compare between patients who refused and who 
accepted recommended treatment, interviews were carried out with patients who 
accepted oncological treatment as well. At the start of the study, observational 
studies were performed in order to be introduced in the field of research, to make 
a first inventory of physician and patient considerations and deliberations 
regarding treatment decision making, and to formulate interview topics. 
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For the interview study, physicians from different disciplines and settings were 
approached to include patients: (general) oncologists, surgeons, radiotherapists, 
haematologists, gynaecologists, urologists, lung specialists, and general 
practitioners. Physicians approached 47 patients. Thirty-three of these patients 
were included in the study (Figure 1). The response rate of the patients recruited 
by physicians was 70%. This response rate needs to be interpreted with certain 
caution because it is not clear how many potential participants were asked to 
participate. Only the informed consent forms of those patients who actually wanted 
to participate in the study were received. Patients were asked to participate by 
general practitioners (npat=5), and by specialists in a university hospital (npat=25) 
and in five general hospitals (npat=3) in the Netherlands. The hospitals were 
located in Alkmaar, Amsterdam, Hilversum, Hoorn, Purmerend, and Zaandam. 
The general practitioners had their practice in or near Amsterdam. Because 
physicians indicated that most patients who refused treatment did not visit them 
anymore, all Dutch associations for cancer patients were approached. Dutch 
associations for cancer patients were willing to spread information about the study. 
Patient members of these associations (npat=19) responded themselves to the call 
to participate. 
 
Figure 1 Flow-chart of the inclusion of patients for the interview study (n = number of patients; gp = 
general practitioners; uh = specialists in a university hospital; gh = specialists in general hospitals) 
 
 
Included by physicians: 
refusers n=13 
(gp:n=5; uh:n=6; gh:n=2) 
Included via patient 
associations: 
acceptors n=2 
Included by physicians: 
acceptors n=20 
(gp:n=0; uh:n=19; gh:n=1)
Matching of 
refusers n=30
 
 
 
Included via patient 
associations: 
refusers n=17 
 
 
 
 
A total of 52 patients were included in the study (30 patients who had refused and 
22 patients who had accepted oncological treatment). Inclusion criteria were: 
being over the age of 18, speaking and understanding the Dutch language, having 
cancer, having a life expectancy of more than three months (expected prognosis 
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based on known natural history of a given diagnosis), and having refused or 
accepted a recommended oncological treatment. All patients recruited by 
physicians or those who responded themselves from January 2001 until March 
2003 were included in the study if they met the inclusion criteria. Both, patients 
were included who had decided on recommended treatment with higher potential 
benefit (curative treatment) and patients who had decided on recommended 
treatment with lower potential benefit (non-curative treatment). Not included were 
patients who did not respond to the information letter, who indicated that they did 
not want to participate, who withdrew themselves, or for whom the interview 
appeared to be too much of a burden. 
The study is a matched case-control study, i.e. cases (refusers of treatment) 
were enrolled followed by controls (acceptors of treatment) who were selected on 
the basis of similarities to patients in the case group. Selection criteria were: 
gender, age (± 5 years), and comparable tumour type, stage of disease, estimated 
prognosis, treatment history, and treatment recommendation. 
All patients have been interviewed by one trained interviewer (TvK) either at 
the patient’s home (npat=49) or in the hospital (npat=3). In-depth interview 
techniques were used. This means that the interviews contained some general 
topics and no close-ended questions.16 The interview topics have been formulated 
on the basis of studies of relevant literature and observations. During the 
observational studies, 72 patients were observed during their visits to five different 
oncologists at an oncological outpatient clinic in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
Notes were taken on the reason why the patient visited the oncologist (intake/first 
visit, control visit after treatment, start/continuation curative treatment, 
start/continuation palliative treatment), on how a treatment decision was made 
(initiative by physician, initiative by patient, interaction physician-patient), and on 
which aspects came up during discussion between physician and patient with 
regard to treatment (treatment goal, considerations and deliberations of physician 
and patient). Transcripts from the observations were coded and subsequently the 
codes were organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. The main 
categories together with topics from the literature were converted into interview 
topics. The interview topics of the patient interviews concerned demographic and 
clinical characteristics of the patient, the course of the disease, communication 
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with physicians about the recommended treatment, deliberations about the 
treatment, attitudes of the patient to the recommended treatment, and future 
perspectives of the patient. To increase objectivity of data analysis, two 
independent researchers supervised the process of converting the categories of 
the observational study into interview topics. They underlined important aspects in 
the transcripts. Subsequently, those aspects were compared with the codes and 
categories in the analysis performed by the main researcher. Together with topics 
from relevant literature, this resulted in a topic list. This topic list has been 
discussed with specialists in the field of research. During the development of the 
interviews, two pilot interviews were carried out. 
In addition to the patient interviews, 16 physicians were interviewed from 
among the physicians who recruited the patients. Eight general practitioners and 
eight (general) oncologists were selected, including younger and older, male and 
female physicians, with few to many years of working experience, and from 
different settings (general practice, university hospital, and general hospital). The 
interview topics of the physician interviews concerned characteristics of the 
physician, working experience, attitudes on curative versus non-curative 
treatments, and palliative care in oncology, physician-patient relationship 
especially concerning treatment decisions, treatment refusals and their rationality, 
patient autonomy, and physician’s beneficence. The physician interviews were 
carried out from May 2002 until October 2002. 
All the interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. A descriptive qualitative 
approach was used to analyse the interviews.17 During the analysis, computer 
software based on grounded theory (Kwalitan 5.0) was used for multiple text 
management, including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, 
and words. Each interview was divided into several segments. The segments were 
coded and the codes were organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. 
A second independent researcher supervised this process of data management, 
i.e. this researcher analysed segments, categorized codes, and analysed this on 
remarkable aspects. Subsequently, this was compared with the analysis 
performed by the main researcher. Demographic characteristics have been 
analysed using SPSS 11.0. 
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Scope of the thesis 
 
The chapters of this thesis are based on articles, which have been published or 
have been submitted for publication. Therefore, the various chapters may show 
some overlap, especially with regard to the Methods sections, which have been 
maintained in each chapter so that the chapters can be read independently. 
 
Clarification of used terminologies 
Chapter 1 starts with a description and a clarification of a generally used, but 
confusing term in clinical oncology: ‘palliative’. Close consideration of the use of 
the term ‘palliative’ may clarify the various goals of treatment and care in 
oncological practice. The different uses of the term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology 
are elaborated and some differences between the goals of palliative care and the 
goals of palliative oncological treatment are discussed. 
 
Patients’ and physicians’ considerations 
In Chapter 2, the focus is on physicians’ evaluations of patients’ decisions to 
refuse oncological treatment. It is described what is meant in daily medical 
practice by rational decision making. Discussed are questions concerning the 
following: what do physicians understand by ‘good reasons’ to refuse 
recommended oncological treatment, and what motivate patients to refuse 
treatment and how has this been communicated with their physician. 
In Chapter 3, the end-of-life attitudes mentioned by patients who decide on 
oncological treatments are described. It is discussed whether end-of-life attitudes 
of patients who refuse oncological treatment differ from those who accept such 
treatment. 
 
Patient autonomy 
In Chapter 4, the concept of patient autonomy is approached from a practical point 
of view by using empirical data retrieved from the interviews. Focus questions are: 
(1) what is meant by patient autonomy, i.e. how is this autonomy conceptualized 
and (2) which factors influence patient autonomy. 
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Chapter 5 offers a more comprehensive, ethical-philosophical elaboration on 
patient autonomy. The empirical findings are discussed in relation to the liberal 
understanding of patient autonomy, to the perspective of an ethic of care, and to 
the approach of patient-centered medicine. The focus is on (1) patient autonomy 
as ‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’, (2) the idea of freedom that is 
attached to patient autonomy, and (3) a patients’ and a physicians’ perspective in 
medical decision making. 
 
General discussion and summary 
In the general discussion, methodological considerations are given, the results are 
put into perspective, and the research question is discussed. Finally, the results 
are summarized. A summary is also given in Dutch. 
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1 Clarifying the term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology 
 
The objective of this study was to clarify the term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology. A 
qualitative study design with in-depth interviews was applied. The study sample included 
30 cancer patients and 16 physicians. 
In clinical oncology, the use of the term ‘palliative’ to describe both anticancer 
treatments and palliative care may cause confusion and misunderstanding. Different 
aspects of palliative care, as expressed by the WHO definition, are not so easily 
recognizable with regard to palliative oncological treatments. Furthermore, the fact that 
the same anticancer treatments can be given to patients with palliative or curative 
intention is confusing. The distinction between curative and palliative oncological 
treatments is of crucial importance for the treatment decision-making process. Close 
consideration of the use of the term ‘palliative’ will help to clarify the various goals of 
treatment and care in oncological practice. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Developments in medicine, including an increase in palliative options, have led to 
new approaches to support dying people.1 One such approach is palliative care, 
derived from the English Modern Hospice Movement. Cicely Saunders laid down 
the fundaments of this movement by founding the St. Christopher’s Hospices in 
1967.2 The approach focused on care for the patient and not solely on the 
patient’s disease. Saunders realized that effective use of morphine could relieve 
pain and distress, but pain management was not enough to improve the overall 
care of the terminally ill.1 She emphasized that pain and symptom management 
together with the attention for practical and social needs of patients and their 
relatives shape the care for the dying. Gradually the conviction grew that, 
especially in the last phase of a person’s life, it is extremely important to meet a 
person in his or her specific questions, wishes, desires and needs. These aspects 
are to some degree part of the new definition of palliative care, recently formulated 
by the World Health Organization (WHO).3 
 
Palliative care is an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their 
families facing the problems associated with life-threatening illness, through the 
prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable 
assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial 
and spiritual. Palliative care: 
- provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; 
- affirms life and regards dying as a normal process; 
- intends neither to hasten or postpone death; 
- integrates the psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; 
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- offers a support system to help patients live as actively as possible until death; 
- offers a support system to help the family cope during the patient’s illness and 
in their own bereavement; 
- uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and their families, 
including bereavement counselling, if indicated; 
- will enhance quality of life, and may also positively influence the course of 
illness; 
- is applicable early in the course of illness in conjunction with other therapies 
that are intended to prolong life, such as chemotherapy or radiation therapy, 
and includes those investigations needed to better understand and manage 
distressing clinical complications. 
 
Before the introduction of the above-mentioned new WHO definition, another 
description of palliative care was used. That description emphasized its relevance 
to patients not responsive to curative treatment.2,4 Whereas ‘not responsive to 
curative treatment’ could be interpreted as relegating palliative care to the last 
stages of life, the new WHO definition emphasizes that the care is “associated with 
life-threatening illness”. The latter formulation shows that it is recognized that the 
principles of palliative care should be applied as early as possible in the course of 
any chronic, ultimately fatal disease.3 
According to Porzsolt and Tannock, the explicit statement of the goals of 
palliative treatments in clinical oncology is very important.5 When defining the term 
‘palliative’ related to treatments in clinical oncology, these goals may become 
clear. Porzsolt and Tannock stated that “the critical end point of anticancer 
therapies when applied in incurable situations is relief of suffering rather than 
prolongation of existence”.5 By using this definition, the term ‘palliative’ in clinical 
oncology seems comparable to palliative care as defined by the WHO: “relief from 
pain and other distressing symptoms” and “intends neither to hasten or postpone 
death”. The goals of palliative treatments in clinical oncology are, however, not 
always that clear. In the literature, most studies about palliative oncological 
treatments refer to the definition of Porzsolt and Tannock, but different 
interpretations have been given. The goals of palliative cancer therapy have, for 
example, been described as: 
 
- “the alleviation of existing symptoms or the prevention of impending 
problems”6; 
- “to prolong the patient’s life and to alleviate debilitating symptoms of the 
disease”7; 
- “to ensure an optimal quality of life and/or sometimes increase their [patients’] 
length of survival”.8 
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The use of the term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology seems to be problematic: 
confusion and misunderstanding may arise.9 Close consideration of the use of the 
term ‘palliative’ may clarify the various goals of treatment and care in oncological 
practice. In this study, we will therefore elaborate on the different uses of the term 
‘palliative’ in clinical oncology. Based on physician and patient interviews, we 
focus on two aspects. Firstly, we discuss some striking differences between the 
goals of palliative care as described by the WHO definition and the goals of 
palliative oncological treatments. Secondly, we try to clarify the term ‘palliative’ by 
focusing on the distinction between curative and palliative oncological treatments. 
 
1.2 Methods 
 
The present study is part of a study that aims to clarify the ethical aspects 
concerning decisions of patients to refuse a recommended oncological treatment, 
both in a curative and in a palliative setting. The study is based on in-depth 
interviews with patients and physicians. A qualitative research method has been 
chosen to elaborate on attitudes and approaches to palliative care and treatments 
in clinical oncology. Our study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committees of 
the study sites. All patients gave informed consent. 
 
1.2.1 Participants 
 
Patients who refuse an oncological treatment are difficult to include in a research 
sample.10 One reason may be that after their refusal, they withdraw from the 
medical circuit and are therefore difficult to approach. Another reason may be that 
patients, after their withdrawal, do not want to be involved in medical research 
anymore, either because they do not want to be confronted again with hospitals or 
doctors, or because they are too ill to be interviewed. The patients included in this 
study form a rather unique sample and deserve our gratitude. 
Thirty patients suffering from cancer were interviewed. All of them had refused 
a recommended oncological treatment. Demographic and clinical characteristics of 
the patients are given in Table 1. The patients were asked to participate by 
general practitioners (n=5), and by specialists in a university hospital (n=6) and in 
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five general hospitals (n=2) in the Netherlands. Dutch associations for cancer 
patients were willing to spread information about the study. Patients participating 
in associations (n=17) responded themselves for participation. 
 
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients (n=30) 
 
M (range) n (%) 
 
 
Age     58 (23-91) 
 
Gender 
Male       12 (40) 
Female       18 (60) 
 
Marital status 
Single/divorced, widowed    13 (43) 
Married/registered partnership    17 (57) 
 
Education 
Primary school/lower level high school     9 (30) 
Middle level high school       6 (20) 
Advanced vocational/university    15 (50) 
 
Cancer diagnosis 
Breast       11 (37) 
Gastroenterological       8 (27) 
Urological        3 (10) 
Gynaecological        2   (7) 
Pulmonary        2   (7) 
Haematological        2   (7) 
Other         2   (7) 
 
Recommended treatment refused 
Chemotherapy      14 (47) 
Chemotherapy + radiotherapy      3 (10) 
Surgery         3 (10) 
Surgery + chemotherapy      4 (13) 
Surgery + radiotherapy       3 (10) 
Other         3 (10) 
 
What did patient refuse 
All treatment        7 (23) 
Part of treatment     23 (77) 
 
 
Inclusion criteria were: being over the age of 18, speaking and understanding 
Dutch language, having cancer, having a life expectancy of more than three 
months, and having refused a recommended oncological treatment. A refusal in 
this study means that the patient did not start treatment at all, stopped during 
treatment, or refused a part of a recommended treatment but accepted another 
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part (e.g. accepted surgery, but refused chemotherapy). All patients recruited by 
physicians or those who responded themselves from January 2001 until April 2002 
were included in the study if they met the inclusion criteria. 
Sixteen physicians were interviewed. Physician characteristics are given in 
Table 2. Of the physicians who recruited patients, a selection of eight general 
practitioners and eight (general) oncologists was made. To obtain a wide range of 
different opinions, we included younger and older, male and female physicians, 
with few and many years of working experiences, and from different settings 
(university hospital and general hospital). The interviews were carried out from 
May 2002 until October 2002. 
 
Table 2 Characteristics of physicians (n=16) 
 
M (range) n (%) 
 
 
Age     49 (29-60) 
 
Gender 
Male       11 (69) 
Female         5 (31) 
 
Profession 
General practitioner       8 (50) 
(General) oncologist       8 (50) 
 
Work experience   18 (2-29) 
 
 
1.2.2 Interview procedure 
 
The patient interviews were carried out at the patient’s home. Each interview 
lasted between 60 and 120 min. We used in-depth interview techniques. This 
means that the interviews contained some general topics and no close-ended 
questions.11 Interview topics were formulated after studies of relevant literature 
and observations. Observational studies were performed in order to be introduced 
in the field of research and to make a first inventory of physician and patient 
considerations and deliberations regarding treatment decision making. During the 
observational studies, 72 patients were observed during their visit to five different 
oncologists at an oncological outpatient clinic in the Netherlands. Notes were 
taken on the reason why the patient visited the oncologist (intake/first visit, control 
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visit after treatment, start/continuation curative treatment, start/continuation 
palliative treatment), on how a treatment decision was made (initiative by 
physician, initiative by patient, interaction physician-patient), and on which aspects 
came up during discussion between physician and patient with regard to treatment 
(treatment goal, considerations and deliberations of physician and patient). 
The physician interviews were carried out in the physician’s office. Each 
interview lasted between 30 and 60 min. Interview topics were formulated after 
literature studies and after analysis of the observational studies and patient 
interviews. As the physician interviews were carried out after literature studies and 
after analysis of the observational studies and patient interviews, we were able to 
discuss themes that were put forward by different perspectives and to gather 
information on some remaining gaps. 
 
1.2.3 Analysis 
 
Transcripts from the observations were coded and subsequently the codes were 
organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. The main categories were 
converted into interview topics. To increase objectivity of data analysis, two 
independent researchers have supervised the process of converting the 
categories of the observational study into interview topics. We will give two 
examples of such a conversion: firstly, the observational studies indicated that 
among oncologists differences existed in discussing treatment goal. This 
observation was categorized as ‘physician treatment goal’. Subsequently this 
category was converted into the interview topic ‘opinions of palliative and curative 
care and treatments in oncology’ (physician interview). A second example: the 
observational studies indicated that ideas of patients about treatment goal were 
sometimes different from those of physicians. This observation was categorized as 
‘patient-physician interaction treatment goal’. Subsequently this category was 
converted into the interview topic ‘communication with physicians about the 
recommended treatment and attitudes of the patient to the recommended 
treatment’ (patient interview). 
The interview topics of the patient interviews concerned demographic and 
clinical characteristics of the patient, the course of the disease, communication 
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with physicians about the recommended treatment and attitudes of the patient to 
the recommended treatment (with specific attention for communication about and 
ideas on treatment goal), and future perspectives of the patient. 
The interview topics of the physician interviews concerned characteristics of 
the physician, working experience, opinions concerning palliative vs. curative care 
and treatments in oncology, physician-patient relationship especially concerning 
treatment decisions, treatment refusals, patient autonomy, and physician’s 
beneficence. 
All the patient and physician interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. A 
descriptive qualitative approach was used to analyse the interviews.12 During the 
analysis, we used computer software (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text management, 
including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, and words. Each 
interview was divided into several segments. The segments were coded and the 
codes were organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. A second 
independent researcher has also supervised this process of data management. 
 
1.3 Results 
 
1.3.1 The term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology 
 
1.3.1.1 Differences between general practitioners and oncologists 
 
When referring to the term ‘palliative’, general practitioners in our study referred 
primarily to palliative care and treatments such as support, relief of pain and 
symptom management as described by the WHO definition. General practitioners 
associated palliative care and treatments especially with care for terminal patients. 
 
Physician 1: … accompaniment of patients (…) a bit of explanation and telling 
about the disease and further, well, pain management, control of nausea, 
constipation, that kind of things. 
 
Physician 2: All care for persons who have an incurable disease, who may not 
recover anymore, thus to be cured from their disease. Thus all measures 
regarding physical, social, and psychological needs that are imaginable to let life 
be as qualitatively good as possible, as long as it takes. (…) The majority is of 
course the care surrounding the end of life. 
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Oncologists in our study referred both to aspects of palliative care and to 
treatments as described by the WHO definition, but also to palliative anticancer 
treatments such as chemotherapy, radiotherapy, or surgery, without any prospect 
of cure. 
 
Physician 3: There exists a beautiful definition, the WHO definition (…) in 
essence, all care that will not lead to cure. 
 
Physician 4: Palliative care is both the care you give to the woman with for 
example breast cancer to whom you give a qualitative good life for 10, 15 years, 
and the terminal care in hospices. 
 
Physician 5: By palliative care I mean indeed the chemotherapy I give for the 
greater part. 
 
In this chapter, we will use the term ‘palliative care’ for indicating aspects of 
palliative care and treatments as described by the WHO definition. For indicating 
anticancer treatments used in the palliative setting, we will use the term ‘palliative 
oncological treatments’. 
The following differences between these two different approaches of the term 
‘palliative’ in clinical oncology could be distinguished. 
 
1.3.1.2 Stage of disease in which care or treatment is provided 
 
According to the WHO definition, palliative care is associated with life-threatening 
illness. This formulation is meant to show that palliative care should not only be 
associated with terminal care, but should be applied as early as possible in the 
course of any chronic, ultimately fatal disease. However, the physician interviews 
revealed that palliative care is still often associated with pain and symptom 
management for dying persons. In clinical oncology, it is evident that palliative 
oncological treatments are provided in all stages of the disease and that these 
treatments are certainly not associated with patients in the terminal phase. If 
patients are confronted with a bad prognosis, palliative oncological treatments can 
be provided in early stages of the disease process. 
 
Physician 3: There are persons who may palliatively react very beautifully and for 
example can have a few more years, at least according to the expectations. 
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Physician 6: For example a patient with breast cancer having a hormone-
sensitive tumour. You give her an antihormone and she lives for another 10, 15 
years, but it still is a palliative treatment. And we do say that it is [palliative]. From 
the beginning we call it a palliative treatment, because it will not lead to cure. 
Eventually they will die because of breast cancer. 
 
1.3.1.3 Treatment goal: symptom relief 
 
Palliative care provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms. The 
physician interviews revealed that palliative oncological treatments are also 
directed to relieve tumour-associated symptoms. An effective palliative oncological 
treatment may cause improvement of these symptoms. Besides relieving 
symptoms, a reduction of cancer volume or stabilization of disease is considered 
as an important goal of palliative oncological treatments, even though cure is no 
longer an option. 
 
Physician 1: When you have constipation in your intestines, because of a tumour, 
then you can remove that tumour as such that the intestines keep on functioning 
although it is not a curative operation. 
 
Physician 7: That means that you can not totally remove the tumour, but what 
can be very important for patients for gaining some time and manage the pain. 
(…) In several cases, it is just the tumour that bothers, that prevents things, that 
gives complaints. Well, then I have the opinion that if you have a good effective 
therapy, then that is a very good palliation. You approach the complaints from the 
source. 
 
Physician 8: … it [oncological treatment] is not really directed on cure, well yes, 
restricting the process (…) to relieve the symptoms whereas there is no curative 
aspect anymore as such that you try to achieve a remission of the tumour. 
 
If the tumour mass is reduced by the treatment, alleviation of symptoms may occur 
until the cancer starts growing again. However, if a treatment is ineffective, 
existing symptoms may transiently increase. In addition, toxicity as a consequence 
of the treatment may induce new symptoms, which are acute or sub-acute, 
reversible or irreversible. 
 
Physician 9: … that you will otherwise overshoot the mark. Then you just make 
persons ill with your medicines and things. 
 
Physician 10: … but it has a risk when you give chemotherapy. It may cause side 
effects, it may just happen that you suffer more from the side effects and you can 
not predict that in advance. 
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Physician 7: I think that chemotherapy can work in the palliative setting, but you 
have to be very careful, it may work out the wrong way. 
 
1.3.1.4 Treatment goal: quality of life 
 
Palliative care is an approach that tries to preserve or improve the quality of life of 
patients. This goal is recognized and experienced by patients.13 In line with 
palliative care, physicians indicated that palliative oncological treatments may also 
be directed to preserve or improve quality of life. 
 
Physician 8: It also deals of course with quality of life, handicaps caused by the 
treatment, that is of course something you have to take care of. 
 
Physician 5: … everything you do that has been directed to improve quality of life. 
That can also be chemotherapy or all sorts of other means. 
 
Physician 11: … a variety of measures, and those can be medicinal or non-
medicinal, that aim to keep quality of life as optimal as possible, not dealing with 
cure, but actually preservation of quality or improvement of life. 
 
Many patients, however, believed that quality of life is incompatible with receiving 
palliative oncological treatments. More than half of the patients chose not to be 
treated because they believed that treatments would not result in a better quality of 
life and would only cause side effects and/or increase or induce symptoms. 
 
Patient 1: … the quality of life will diminish when you remove a large part of the 
small intestine. 
 
Patient 2: … nevertheless have a fine life, higher quality of life, without 
chemotherapy. 
 
Patient 3: … that I stand at risk due to the “pleasant” radiotherapy of suffering 
side effects that actually would diminish my quality of life, scared me to bits. 
 
Patient 4: … we can postpone death with chemotherapy. But the time of 
postponement, how will I live then, what is the quality of my life? Thus, I have to 
give up quality. 
 
1.3.1.5 Treatment goal: life-prolonging 
 
Palliative care intends neither to hasten nor to postpone death. The physicians in 
our study stated that, in addition to preserve or improve quality of life, palliative 
oncological treatments aim to prolong life. 
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Physician 3: … you have decided to catch the possibility for improvement or 
prolongation of life or improvement of quality or whatever. 
 
Physician 12: … there’s no chance of cure, but to keep the duration of life as long 
as possible with a quality of life as good as possible. 
 
Life-prolonging is often mentioned as an important reason why palliative 
oncological treatments are recommended to cancer patients. However, more than 
half of the patients in our study indicated that they had refused the recommended 
oncological treatment because for them gaining time did not outweigh the suffering 
from side effects of treatments. 
 
Patient 5: As such for me it is a very clear consideration: if I could not really be 
cured, and it [treatment] is only life-prolonging – and in what way – what kind of a 
life would I have then, how would I feel, and what would I be able to do? 
 
Patient 6: … “an acceptable investment in life-prolonging”. Well, I don’t think so. 
No, because if it would turn out badly, then I don’t want in any case feel 
continuously ill for the remaining years or have pain somewhere because of 
treatment, or the consequences of treatment. (…) No, I don’t think that is 
acceptable. I then prefer to die one or two years earlier, but still feeling 
reasonable. 
 
Patient 7: … I stated in advance that I only want to let these things be done that 
will not affect my quality of life. Thus, I absolutely don’t want that – and 
chemotherapy would be part of this – for three month you’ve been miserable, to 
gain three months of life. Then I would loose in my good time and gain in my bad 
time. 
 
The above-mentioned differences between palliative care and palliative 
oncological treatments are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Summary of the differences between palliative care defined by the World Health 
Organization and palliative treatments in clinical oncology 
 
Palliative Care     Palliative Treatments in  
Clinical Oncology 
 
 
Care directed to:    Treatments directed to: 
 
  Persons with non-curable life-threatening   Incurable patients (in all stages of the  
    disease         disease) 
  (Relief of) symptoms      Tumour and symptoms 
  Quality of life, recognized by patients    Quality of life, not always recognized  
    by patients 
  Neither hastening nor postponing death   Life-prolonging 
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1.3.2 The distinction between curative and palliative oncological 
treatments 
 
1.3.2.1 Clearness of distinction 
 
Our study showed that the goal of an oncological treatment is not always clear to 
patients. For example, FEC (5-Fluorouracil, Epirubicin, Cyclophosphamide) 
chemotherapy can have two purposes. On the one hand, (neo-)adjuvant 
chemotherapy is given to patients with a curative intent. On the other hand, FEC 
chemotherapy given to patients with metastatic breast cancer has a palliative goal. 
Surgery for cancer patients is often directed at cure, but in the case of a patient 
with colon cancer and synchronic liver metastases, the treatment goal is palliative. 
Radiotherapy is often given with a curative intention in addition to surgery or 
chemotherapy. However, radiotherapy is also used with a palliative purpose, for 
example, in the case of bone metastases. From the patient interviews it was 
established that the fact that the same anticancer treatments can be given to 
patients with palliative or curative intention may lead to misleading interpretations 
of the purposes of treatment. 
 
Patient 8: At first, they indicated that they wanted to go for curative treatment. I 
think that if I had knew from the beginning that it was a palliative treatment, I 
would never have started treatment. (…) As long as you’re in that procedure of 
chemotherapy and appointments to be operated, I had the idea it could be 
removed. Suddenly you notice that it is not like that. 
 
Patient 9: And I think that it has also been my rescue. I think that if I had not done 
that [surgery], I wouldn’t have been alive today. Especially the first year, you have 
to be very carefully then. Well, it’s almost one year by now, and I assume that I’m 
cured. 
 
Patient 10: For me it has been used as a support for that chemotherapy, but it is 
often administered to palliative patients as well. (…) Well yes, if you have a very 
severe pain, or very serious situations develop as such that they [physicians] can 
keep it under control, and you will not scream it out loud, may be then it’s, but 
then I know that it’s really a palliative treatment and that’s not where I am now, I 
think. (…) I believe, that’s the expression for people who can really not be treated 
anymore with chemotherapy and the process apparently still continues. 
 
Possible misinterpretation of treatment purposes could not only be deduced from 
the patient interviews. Physicians also recognized that the various purposes of a 
treatment can be mixed up. 
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Physician 13: If something is operable then that seems to be curative. You never 
know that for sure, because there may always be a metastasis. If that’s the case, 
then immediately it is palliative of course. You’re never able tot say that in 
advance. 
 
Physician 7: Depending on the goal of the treatment one can say whether a 
treatment is curative or palliative. This goal can only be clarified by expressing it 
to the patient. (…) The choice of treatment could be an indication whether the 
treatment is curative or palliative, but often the same chemotherapy is used for a 
patient who is treated aiming for cure and for a patient who receives palliative 
treatment. This is rather unclear for patients. 
 
Although some physicians expressed that they had no difficulties with indicating if 
a certain treatment was palliative or curative, other physicians had great difficulties 
with this distinction and pointed to this separation as a grey area instead of a 
sharp line. 
 
Physician 1: That distinction can of course fade away. 
 
Physician 2: The distinction between a curative goal of such a treatment and a 
palliative one is not always sharp. I think it is reality that one not always knows it. 
(…) There exists a grey area (…) I think one often knows it but there exist 
doubtful cases. 
 
Physician 9: That moment can not always clearly be indicated, but often it can. 
My experience is that in that case it’s often not indicated and that’s a pity. It is 
possible, especially when you are more experienced, then in general it can rather 
good be indicated. 
 
Physician 6: Crystal clear (…) regarding to breast cancer, in the beginning when 
you operate someone and affected lymphnodes are still present in the armpit, we 
give adjuvant chemotherapy, as we call it, and that belongs to curative treatment. 
That kind of chemotherapy is also given for palliative purposes, thus that may get 
mixed up, but it never causes confusion because it’s a totally different phase and 
the persons who are treated curatively, don’t know anything about palliative 
chemotherapy. 
 
1.3.2.2 Importance of distinction 
 
Physicians, nevertheless, indicated that it is important to know whether a 
treatment is curative or palliative and to communicate this to the patient for three 
reasons: 
(a) It is an indication for patients to know in which phase of the disease they are; 
what their prognosis is. 
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Physician 9: … that you will not unnoticeably plod along as such that the patient 
keeps on fighting, whereas the fight has already been lost. It would prove very 
helpful to the patient, when preparing him or herself to the things that are to 
come, taking care of everything, saying goodbye. 
 
Physician 3: Persons are inclined to say that it’s going well and put even into 
words, something I never say, in percentages that they have a very little chance, 
only one percent, they know exactly in percentages their chances on cure, 
whereas that’s more something that results from their own hope and what they 
deduce from the success of a palliative treatment. 
 
Physician 5: A lot of persons have never realized, that whole period, they were 
going to die. 
 
(b) It influences the grade of toxicity of a treatment that is acceptable for the doctor 
and for the patient. 
 
Physician 3: Concerning curative treatments you will go farther and accept more 
side effects than concerning palliative treatments. 
 
Physician 6: The curative treatment (…) often is very intensive and generally you 
will accept a lot of side effects, much toxicity as such that you say, well it’s a 
heavy treatment. 
 
(c) It strongly influences the extent of pressure physicians will exert to persuade 
the patient to be treated as recommended. Physicians indicated that they exert 
more pressure on patients to accept a curative oncological treatment, whereas, if 
the recommended treatment has a palliative goal, physicians indicated that they 
exerted less pressure. 
 
Physician 10: Well, if patients could just really realize what they may be missing, 
with the treatment they could obtain, if they continue, if they at least know that. 
Then I could accept it [treatment refusal]. And I’m talking particularly about 
palliative treatment. As to a cure, I would always be willing to go a bit further and 
possibly involve some colleagues. 
 
Physician 12: Concerning palliative care, you don’t have to be insistent, because 
it’s a matter of your obligation to explain it clearly, and then the patient together 
with his family decides. Concerning a cure, you have to exert pressure. Of course 
it depends on the chance of a cure. 
 
1.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
From hospices and nursing homes, the term ‘palliative’ has been taken over by 
other settings, for example the clinical oncological setting. The use of the term 
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‘palliative’ in clinical oncology is problematic: confusion and misunderstanding may 
arise. We argue that the notion of palliative care, represented by the WHO 
definition, is not applicable as such in clinical oncology. 
In line with Porzsolt and Tannock,5 our findings emphasize that the use of the 
term ‘palliative’ in cancer medicine refers to two approaches: on the one hand, 
pain control and symptom management as described by the WHO definition 
(‘palliative care’), and, on the other hand, non-curative anticancer treatments such 
as chemotherapy, radiotherapy, and surgery (‘palliative oncological treatments’). 
Both approaches appear to be mixed up, whereas, as the present study shows, 
clear differences between the two approaches can be distinguished. These 
differences include: the moment care or treatments are provided, whether care 
and treatments are symptom and/or disease directed, the recognition by patients 
of the goal to preserve or improve quality of life, and the aim to prolong the life of 
the patient. 
In clinical oncology, different terminologies have been used to describe 
anticancer treatments that are not cure-directed.5,14-17 In addition, various 
definitions have been used to indicate the goals of palliative oncological 
treatments.5-8 All these definitions emphasize other aspects of the treatment goals. 
Diversity in treatment goals and effects make the use of the term ‘palliative’ in 
clinical oncology disputable. ‘Palliative’ is sometimes used to indicate less 
aggressive treatments. Palliative therapy is not always given to ameliorate quality 
of life or to treat embarrassing symptoms. Instead, patients may be treated with 
palliative means, while they have no symptoms at all. Patients in advanced stages 
of their disease, who receive palliative treatment, will in fact encounter additional 
symptoms (toxicity), and not always only transient. Palliative treatments are initially 
often associated with worsening conditions (nausea, fatigue, etc.). Furthermore, 
an initial antitumour response does not always mean an increase in life 
expectancy. Finally, palliative therapy sometimes means mainly therapy with a low 
response rate or without complete responses. 
Ahmedzai stated that most contemporary views, including the WHO definition, 
depend on the identification of a ‘critical transition’ between curative and palliative 
care.18 He argued that often no critical moment of transition exists and ‘curative’ 
usually means life-prolonging. We observed that, concerning situations in which 
 33
Chapter 1 
patients refuse a recommended oncological treatment, this distinction indeed 
seems to be problematic. After treatments with palliative intention, sometimes 
long-survivors have been found, and after therapy with a curative goal patients 
may die because of progressive or recurrent cancer. Moreover, the same 
anticancer treatments can be given to patients with palliative or curative intentions, 
which may be rather unclear for both patients and physicians. Some physicians 
point to the curative/palliative separation as a grey area. At the same time the 
distinction between curative and palliative treatment goals is of crucial importance 
for patients and physicians: it is an indication for patients to know what their 
prognosis is, it influences the grade of toxicity that is acceptable for the physician 
and for the patient, and it influences the extent of pressure physicians will exert to 
persuade patients to be treated as recommended. 
The American Society of Clinical Oncology has emphasized the importance of 
the critical transition point from curative to palliative.19 They recommend that 
oncologists must learn to recognize and respond to the transition point in a 
patient’s care “when disease-oriented anticancer therapy must give way to 
symptom-oriented palliative therapy”.19 We argue that the transition from curative 
to palliative treatment may be obscured when symptom-oriented palliative 
treatments are in fact tumour-directed. Often, the doctor knows very well what he 
or she means using the word palliative (= low or zero chance of cure). However, 
the word ‘palliative’ may be interpreted in a more favourable way by patients or 
their family. The et al., for instance, described the confusion among patients with 
advanced small cell lung cancer who received tumour-directed chemotherapy, 
although cure was no longer possible.15 These patients developed a false 
optimism about the success of their chemotherapy, because on the X-rays they 
saw that the tumour vanished. The distance between doctors and patients when 
interpreting the value of a certain therapy becomes greater when the therapy 
generates some initial success. The patient may be inclined to see this as a signal 
towards potential cure – maybe despite earlier warning by the oncologist – 
whereas the doctor knows that success will be transient mostly, because of 
acquired resistance. 
In clinical oncology, the term ‘palliative’ is used to indicate non-curative, 
tumour-directed treatments that may have side effects. The contamination of the 
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term ‘palliative’ with the inflicted symptoms of toxicity of oncological treatments 
and possible worsening conditions of quality of life is problematic. The term 
‘palliative’ is connected with the WHO definition of palliative care, which states that 
treatment or care is directed to relieve symptoms. If we want to define an 
oncological treatment as palliative, then side effects endangering quality of life 
should be avoided. Although a non-curative oncological treatment may be 
palliative, to forego miscommunication, goals should be called non-curative. 
Patients have an interest in knowing whether their oncological treatment has a 
curative or a non-curative goal. Clarification about treatment goal may also be of 
crucial importance for communication with other professionals. General 
practitioners and oncologists are inclined to refer to different interpretations of the 
term ‘palliative’. General practitioners primarily refer to palliative care as described 
by the WHO definition, whereas a majority of the oncologists refers to palliative 
anticancer treatments. To forgo miscommunication between professionals from 
different disciplines, but also within one discipline, we believe that we should not 
use various definitions of the term ‘palliative’. Therefore, we propose to reserve the 
term ‘palliative care’ for care that is directed to pain, nausea, fatigue, dyspnoea, 
diarrhoea, for example, for symptom therapy. When referring to anticancer 
treatments in the clinical oncological practice, we propose to distinguish between 
treatments with curative and non-curative goals. The above-described 
clarifications in the use of the term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology may help 
professionals in their practice and it may serve to forgo miscommunication with 
patients and other professionals, intra- and interdisciplinary. 
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2 Physicians’ evaluations of patients’ decisions to refuse 
oncological treatment 
 
The objective of the study was to gain insight into the standards of rationality that 
physicians use when evaluating patients’ treatment refusals. A qualitative study design 
with in-depth interviews was applied. The study sample included 30 patients with cancer 
and 16 physicians (oncologists and general practitioners). All patients had refused a 
recommended oncological treatment. 
Patients base their treatment refusals mainly on personal values and/or experience. 
Physicians mainly emphasize the medical perspective when evaluating patients’ treatment 
refusals. From a medical perspective, a patient’s treatment refusal based on personal 
values and experience is generally evaluated as irrational and difficult to accept, 
especially when it concerns a curative treatment. Physicians have different attitudes 
towards non-curative treatments and have less difficulty accepting a patient’s refusal of 
these treatments. Thus, an important factor in the physician’s evaluation of a treatment 
refusal is whether the treatment refused is curative or non-curative. 
Physicians mainly use goal-oriented and patients mainly value-oriented rationality, but 
in the case of non-curative treatment refusal, physicians give more emphasis to value-
oriented rationality. A consensus between the value-oriented approaches of patient and 
physician may then emerge, leading to the patient’s decision being understood and 
accepted by the physician. The physician’s acceptance is crucial to his or her attitude 
towards the patient. It contributes to the patient’s feeling free to decide, and being 
understood and respected, and thus to a better physician-patient relationship. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
When a patient decides to refuse a recommended oncological treatment, the 
physician is faced with questions about the background of this decision, the 
patient’s arguments, the acceptability of the decision, and the patient’s role in the 
decision-making process. The physician has to evaluate the patient’s decision: is it 
sensible, responsible, and judicious? Often the evaluation is then directed to the 
question: is the patient’s decision rational or not?1,2 The actual standards of 
rationality in these cases, however, are not clear. The question therefore arises: 
on what basis do physicians distinguish between their patients’ rational and 
irrational arguments? 
In medical-ethical literature, rationality is described in various ways. Rational 
choice has, for example, been described as the choice that maximizes expected 
utility or that satisfies the patient’s aims and values most.1 In other cases, having 
‘good reasons’ is at the centre of the evaluation of rationality.2-4 Savulescu and 
Momeyer state that “It is rational for a person to perform some act if there would 
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be a good reason to perform that act if the facts were as he/she believes them to 
be.”2 A pilot study revealed that a physician’s evaluation of the rationality of the 
patient’s decision is crucial to their attitude towards the patient: if a physician 
thinks the patient’s refusal is not based on good reasons, he or she is often 
inclined to consider the decision as irrational and will keep trying to convince the 
patient to accept the treatment.4 The evaluation of ‘good reasons’, however, raises 
another question: what makes a reason a good reason: ‘good’ in a medical 
context, ‘good’ in a patient context, or ‘good’ in both? 
The purpose of this chapter is to gain insight into the standards of rationality 
used by physicians. We focus on two aspects of this issue: firstly, we describe 
what is meant in daily medical practice by rational decision making and discuss 
what physicians understand by ‘good reasons’ to refuse recommended oncological 
treatment. Secondly, we discuss what motivates a patient to refuse a treatment 
and how this is communicated to their physician. 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
The present study is based on in-depth interviews with patients and physicians. All 
patients had refused a recommended oncological treatment. In this study refusal 
meant the patient did not start treatment at all; or stopped during treatment; or 
refused a part of a recommended treatment but accepted another (for example, 
accepted surgery but refused chemotherapy). A qualitative research method was 
adopted to explore patients’ deliberations that led to refusal of a recommended 
oncological treatment and to determine physicians’ evaluations of the treatment 
refusals. The study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committees at the study 
sites. All patients gave written informed consent. 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
 
Patients who have refused an oncological treatment are difficult to enrol for a 
research sample.4 One reason may be that after their refusal, they have withdrawn 
from the medical circuit and are therefore not easy to approach. Another reason 
may be that after their withdrawal, patients no longer want to be involved in 
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medical research, either because they do not want to be confronted by hospitals or 
doctors again or because they are too ill to be interviewed. The patients included 
in this study form a rather unique sample and deserve our gratitude. 
A total of 30 patients (mean age 58 years, range 23-91) were interviewed. 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients 
included in the present study (n=30) 
 
n (%) 
 
 
Gender 
Male       12 (40) 
Female       18 (60) 
 
Marital status 
Single/divorced, widowed    13 (43) 
Married/registered partnership    17 (57) 
 
Education 
Primary school/lower level secondary school    9 (30) 
Middle level secondary school      6 (20) 
Advanced professional/university   15 (50) 
 
Cancer diagnosis 
Breast       11 (37) 
Gastroenterological       8 (27) 
Urological        3 (10) 
Gynaecological        2   (7) 
Pulmonary        2   (7) 
Haematological        2   (7) 
Other         2   (7) 
 
 
The inclusion criteria were: (a) age more than 18 years; (b) able to speak and 
understand Dutch; (c) having cancer; (d) life expectancy of more than three 
months; and (e) having refused a recommended oncological treatment. The 
patients were asked to participate by general practitioners (n=5) and by specialists 
in a university hospital (n=6) or in general hospitals (n=2) in the Netherlands. 
Dutch associations for patients with cancer were willing to spread information 
about the study. Patient members of these associations (n=17) responded 
themselves to the call to participate. All patients recruited by the physicians or 
those who responded themselves between January 2001 and April 2002 were 
included in the study if they met the inclusion criteria. We included both patients 
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who had refused a recommended treatment with higher potential benefit (curative 
treatment, n=10) and patients who had refused a recommended treatment with 
lower potential benefit (non-curative treatment, n=20). 
A total of 16 physicians were interviewed from among the physicians who 
recruited the patients. Eight general practitioners (50%) and eight (general) 
oncologists (50%) were selected, including younger and older (mean age 49 
years, range 29-60), male (n=11, 69%) and female (n=5, 31%) physicians with few 
to many years of working experience (mean 18 years, range 2-29), and from 
different settings (general practice, university hospital, and general hospital). The 
interviews were carried out between May and October 2002. 
 
2.2.2 Interview procedure 
 
Each patient interview was carried out at the patient’s home. Each interview lasted 
between 60 and 120 minutes. We used in-depth interview techniques, that is, the 
interviews contained some general topics and no close-ended questions.5 The 
interview topics covered demographic and clinical characteristics of the patient; 
the course of the disease; communication with physicians about the recommended 
treatment; the patient’s attitude to the recommended treatment; and the patient’s 
perspectives of the future. The interview topics were formulated after examining 
the relevant literature and undertaking preliminary observational studies. In these 
studies, 72 patients were observed during their visits to five different oncologists at 
an oncological outpatient clinic in the Netherlands. From the transcripts, various 
aspects of the discussion between physician and patient about recommendations 
for treatment were noted and converted into interview topics. 
Each physician was interviewed at his or her office. Each interview lasted 
between 30 and 60 minutes. The in-depth interview topics covered the 
characteristics of the physician; working experience; curative versus non-curative 
treatment and palliative care in oncology; the physician-patient relationship, 
especially concerning treatment decisions; patient autonomy; physician’s 
beneficence; and treatment refusals and their rationality. At the end of the 
interview, the medical history of one patient who participated in the study was 
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presented as a case (see Box 1), and the physicians were asked to give their 
opinion about the rationality of the patient’s decision. 
 
Box 1 The case of Mrs S. 
 
 
Mrs S. is 54 years old. After a period of fever and pneumonia, she was 
diagnosed as having bronchial carcinoma (non-small cell lung cancer in 
the upper right pulmonary lobe). The attending physician recommended 
surgery in which part of the lung would be removed (lobectomy). Mrs S. 
decided to refuse the recommended surgery. 
 
Mrs S.: I was afraid, and this fear was based on the mediastinoscopy [a 
diagnostic procedure carried out behind the sternum in the upper part of the 
chest cavity, which she recently had undergone, TvK]. I awoke when I was still 
in the operating room. I think something was not timed very well. A tube was 
still in my throat. I don’t know if the tube was in my trachea or in my throat. I 
don’t know, but I heard someone say that the surgery had been successful. 
And I was choking, I pulled out the tube and immediately afterwards I was 
transferred to the recovery room and there, for one and a half hours, I had 
terrible shortness of breath. I really thought I would suffocate.  
At that moment I thought: what if I had to undergo such a lobectomy? Then 
I would be in intensive care for three or four days. What if I keep getting that 
suffocating feeling. I know that they may make it technically possible for me 
not to really suffocate, but the feeling is terrible. I took three days to reflect on 
that, and then I decided for myself, no surgery. I am afraid. It is fear, fear of 
the surgery and what may come afterwards. 
2.2.3 Analysis 
 
All the patient and physician interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. A 
descriptive qualitative approach was used to analyse the interviews.6 During the 
analysis, we used computer software (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text management, 
including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, and words. Each 
interview was divided into several segments. The segments were coded and the 
codes were organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. A second 
independent researcher supervised the process of data management. 
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2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 A medical perspective 
 
Mrs S.’s case (see Box 1) was presented to all the physicians in the study. They 
were asked whether they would judge her decision as rational or as irrational. 
 
Physician 1: If it is related to previous communication breakdown combined with 
an enormous amount of fear thus preventing the patient from forming a good idea 
of what that cancer can do if it is not treated, and no good decisions are made, 
then I find it irrational. Or at least something I would try to change. 
 
Physician 2: Well, those experiences, if they are based somehow on facts that I 
can verify, I could find that rational. But when I have the feeling that it is not 
based on facts, I find it very irrational. 
 
The physician interviews revealed that physicians mainly emphasize the medical 
perspective when evaluating what are good reasons, and thus, what is rational. 
This perspective consists of a consistent system of terminologies, deliberations, 
and expressions that are common in medical practice. The physicians indicated 
that if a patient’s refusal was based on reasons related to the kind of tumour, the 
prognosis, and/or the side effects of the treatment, they were rather inclined to 
evaluate these reasons as good reasons and to accept the refusal. Moreover, the 
physicians felt that rational arguments are related to those reasons that are 
scientifically proved, such as the chance of the treatment being effective or gaining 
medical benefit. If a patient refuses oncological treatment because he or she does 
not want to experience the side effects, a physician judges this decision to be 
rational if side effects are indeed expected to occur. 
 
Physician 3: If the chance of effectiveness is small and the price one has to pay 
is high with regard to side effects, I can imagine someone saying, ‘It is not worth 
all the trouble and at this moment I have few complaints, thus why should I?’ I 
find that a rational argument. 
 
A significant factor in the physician’s evaluation of a patient’s decision is the phase 
of the patient’s disease; the distinction between the curative and palliative phases 
of the disease and treatment processes plays an important role in a physician’s 
evaluation and acceptance of a patient’s refusal for treatment. 
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Physician 4: Well, if patients could just really realize what they may be missing, 
with the treatment they could get, if they continue, if they at least know that. Then 
I could accept it [treatment refusal]. And I’m talking particularly about palliative 
treatment. As to a cure, I would always be willing to go a bit further and possibly 
involve some colleagues. 
 
2.3.1.1 Curative treatment 
 
The interviews revealed that when a physician thinks there is a reasonable chance 
of cure, a patient’s treatment refusal is often judged as irrational and is difficult to 
accept for the physician. Physicians evaluate the decision to accept or to refuse a 
recommended oncological treatment as a decision about life or death: when the 
patient refuses treatment, he or she chooses for disease progression, with a 
greater chance of dying from the disease. They consider the decision to refuse 
curative oncological treatment out of proportion. From a physician’s point of view, 
the consequences of the decision are enormous and cannot be compared with the 
possible side effects of the treatment. In other words, according to the physician, 
the benefits are much greater than the price the patient has to pay. 
 
Physician 4: Those tubes [of Mrs S.], I do not find that rational. It is not such a big 
problem compared to the fact that she can remain alive. The patient does not see 
the right relation between the proportions [sic!]. It’s like when you say that your 
cat will be alone for one day, that has no relation to what you can gain from it 
[treatment]. 
 
Age also seems to play a role in the physician’s evaluation of the patient’s refusal 
of curative treatment. Physicians find it easier to accept a treatment refusal by an 
older patient than a younger patient. 
 
Physician 5: Concerning chemotherapy, which can also cure the elderly, I can 
imagine some people would not want that. I would agree to not giving 
chemotherapy with a curative intention. Concerning young people, I find it hard 
not to offer curative treatment, because that is simply choosing death. In such 
cases I am the attending physician who will try to win someone over. 
 
2.3.1.2 Non-curative treatment 
 
When a physician is of the opinion that cure is no longer an option, the decision of 
a patient to refuse oncological treatment seems easier to accept compared with 
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the situation in which there is a reasonable chance of cure. The appropriateness of 
the decision about non-curative oncological treatment directed at palliation, which 
includes choices about prolonging life as well as quality of life, is perceived 
differently from the decision about curative oncological treatment. The 
consequence of refusing non-curative oncological treatment may be that the 
patient will die a few months earlier, but it is not a matter of life or death. 
Physicians are of the opinion that in the palliative phase the most important thing 
is accurate interpretation of the patient’s wishes, and in these circumstances it is 
the patient who decides what a ‘good’ palliative phase actually means. The 
interviews revealed that physicians find the degree of rationality of patients’ 
arguments less important from a medical perspective when it comes to decisions 
about non-curative treatment compared with decisions about curative treatment: in 
the palliative phase, the best option for the patient is at the forefront, and this 
option does not have to be in agreement with the best medical option. 
 
Physician 4: And when that patient just says, ‘Well, for me it is not a matter of a 
long life, I just want a good quality of life and I just want to do some nice things.’ 
Yeah, I find that a very good reason. 
 
Life expectancy seems to play an important role in the physician’s evaluation and 
acceptance of a patient’s refusal of non-curative treatment. For example, patients 
with breast cancer can receive non-curative treatment for a very long time. A 
patient with a prognosis of a five year palliative phase, could, by her decision to 
refuse treatment, shorten her life by several years. That decision is much more 
difficult for a physician to accept compared with a decision about a palliative phase 
lasting only a few months. In the latter case, refusing oncological treatment could 
mean that instead of, for instance, six months, the patient’s prognosis would be 
three months. 
 
Physician 6: For some treatments, like for metastasised stomach carcinoma, you 
wonder whether or not you should carry it [treatment] out. And if patients say, ‘I 
don’t want it’, I will not say they have to. Regarding breast cancer, I am more 
inclined to convince patients of the usefulness of the treatment, because there 
are some very valuable palliative treatments. (…) The tumours respond very well 
and a very good palliative effect can be attained. As such, the patient’s 
complaints disappear and they will benefit from the treatment for a long time. (…) 
Concerning breast cancer you will try to convince patients, whereas in stomach 
cancer you will try but to a lesser degree. 
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As with refusal of curative treatment, age also seems to play a role in the 
physician’s evaluation of a patient’s decision to refuse non-curative treatment, 
mostly in combination with life expectancy. When it is expected that a 
recommended treatment will prolong a patient’s life for several years, the decision 
of a younger patient to refuse treatment is more difficult to accept than when an 
older patient makes the same decision. If the aim of the recommended non-
curative oncological treatment is to prolong life by several months, the age of the 
patient, that is, whether the decision is made by a younger or an older patient, 
usually does not make a difference to the physician’s acceptance of the decision. 
To illustrate this point, Mrs S.’s case can be used again as an example. As 
revealed by our empirical study, if Mrs S.’s decision concerned curative treatment, 
physicians would find it very hard to accept it: the decision is irrational from a 
medical point of view since it is very unlikely that she would have the same 
experience again. If the decision concerned non-curative treatment, physicians 
would find it easier to accept it, even though Mrs S.’s life expectancy can be 
prolonged by the treatment. In the latter case, the physician is inclined to place 
more emphasis on the patient’s considerations about fear, experiences, and 
personal wishes and desires than on whether their arguments are rational or 
irrational from a medical perspective. 
 
Physician 1: It is irrational, but for her [Mrs S.] it is reality. 
 
Physician 7: Why she [Mrs S.] does it is irrational, but the decision is easy to 
sympathize with, that’s the problem. 
 
From the last quote, it appears that a physician may sometimes experience 
problems when evaluating the patient’s decision. The physician may judge the 
patient’s treatment refusal as irrational since the decision, from a medical point of 
view, is not based on good reasons. The decision is based on emotions and on 
arguments that result from a false impression of things, that is, from earlier 
experiences of the patient that are not likely to occur a second time. At the same 
time, however, the same physician may, from a patients’ perspective, sympathize 
with the decision. 
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2.3.2 The patients’ perspective 
 
The reasons why patients refuse oncological treatment are diverse (Table 2). Both 
medical and personal considerations seem to play a role in the patient’s decision 
to refuse treatment, but personal values and experiences predominate. For 
example, patients may find it important to occupy themselves – painting, playing 
tennis, or walking in the mountains. If the side effects of chemotherapy would 
prevent them from carrying out these activities, the patients in the present study 
indicated that the meaning to their life would be gone and quality of life decreased. 
Our empirical study revealed that patients find quality of life to be very important. It 
was clear that many patients believed that quality of life was incompatible with 
receiving oncological treatment. More than half chose not to be treated because 
they believed that treatment would not result in a better quality of life and would 
only cause side effects and/or increase or induce symptoms. Some patients 
indicated they would rather live for a little lesser time than prolong their lives with 
all kinds of troubles due to treatment. 
 
Patient 1: … my quality of life will diminish when you remove a large part of the 
small intestine. 
 
Patient 2: … nevertheless have a fine life, higher quality of life, without 
chemotherapy. 
 
Patient 3: … that I risked suffering side effects from the “pleasant” radiotherapy 
that actually would diminish my quality of life scared me stiff. 
 
Patient 4: … we can postpone death with chemotherapy. But then, in this period 
of postponement, how will I live? What will my quality of my life be like? Thus, I 
have to give up quality. 
 
For some patients with breast cancer, losing a breast plays an important role in 
their decision to refuse surgery. Such a decision is based on important 
considerations of the patient’s life: keeping her breast may reflect personal values 
such as identity, dignity, and/or integrity. The importance the patient attaches to 
her personal values underlies her refusal for treatment, and, apparently, her 
personal values are so important that she uses them as an argument for a 
decision that may have far-reaching consequences. 
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Table 2 Reasons why patients refuse a recommended oncological treatment 
 
 
  Believe in the body’s own curative possibilities 
  Do not want a stoma 
  Do not want to be ill due to the treatment 
  Do not want to be used as a guinea pig 
  Do not want to enter into menopause, still wanting a child 
  Do not want to fight anymore 
  Do not want to lose a breast 
  Do not want to lose hair 
  Do not want to reach old age with dementia, incontinence, and dependency 
  Do not want to spend valuable time in hospital 
  Have accepted death 
  Have a lot to cope with, want to take time to do that 
  Have already reached old age 
  Have fear of treatment 
  Have no trust in treatment/medical establishment 
  Resist chemotherapy; consider it poison 
  Treatment decreases quality of life 
  Treatment will not result in cure, is only life-prolonging 
  Want to continue playing tennis, making paintings, or walking in the mountains 
  Want to stay in control 
  Want to take own responsibility for themselves 
  Want to work on the initial cause of the cancer, not just removing the symptoms 
 
 
As also revealed in the case of Mrs S., patients’ personal considerations that 
underlie a treatment refusal are often based on earlier experiences or on stories 
and experiences of others. The interviews revealed that most patients referred to 
their own experience or that of others as a source of knowledge as to what they 
can expect from being treated or not. These experiences seem to highly inspire 
patients’ decision making. 
 
Patient 5: Besides, two days before I went to my GP, I had buried my friend who 
had been ill for six years. She had undergone all the standard things and suffered 
horribly. She was groaning with pain when I visited her at the hospital and I found 
it just terrible. (…) Afterwards I buried another friend who was also ill for six 
years. (…) I saw these friends of mine. I saw them suffering. (…) And since I 
have witnessed and seen all of that, I think well then perhaps just let me go, but 
don’t torture me. 
 
Much of the criticism of patients who refused treatment is related to the fact that 
treatment is often offered as the ‘standard treatment’, based on statistics. Our 
patients indicated that they did not recognize themselves in these statistics. 
Moreover, they found it important to be approached as individuals. 
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Patient 6: I think, you can say whatever you like, but of course for them I am only 
a case. And they apply a lot of statistics to it. ‘If we do that, this will happen and 
so many will survive. If we don’t do that, so many will die.’ I think, that’s not how it 
works. I am an individual, I have my history, I have all different kinds of 
perspectives. 
 
When offered treatment as the ‘standard treatment’, some patients feel they are 
not given sufficient room to reflect on the recommended treatment. Personal 
considerations, based on norms and values to which they attach great importance, 
are not allowed to play a role. 
 
Patient 7: You have to get the chance, I think, as a human being, to be allowed to 
reflect on it [treatment], to consider what are the consequences and decide only 
then whether or not you can or want to do it. At that time, that was absolutely not 
the case. That was it, that was standard. (…) But a patient with cancer is his own 
“hands-on” expert and physicians have to pay much more attention to what the 
patient himself experiences. They can learn a lot from their patients, like trying 
not say, ‘This is the European standard, these things make up the treatment and 
that’s what you have to do.’ 
 
2.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our study revealed that when patients decide to refuse a recommended 
oncological treatment, the physician’s perspective may not concur with the 
patient’s perspective. Only few studies have investigated the reasons why patients 
opt for or against treatment. According to Fried et al., the burden of treatment, the 
outcome, and the likelihood of the outcome all influence patients’ treatment 
preferences.7 Slevin et al. described how patients make a cost-benefit assessment 
of chemotherapy before opting for or against radical treatment. Chance of a cure, 
prolonging life, and relief of symptoms were weighed.8 Siminoff and Fetting 
investigated factors affecting treatment decisions in the case of breast cancer. 
They found that patients who did not accept their physician’s treatment 
recommendation weighed benefits of treatment against the probability and severity 
of side effects.9 Studies examining the type of trade-offs patients with early breast 
cancer make between benefits and side effects reveal that women with milder side 
effects (less toxicity) judged smaller benefits worthwhile and that small 
improvements in survival were sufficient to make adjuvant chemotherapy 
worthwhile.10,11 In addition to weighing improvements in survival and side effects, 
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women with dependants and social support judged smaller benefits worthwhile.10 
Our results show that a patient’s decision to refuse recommended oncological 
treatment is not particularly based on weighing the pros and cons of treatment 
from a medical perspective. The decision relies, in particular, on personal values 
and/or experiences, which seem not to be based on a general moral point of view 
but seem to have a circumstantial basis, that is, the patient takes his or her own 
situation, at this very moment, as a starting point. 
From both the medical perspective and the patient’s perspective, good 
reasons can be given for refusing oncological treatment. The two perspectives 
may overlap to some extent, but large parts may not concur. Patients’ treatment 
decisions, which are based on personal values or experiences, most of the time 
fall outside a medical perspective and are judged by physicians as irrational. The 
meaning and use of the term ‘rationality’ from a medical perspective and from a 
patient’s perspective can in our view be described by using the terms ‘goal-
oriented rationality’ (‘zweckrationalität’) and ‘value-oriented rationality’ 
(‘wertrationalität’) as distinguished and defined by Max Weber.12 Goal-oriented 
rationality is directed at effects considering a certain goal. It is part of instrumental 
rationality; the effectiveness of the relation between means and ends is most 
important. Value-oriented rationality is not directed at effects, but at a system of 
values. In our view, the distinction between a medical perspective and a patient’s 
perspective is based on physicians mainly using goal-oriented rationality. 
Physicians have means (medical treatment) to reach a goal (cure the patient, 
prolong survival, or improve the quality of life). They weigh the costs and benefits 
of medical treatments, they opt for the best treatment, and they want to use this 
treatment to help the patient. However, physicians also seem to use value-
oriented rationality, for example, a patient who refuses a medically advisable 
treatment runs against the physician’s feeling of doing well. Similarly, patients also 
seem to use goal-oriented rationality but to a lesser degree. They do consider 
advantages and side effects of treatment, but concerning treatment refusal, they 
mainly use a system of values, that is, they use value-oriented rationality. Thus, 
both seem to use value-oriented as well as goal-oriented rationality but physicians 
put more emphasis on the latter and patients on the former. Moreover, physicians’ 
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value-oriented rationality is based on a general moral point of view (for example, 
doing well), and patients’ value-oriented rationality has a circumstantial basis. 
Nowadays, it is clearly established in medicine, ethics, and law that a 
competent patient has the right to refuse medical treatment. There is no difficulty if 
a patient’s refusal concurs with clinical evaluation, but the issue becomes 
problematic when a patient’s refusal conflicts with medical opinion.13 Physicians 
interpret decisions conflicting with medical opinion mostly as irrational, and 
irrational decisions are difficult to accept. When the patient expresses a non-
rational preference, physicians face a dilemma between their duty to care for a 
patient and respect for patient autonomy, that is, the personal choice of the 
patient. A physician may try to convince their patient to agree with the doctor’s 
viewpoint by discussing medical facts to ensure that the patient understands his or 
her situation. Coercive methods to force the patient to agree, however, easily lead 
to miscommunication and abandonment of the patient. 
We argue that the issue is less problematic if physicians interpret ‘good 
reasons’ to refuse a recommended oncological treatment from both the medical 
and the patient’s perspective based on specific values. This already occurs in the 
case of non-curative treatment. Physicians find it less difficult to accept a patient’s 
treatment refusal of a non-curative treatment even if the refusal is, from a medical 
perspective, based on irrational grounds. Then the physician seems to place more 
emphasis on the patient’s value system. When a physician attempts to see the 
patient’s perspective, this may be enhanced by discussing the physician’s and 
patient’s value-oriented rationality in such a way that the circumstantial basis of 
the patient’s decision is understood. Respecting the patient’s perspective in the 
acceptance of treatment refusal is important for the physician-patient relationship. 
The physician’s acceptance is crucial to his or her attitude towards the patient: if a 
physician does not accept the treatment refusal, he or she is often inclined to 
persist in convincing the patient to accept the treatment.4 This results in patients 
experiencing that they are not really free to make their decisions, leading to 
frustration and miscommunication.14 If a physician does accept a patient’s 
treatment refusal, this will contribute to the patient’s feeling of being free to decide, 
to be understood and respected in his or her decision, and thus contribute to a 
better physician-patient relationship. 
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3 End-of-life attitudes of patients who decide on oncological 
treatment 
 
Patients’ decisions on accepting or refusing oncological treatment are influenced by 
several factors. A factor that needs more understanding concerns the end-of-life attitude 
of the patient. We discuss patients’ attitudes regarding death and dying in relation to their 
treatment decision. 
Thirty patients who refused and 22 patients who accepted oncological treatment were 
interviewed using in-depth interviews. 
Seven end-of-life attitudes were distinguished: fighting death, avoiding death, fearing 
death, fearing dying, making (funeral) arrangements, controlling death, and accepting 
death. A majority of the patients who had refused treatment also accepted death. They 
particularly focused on the end of their life. A majority of the patients who had accepted 
treatment fought against death or avoided death. They focused on how to stay alive and 
how to define life choices. They regarded their treatment as life-prolonging and death-
postponing. Having a social network seemed to be important in accepting treatment. 
Accepting or refusing treatment appeared not to be related to fear of death or fear of 
dying. A desire for euthanasia, however, appeared to be related to fear of dying. Both 
patients who refused and who accepted treatment mentioned euthanasia. Patients 
desired euthanasia because they wanted to stay in control and did not want to be 
dependent on physicians. 
Acceptance or refusal of oncological treatment corresponds to different end-of-life 
attitudes of patients. Knowledge of the end-of-life attitude of a patient in an early stage of 
disease may help physicians to understand patients’ decisions regarding oncological 
treatment. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, patients have tended to move toward an active role in making 
decisions about their medical treatment.1-4 In today’s health care, patients are 
even expected to be involved in decisions about their medical care.5 Although the 
majority of cancer patients accepts primary treatment recommendations, patients 
sometimes refuse recommended oncological treatment. Only a few factors are 
known concerning the influences on the patients’ treatment decision-making 
process. Silvestri et al. described how patient decision making is influenced by 
physicians’ recommendations, faith in God, ability to cure, side effects, and the 
input of relatives.6 Furthermore, Slevin et al. stated that having a terminal illness 
causes a shift in attitude in favour of aggressive treatment: patients with cancer 
are much more likely to opt for radical treatment with minimal chance of benefit 
than people who do not have cancer.7 Weeks et al. studied the influence of 
prognosis on the choice in favour of certain treatments. They concluded that 
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patients who believe that they will survive for at least six months favour life-
extending therapy over comfort care more than those who believe that there is a 
chance that they will not live six months.8 In our study, we observed that patients’ 
earlier experiences and experiences of close others influence the treatment 
decision-making process. Those experiences appeared to be a source of 
knowledge of what can be expected from being treated or not.9 
In literature, another factor that is suggested to be related to patients’ decision 
making concerns the end-of-life attitude of the patient. Quill, for example, 
mentioned a case of a woman with acute myelomonocytic leukaemia who refused 
treatment.10 Quill concluded: “it was extraordinary important to [this woman] to 
maintain control of herself and her own dignity during the time remaining to her. 
When this was no longer possible, she clearly wanted to die”. Quill reported that 
the woman indeed committed suicide. The case reflects an interesting subject that 
needs more investigation: patients’ attitudes regarding death and dying in relation 
to the decision to accept or refuse recommended oncological treatment. In this 
chapter we focus on two aspects: firstly, we describe the end-of-life attitudes as 
mentioned by patients after they had decided to accept or to refuse oncological 
treatment. Secondly, we deal with the question whether or not the end-of-life 
attitudes differ in correspondence with accepting or refusing treatment. In the end 
we pay attention to treatment decisions related to a desire for euthanasia. In the 
Netherlands, euthanasia is a legally accepted option as a last resort at the end of 
life. 
 
3.2 Methods 
 
The present study is based on in-depth interviews with patients. The patients had 
either refused or accepted recommended oncological treatment. In this study, 
refusal means that the patient did not start treatment at all, stopped during 
treatment, or refused a particular part of a treatment while accepting other parts 
(for example, accepted surgery, but refused chemotherapy). The deliberations of 
patients that led to refusal or acceptance of recommended oncological treatment 
have been explored using qualitative research methods. Our study was approved 
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by the Medical Ethics Committees of the study sites. All patients gave written 
informed consent. 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
 
Patients who refuse oncological treatment are difficult to include in a research 
sample.11 One reason may be that after their refusal, they withdraw from the 
medical circuit and are therefore difficult to approach. Another reason may be that 
after their withdrawal, patients no longer want to be involved in medical research, 
either because they do not want to be confronted again with hospitals or doctors, 
or because they are too ill to be interviewed. The patients included in this study 
form a rather unique sample and deserve our gratitude. 
Physicians have approached 47 patients. Thirty-three of these patients were 
included in the study (response rate 70%). Patients were asked to participate by 
general practitioners (npat=5), and by specialists in a university hospital (npat=25) or 
in five general hospitals (npat=3) in the Netherlands. Because physicians indicated 
to believe that most patients who refuse treatment do not visit them anymore, all 
Dutch associations for cancer patients were approached. Dutch associations for 
cancer patients were willing to spread information about the study. Patient 
members of these associations (npat=19) responded themselves to the call to 
participate. The fact that a number of patients were obtained from associations for 
cancer patients may suggest that the patients in the study are not representative 
of the population of patients with cancer. However, most of the patients became 
acquainted with the associations only after they had decided about the oncological 
treatment. Thus, most patients were not members of the associations while they 
made their treatment decision. Our study focuses on this decision-making process. 
A total of 52 patients were interviewed. Inclusion criteria were: being over the 
age of 18, speaking and understanding the Dutch language, having cancer, having 
a life expectancy of more than three months (expected prognosis based on known 
natural history of a given diagnosis), and having refused or accepted 
recommended oncological treatment. All patients recruited by physicians or those 
who responded themselves from January 2001 until March 2003 were included in 
the study if they met the inclusion criteria. Not included were patients who did not 
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respond to the information letter, who indicated that they did not want to 
participate, who withdrew themselves, or for whom the interview appeared to be 
too much of a burden. 
The study is a matched case-control study, i.e. cases (refusers of treatment) 
were enrolled followed by controls (acceptors of treatment) who were selected on 
the basis of similarities to patients in the case group. Selection criteria were: 
gender, age (± 5 years), and comparable tumour type, stage of disease, estimated 
prognosis, treatment history, and treatment recommendation. Two patients who 
had refused oncological treatment other than for breast or gastroenterological 
cancer could not be matched because they had a rare combination of a particular 
tumour type with age and treatment recommendation. One extra patient with 
gynaecological cancer was included to reach data satisfaction. This resulted in 30 
patients who had refused treatment (mean age 53 years, range 20-79) and 22 
patients who had accepted oncological treatment (mean age 58 years, range 23-
91, Table 1). 
We included both patients who had decided about treatment with higher 
potential benefit (curative treatment, npat=17) and patients who had decided about 
treatment with lower potential benefit (non-curative treatment, npat=35). Patients 
who had decided about adjuvant therapies (mostly in the case of breast cancer) 
were categorized in the curative treatment group. Although a treatment decision 
on adjuvant therapy seems not so much comparable with a decision on, for 
example, curative surgery, taking perceived prognosis into account, our study 
revealed that a treatment decision on adjuvant therapy is better comparable with a 
treatment decision on curative treatment than with a decision on non-curative 
treatment. 
Patients recruited by physicians were offered treatments with goals 
determined by the medical information given by the attending physician. For 
patients who responded themselves to the call to participate, treatment goals were 
determined by an independent oncologist and by information from the handbook of 
oncology.12 In our study, for distinguishing different patient groups, we did not take 
the patient’s prognosis into account, because no reliable prognostic indicators are 
available. Instead, we distinguished between the goals of the recommended 
treatments (curative or non-curative). Patients who are facing a cancer diagnosis 
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with curative opportunities may respond differently to their treatment 
recommendation and may have different end-of-life attitudes than patients with 
non-curative opportunities. Therefore, four patient groups were distinguished: 
patients who refused curative treatment (Rc, npat=10), patients who refused non-
curative treatment (Rnc, npat=20), patients who accepted curative treatment (Ac, 
npat=7), or patients who accepted non-curative treatment (Anc, npat=15). 
 
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients who refused curative treatment (Rc, 
npat=10), who refused non-curative treatment (Rnc, npat=20), who accepted curative treatment (Ac, 
npat=7), and who accepted non-curative treatment (Anc, npat=15). Rt = total refusal-group (npat=30); 
At = total acceptance-group (npat=22) 
 
Treatment Refused  Treatment Accepted 
 
Rc Rnc Rt (%Rt/%total) Ac Anc At (%At/%total) 
 
 
Gender 
Male          1 11 12 (40/23)    1   9 10 (45/19) 
Female          9   9 18 (60/35)    6   6 12 (55/23) 
 
Race 
White Dutch         9 19 28 (93/54)    6 15 21 (95/40) 
Other          1   1   2     (7/4)    1   0   1     (5/2) 
 
Marital status 
Single/divorced, widowed      7   6 13 (43/25)    1   2   3   (14/6) 
Married/registered partnership     3 14 17 (57/33)    6 13 19 (86/37) 
 
Children 
No           2   3   5 (17/10)    3   2   5 (23/10) 
Yes (independent)        6 12 18 (60/35)    2   6   8 (36/15) 
Yes (dependent)        2   5   7 (23/13)    2   7   9 (41/17) 
 
Grandchildren 
No           7 12 19 (63/37)    5 10 15 (68/29) 
Yes           3   8 11 (37/21)    2   5   7 (32/13) 
 
Education 
Primary school/lower level high school   5   4   9 (30/17)    3   3   6 (27/12) 
Middle level high school      2   4   6 (20/12)    2   5   7 (32/13) 
Advanced vocational/university     3 12 15 (50/29)    2   7   9 (41/17) 
 
Cancer diagnosis 
Breast          6   5 11 (37/21)    4   3   7 (32/13) 
Gastroenterological       1   7   8 (27/15)    0   5   5 (23/10) 
Urological         1   2   3   (10/6)    1   1   2     (9/4) 
Gynecological         0   2   2     (7/4)    1   2   3   (14/6) 
Pulmonary         0   2   2     (7/4)    0   1   1     (5/2) 
Hematological        1   1   2     (7/4)    1   1   2     (9/4) 
Other          1   1   2     (7/4)    0   2   2     (9/4) 
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3.2.2 Interview procedure 
 
All patients have been interviewed by one interviewer (TvK) either at the patient’s 
home (npat=49) or in the hospital (npat=3). Each interview lasted between 60 and 
120 minutes. We used in-depth interviews. This means that the interviews 
contained some general topics and no close-ended questions.13 The interview 
topics have been formulated on the basis of studies of relevant literature and 
observations. During the observational studies, 72 patients were observed during 
their visits to five different oncologists at an oncological outpatient clinic in the 
Netherlands. Notes were taken concerning the reason why the patient visited the 
oncologist (intake/first visit, control visit after treatment, start/continuation curative 
or palliative treatment), about how a treatment decision was made (initiative by 
physician or patient, interaction physician-patient), and about the aspects coming 
up during the discussions between physician and patient with regard to treatment 
(treatment goal, considerations and deliberations of physician and patient). 
Transcripts from the observations were coded and the codes were 
subsequently organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. The main 
categories were converted into interview topics. To increase objectivity of data 
analysis, two independent researchers supervised the process of converting the 
categories of the observational study into interview topics. The interview topics 
concerned demographic and clinical characteristics of the patient, the course of 
the disease, communication with physicians about treatment, deliberations about 
treatment, attitudes of the patient to treatment, and future perspectives of the 
patient. 
 
3.2.3 Analysis 
 
All the patient interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. A descriptive 
qualitative approach was used to analyse the interviews.14 During the analysis, we 
used computer software based on grounded theory (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text 
management, including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, 
and words. Each interview was divided into several segments. The segments were 
coded and the codes were organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. 
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A second independent researcher supervised this process of data management. 
To define which end-of-life attitudes patients who decided on oncological 
treatments mention, we analysed all the interviews on phrases about the end of 
life. This resulted in over 130 different end-of-life codes. These codes could be 
organized into seven categories. These seven categories reflect the seven end-of-
life attitudes that have been distinguished in the study. 
Demographic characteristics have been analysed using SPSS 11.0. Although 
we strived for comparability of the two patient groups (At and Rt), comparing the 
two groups needs caution. Frequencies are given when presenting demographic 
characteristics of the two patient groups and not significances. For analyses within 
the groups (Rc-Rnc) and for analyses of the seven end-of-life attitudes, 
significances are given using χ2-tests and t-tests. Although these analyses need 
also be approached with caution, because some patients were classified in more 
than one of the seven end-of-life attitude categories, these analyses were helpful 
to indicate how to interpret the results. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Treatment decision and demographic characteristic 
 
Between groups 
Of the patients who accepted treatment (At, npat=22, Table 1), 86% were married 
or had a registered partnership, 41% had dependent children, and 36% had 
independent children compared to respectively 57%, 23%, and 60% of the patients 
who refused treatment (Rt, npat=30). 
 
Within groups 
In the refusal-group (Rt), we observed that chemotherapy was the most refused 
treatment (70%). Furthermore, we observed that in the Rt-group, 67% refused 
non-curative treatment (Rnc) and 33% refused curative treatment (Rc). Curative 
treatment was refused by 50% of the women compared to 8% of the men 
(χ2=5,625 (df=1), p<0,05) and by a minority (18%) of the patients who were 
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married or had a registered partnership compared to 54% of the single, divorced, 
or widowed patients (χ2=4,344 (df=1), p<0,05). 
 
3.3.2 End-of-life attitudes 
 
In the interviews, seven end-of-life attitudes could be distinguished. With end-of-
life attitude we mean the way patients deal with, and think and feel about the end 
of life. Categories were not mutually exclusive, in other words, some patients were 
categorized in only one of the seven end-of-life attitudes, whereas others were 
categorized in more than one end-of-life attitude. We illustrate every end-of-life 
attitude with one quotation of a patient from each patient group (Rc, Rnc, Ac, Anc). 
The number of quotations (one per patient group) is not representative for the 
number of patients per patient group classified in a specific end-of-life attitude 
category. 
(a) Fighting death. Patients who did not want to give up hope, who wanted to fight 
for their lives, who fought to stay alive for their children and/or partner, who did not 
want to rest till they knew they had done everything they could to postpone death. 
 
Patient 1 (Rc): I just wanted to do everything to survive, for my child. 
 
Patient 2 (Rnc): I did not want to die. No, I fought, I kept fighting. I thought, we will 
see where it all will end. 
 
Patient 3 (Ac): I just want to live as long as possible, I mean I’ve got a nine-year-
old son (…) I mean, that boy can’t live without his mother, and I have a husband 
who never wants to lose me. 
 
Patient 4 (Anc): It’s obvious that it is like that, that it [disease] will be terminal, but 
you never know. So I won’t give up hope. I continued to hold on to that 
experimental treatment. 
 
(b) Avoiding death. Patients who did not want to think of or want to talk about 
death and dying, who avoided or denied the subject, who kept busy with living and 
making future plans, who thought they were not going to die, whether or not their 
disease was curable. 
 
Patient 5 (Rc): I just live, and that’s all, nothing more. I live day by day. No, that 
[dying] is not something I think of. Well yes, if it is to happen, then it happens. But 
like I am at this moment, I just do not think of it. 
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Patient 6 (Rnc): That’s not a nice thing to hear and that makes you think, ‘Well, 
yes, but that won’t happen to me, that I’m going to die of that disease, that won’t 
happen to me, that is just not possible.’ (…) But just, that you still have the idea 
that this is not how it feels for me. No, and that’s what you try to keep in mind, the 
feeling deep inside, that it’s not like that. 
 
Patient 7 (Ac): I’ve not … no, not really thought about dying from this disease. But 
I also have the idea that I can’t die from it, from cancer, that you can’t die from it. I 
think that happens when, for example, you have it in your brains or something 
like that. 
 
Patient 8 (Anc): I have to tell you that I have questions to which he [physician] 
gives a fine answer, but that I also bury my head in the sand. I’m not going to ask 
how long I still have to live or something like that, because exactly these things I 
do not want to hear. 
 
(c) Fearing death. Patients who were afraid of the finality of death, who were afraid 
of leaving behind their loved ones and the grief these loved ones might endure. 
 
Patient 9 (Rc): I was so afraid, so nervous, so with the feeling that I was going to 
die. I do fight, but I’ve had a lot of fear. (…) There was one exercise: recognize 
your own death. That I didn’t dare. I pushed away that exercise, pushed away, I 
found that so unpleasant. 
 
Patient 10 (Rnc): I’m afraid of death. I do not want to die. I find it very sad and 
absolute. (…) I think it is just that the candle has been blown out, there is nothing 
left, no consciousness, no soul or mind. 
 
Patient 3 (Ac): When I feel ill, then I’m very afraid of death. I just find, I just find 
that J [son] cannot and may not miss his mother yet. Thus, I find that the worst 
thing, for him. 
 
Patient 11 (Anc): [With death] I cannot cope (…) I want to have support for that, 
because I don’t know what to do. (…) At that moment, the children were the 
decisive factor in saying, ‘I can’t quit now, I can’t say just leave it.’ (…) I saw my 
children and I saw my husband and I thought I have no choice, I have to [undergo 
treatment]. 
 
(d) Fearing dying. Patients who were afraid of the dying process, the pain, and the 
suffering, who feared a slow process and losing control of organs, who feared 
losing dignity. 
 
Patient 12 (Rc): I’ve thought about how it would be to be terminally ill, to be 
bedridden. And I think that I can handle that, except for having a terrible lot of 
pain or being incontinent, as such that I have the feeling that I lose my dignity. 
And I’m not sure whether it is dignity or that it is the feeling of not having control 
of my organs as I would like to have. 
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Patient 13 (Rnc): For me, being death is just being death. (…) And I just accept 
that. (…) Actually I only have fear of that slow process. 
 
Patient 3 (Ac): When I’m feeling very ill, then I think, ‘Well, is this the beginning of 
the end?’ Is this how it will continue or will I feel better in a few days. And when I 
think of dying, then I’m also very afraid. The suffering is where I’m afraid of, that 
appears to me as something terrible. Then I see myself laying in bed and racked 
with pain. No, that seems terrible to me. 
 
Patient 8 (Anc): What I am afraid of is that final part towards death. That I’m not 
groaning with pain or whatever. That it will be a very decent part. 
 
(e) Making (funeral) arrangements. Patients who prepared their own funeral, who 
discussed their preferences regarding funeral, grave, and inheritance with their 
partner and/or children, who laid down arrangements with, for instance, the notary. 
 
Patient 12 (Rc): When I heard I had cancer, I started to make plans and 
concretized this by starting to make a list of all persons who, if I would die, should 
receive a death announcement. 
 
Patient 14 (Rnc): The first thing I set to work on was the whole business around 
the funeral. I already have finished that. I have all arranged that, I do not have to 
think about that anymore. I have selected a grave. Well, just the fact that I do not 
have to think about that anymore. (…) I am just finishing my life. I have designed 
my own death announcement and I have pre-printed it. Sinister but true. 
 
Patient 15 (Anc): I’ve put down everything on paper, I’ve written down everything. 
I’ve consulted my children, I’ve arranged everything for the children, I’ve sorted 
out everything concerning retirement pays, I’ve phoned everybody. As such that it 
is all arranged, that they [family] will not encounter any surprises anymore. 
 
(f) Controlling death. Patients who had discussed with their physician, partner, 
and/or children their wish to stay in control during the last trajectory, who had 
discussed their preferences for euthanasia, who indicated not wanting to suffer 
longer than necessary, and who wanted to conduct their own death. 
 
Patient 16 (Rc): And I have also immediately arranged the euthanasia-certificate. 
(…) I want to choose by myself. If it would all go wrong, that I want to choose the 
moment when, for me, it is not acceptable anymore. That is something I have to 
decide. 
 
Patient 14 (Rnc): I have letting formulated a euthanasia-certificate, I asked for a 
non-treatment card. I have them here in my house. My wife knows more or less 
what I do and do not want and I also consulted my general practitioner. (…) If I 
am on a drip with morphine and that doesn’t help anymore, and I’m screaming 
out of pain, then for me it doesn’t need anymore. (…) What does it make sense. It 
would only mean that it’s getting worse and worse and then it’s finished. Well, 
then I don’t see why I should scream here for two more months. 
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Patient 17 (Ac): And if I’m getting a lot of pain, I just want to have the choice to 
say, ‘It’s been enough.’ I’ve talked with my husband and he knows that at that 
moment I’m not going to find out all kind of things. 
 
Patient 18 (Anc): At a certain moment you think, nice and peacefully fall asleep or 
something like that. We also directly went to the general practitioner to talk with 
him about euthanasia. (…) I want to have a voice in what is going to happen, I 
want to have this till the end, that’s why I talked about euthanasia. 
 
(g) Accepting death. Patients who were aware of the finality of life, whether or not 
their disease was incurable, who accepted death to come, who were finishing their 
lives, who felt they may yield to death. 
 
Patient 19 (Rc): Yeh, you have to live with it. You’re getting old, and you know it 
[that you’re going to die]. I think, just face it! 
 
Patient 13 (Rnc): I had the feeling that saying ‘no’ to CPT11 [chemotherapy] was 
a kind of accepting death. (…) When I decided about CPT11, I thought, how 
strange, it seems as if I said to the death, at least that is how I experienced it, that 
you will die, because you do not take that medicine anymore. Like I have to take 
that medicine, if you want to live you have to take it, and if you want to stop living, 
you do not take it. 
 
Patient 20 (Ac): I’m not afraid of it. I’m not afraid of dying. Everybody is going to 
die, and when, we will see. 
 
Patient 18 (Anc): That [dying] is the first thing you accept, thus I haven’t got so 
much troubles with that. 
 
3.3.3 End-of-life attitudes and treatment decision 
 
Of the patients who refused treatment (npat=30, Table 2), 13% could be classified 
as ‘fighting death’, 27% as ‘avoiding death’, and 53% as ‘accepting death’ 
compared to respectively 41%, 50%, and 23% of the patients who accepted 
treatment (npat=22). Significant differences could be observed between accepting 
and refusing treatment regarding the end-of-life attitudes ‘fighting death’ and 
‘accepting death’. Regarding ‘avoiding death’, a trend could be observed. 
The interviews showed that certain factors related to end-of-life attitudes 
influenced patients’ treatment decision making: most patients who accepted 
treatment did not so much focus on what the end of life would be, like they focused 
rather on how to stay alive and how to define life choices. They were busy with life, 
they wanted to enjoy life as long as it would take, and they said not to be ready to 
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die yet. They accepted treatment because the treatments were thought to be life-
prolonging and death-postponing. 
 
Patient 3 (Ac): You just want to live as long as possible. 
 
Patient 21 (Anc): That possibility, yes you do seize that with both hands, to frolic 
around here on earth a little bit longer. (…) Everybody is going to die at a certain 
moment, but I do not want to die on the age of sixty-three. 
 
Patient 22 (Anc): Actually, I wanted to become healthy again. I was not yet ready 
to die. (…) It was just like; I was not yet ready for it. It is just like; you have the 
possibility, use it [treatment]! 
 
Patient 23 (Anc): I do not think too much in years. In the past I thought, hopefully 
I will still be here next year. That is not the case anymore. I let go of it and I think, 
well we will see if the moment is there. And of course I already made it until here. 
I still want to do a lot of things. I want to continue, I want to continue life, to enjoy 
my children, my husband, and my acquaintances. 
 
Patients who refused treatment, on the other hand, focused more on their end of 
life rather than on how to stay alive and how to define life choices. Some patients 
refused treatment and expected to die because they had not accepted life-
prolonging treatment. Other patients, however, refused treatment because they 
expected to die if they would accept the recommended treatment; they thought the 
treatments were death-hastening with a lot of suffering. The interviews showed 
that experience with death and dying of relatives or close friends, especially 
experience of suffering and pain, influenced patients’ decisions on their own end of 
life. Patients who refused treatment associated these experiences with treatment 
decisions: they did not want to die ‘while shopping from one to another medical 
treatment’. 
 
Patient 16 (Rc): … “an acceptable investment in life-prolonging”. Well, I don’t 
think so. No, because if it would turn out badly, then I don’t want in any case feel 
continuously ill for the remaining years or have pain somewhere because of 
treatment, or the consequences of treatment. (…) No, I don’t think that is 
acceptable. I then prefer to die one or two years earlier, but still feeling 
reasonable. 
 
Patient 13 (Rnc): As such for me it is a very clear consideration: if I could not 
really be cured, and it [treatment] is only life-prolonging – and in what way – what 
kind of a life would I have then, how would I feel, and what would I be able to do? 
 
Patient 24 (Rnc): … I stated in advance that I only want to let these things be 
done that will not affect my quality of life. Thus, I absolutely don’t want that – and 
chemotherapy would be part of this – for three months you’ve been miserable, to 
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gain three months of life. Then I would lose in my good time and gain in my bad 
time. 
 
Table 2 Frequencies in end-of-life attitudes of patients who refused curative treatment (Rc, 
npat=10), who refused non-curative treatment (Rnc, npat=20), who accepted curative treatment (Ac, 
npat=7), and who accepted non-curative treatment (Anc, npat=15). Rt = total refusal-group (npat=30); 
At = total acceptance-group (npat=22). χ2 is given comparing Rt and At. 
 
Total Rc Rnc Rt (%Rt) Ac Anc At (%At) χ2, p  
(df=1) 
 
 
Fighting death    13    2   2   4 (13)    2   7   9  (41) 5,147* 
 
Avoiding death    19    3   5   8 (27)    6   5 11  (50) 2,980# 
 
Fearing death       9    1   4   5 (17)    1   3   4  (18) 0,020ns 
 
Fearing dying       8    1   3   4 (13)    1   3   4  (18) 0,229ns 
 
Making (funeral) arrangements   8    2   3   5 (17)    0   3   3  (14) 0,090ns 
 
Controlling death    17    4   6 10 (33)    2   5   7  (32) 0,013ns 
 
Accepting death    21    6 10 16 (53)    2   3   5  (23) 4,938* 
 
* p < 0,05; # p < 0,10 
 
3.3.4 End-of-life attitudes and demographic characteristics 
 
In Table 3, demographic characteristics of patients categorized as ‘fighting death’, 
‘accepting death’ and ‘avoiding death are given. The focus is on ‘fighting death’ 
and ‘accepting death’ because for these two end-of-life attitudes significant 
differences could be observed between accepting and refusing treatment (see 
Table 2). In addition, the focus is on ‘avoiding death’, because for this end-of-life 
attitude a trend could be observed between accepting and refusing treatment. 
No significant differences in mean age of the patients between the different 
end-of life attitudes could be determined. Significant differences could be observed 
for the end-of-life attitude fighting death: (1) between married patients and single, 
divorced or widowed patients, and (2) between patients without children and 
patients with independent or dependent children. 
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Table 3 Demographic characteristics of patients categorized as ‘fighting death’ (nela=13), ‘accepting 
death’ (nela=21), and ‘avoiding death’ (nela=19) 
 
           fighting  accepting avoiding 
           death  death  death  
 
 
Mean age         54   58,67  56,05  
           (sd=8,04) (sd=15,08) (sd=15,24) 
 
Gender 
Male (npat=22)         23%   32%   27% 
Female (npat=30)        27%   47%   43% 
 
Marital status 
Single/divorced, widowed (npat=16)    0%   56%   38% 
Married/registered partnership (npat=36)   36%*1  33%   36% 
 
Children 
No (npat=10)         0%   40%   40% 
Yes (independent) (npat=26)      27%   46%   31% 
Yes (dependent) (npat=16)      38%*2  31%   44% 
 
Education 
Primary school/lower level high school (npat=15)  40%   40%   47% 
Middle level high school (npat=13)     15%   54%   46% 
Advanced vocational/university (npat=24)   21%   33%   25% 
 
*1 (χ2=7,704 (df=1), p<0,05); *2 (χ2=4,718 (df=2), p<0,05) 
 
3.3.5 End-of-life attitudes and euthanasia 
 
Euthanasia was mentioned by patients in all of the four treatment groups 
(categorized as ‘controlling death’, Table 2). Demographic characteristics of the 
patients categorized as ‘controlling death’ are given in Table 4. No significant 
differences could be observed.  
The interviews showed that patients desired euthanasia because they wanted 
to stay in control and did not want to be dependent on physicians during a 
treatment process. Patients wanted to take their fate into their own hands and 
responsibility for their last phase of life. They preferred not ‘to get old, ill, and 
demented’, rather they wanted to choose their own moment and way of death. 
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Table 4 Demographic characteristics of patients categorized as 
‘controlling death’ (nela=17) 
 
           controlling 
           death  
 
 
Mean age         55,35  
           (sd=11,77) 
 
Gender 
Male (npat=22)         36% 
Female (npat=30)        30% 
 
Marital status 
Single/divorced, widowed (npat=16)    31% 
Married/registered partnership (npat=36)   33% 
 
Children 
No (npat=10)         40%  
Yes (independent) (npat=26)      35% 
Yes (dependent) (npat=16)      25% 
 
Education 
Primary school/lower level high school (npat=15)  20% 
Middle level high school (npat=13)     23% 
Advanced vocational/university (npat=24)   46% 
 
 
We compared patients’ desires for euthanasia with the other end-of-life attitudes 
(Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Frequencies in desire for euthanasia (npat=17) or not (npat=35) related to end-of-life 
attitudes 
 
total desire for  no desire for 
euthanasia  euthanasia  χ2, p 
n (%)   n (%)   (df=1) 
 
 
Fighting death     13    3 (18)   10 (29)   0,728ns 
 
Avoiding death     19    3 (18)   16 (46)   3,887* 
 
Fearing death        9    2 (12)     7 (20)   0,542ns 
 
Fearing dying        8    6 (35)     2   (6)   7,691** 
 
Making (funeral) arrangements    8    5 (29)     3   (9)   3,818# 
 
Accepting death     21    9 (53)   12 (34)   1,654ns 
 
** p < 0,01; * p < 0,05; # p < 0,10 
 
 73
Chapter 3 
The results revealed that 35% of the patients who desired euthanasia feared 
dying, 18% avoided death, and 29% had made (funeral) arrangements compared 
to respectively 6%, 46%, and 9% of the patients who did not desire euthanasia. No 
significant differences could be observed for the end-of-life attitudes ‘fighting 
death’, ‘fearing death’, and ‘accepting death’. 
 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The objective of this study has been to evaluate patients’ attitudes regarding death 
and dying in relation to decisions to refuse or accept recommended oncological 
treatment. We used a qualitative approach to investigate which motives underlie 
patients’ decisions. Seven end-of-life attitudes were distinguished: fighting death, 
avoiding death, fearing death, fearing dying, making (funeral) arrangements, 
controlling death, and accepting death. These seven end-of-life attitudes appeared 
to be in line with attitudes described by several quantitative instruments that 
measure death attitude: the Death Attitude Profile-Revised15, the Multidimensional 
Fear of Death Scale16, and the Coping with Death Scale17. In addition, ‘controlling 
death’ is a known terminology in the context of the euthanasia debate18,19 and 
terminologies such as ‘fight against the tumour’20, ‘fighting cancer’21, ‘fight for 
life’22, and ‘fighting death’23 are used to describe patients who fight against death 
or physicians who fight for their patients. Thus, the end-of-life attitudes 
distinguished in our study are confirmed by literature, but they have never been 
qualitatively categorized or put together for cancer patients who decide on 
oncological treatments. As our results show, a qualitative approach can give a rich 
understanding of patients’ attitudes and strengthens the interpretation made about 
them: considerations and deliberations of patients related to treatment decision 
making come to the surface, end-of-life attitudes can more precisely be defined 
using quotations, and factors related to end-of-life attitudes can be distinguished. 
From our study it can be concluded that end-of-life attitudes play a role in 
decision-making processes regarding accepting or refusing oncological treatment: 
a majority of the patients who had refused treatment also accepted death. They 
particularly focused on the end of their life. A majority of the patients who had 
accepted treatment fought against death or avoided death. They focused on how 
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to stay alive and how to define life choices. Differences in end-of life attitude could 
not be related to the age of the patients. Our study suggests that having a social 
network is an important factor in the decision-making process: first, being married 
or having a registered partnership and having dependent children were more 
frequently associated with accepting oncological treatment than with refusing 
treatment. As a matter of fact, the results show that it is important to distinguish 
between having dependent and having independent children: patients who refused 
treatment were more likely to have independent children, whereas patients who 
accepted treatment were more likely to have dependent children. Second, we 
found that only a few patients who were married or had a registered partnership 
refused curative treatment compared to single, divorced, or widowed patients. And 
third, being married and having children seemed to be related to the end-of-life 
attitude ‘fighting death’: patients were motivated in their fight against death by their 
social network. The fear of leaving behind their loved ones caused that most 
patients accepted treatment because they wanted to postpone death. A few 
patients who indicated to fight against death, on the contrary, did not accept 
treatment because they expected that accepting treatment would worsen their own 
condition and would hasten death. Interestingly, patients who fight against death 
seem to have different ways of fighting: for most patients fighting is related with 
accepting treatment, but for some with refusing treatment. The latter group of 
patients indicated to be afraid of the side effects and suffering caused by 
treatment; fear that could have been developed by earlier experiences of the 
patient him or herself, or by experiences seen with others. Although the interviews 
suggest that this fear is part of the end-of-life attitude ‘fearing dying’, we found no 
strong relationship between fear of dying and accepting or refusing a treatment. 
The results suggest, however, that fear of dying, which according to our results 
includes fear of pain and suffering, is related to a desire for euthanasia. Many 
studies report that pain itself is not a major determinant of interest in or use of 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide24-30, whereas suffering is.25 A distinction 
between pain and suffering made by Van der Wal et al.25 could not be confirmed in 
our study: patients indicated fear of pain as part of their fear of suffering. We 
stipulate a difference between fear of pain and suffering and actual ratings of pain 
and suffering. In our opinion, good (palliative) care can offer relieve of pain and 
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suffering using medical techniques, leading to patients feeling physically 
comfortable. However, decreasing fear of pain and suffering asks for more than a 
medical technical solution; this needs an exploration of patients’ ideas about the 
last part of their lives and of the information the patient has received about the 
possibilities to relieve pain and suffering. 
It should be noted that we did not investigate actual requests for euthanasia, 
but early desires for euthanasia. Patients deliberately discussed their treatment 
decision and reported to have a future desire for euthanasia, although they were 
not yet in a terminal stage of their disease. The study suggests that patients desire 
euthanasia because they want to stay in control and do not want to be dependent 
on physicians. In the Quill-case, as described in the introduction, the patient’s wish 
to stay in control seemed to be reflected in both the decision to refuse oncological 
treatment and in the patient’s wish for hastened death. We, however, did not 
observe a relationship between treatment refusal or acceptance and a desire for 
euthanasia: both, in the group of patients who refused and who accepted 
treatment there was a comparable percentage of patients who desired euthanasia. 
From a survey in England, Seale et al. concluded that besides having cancer, 
being of higher social class and not being mentally confused are independently 
predictive of full open awareness of dying. Additionally, these individuals are more 
likely to have spoken of their desires for euthanasia.18 We could not observe a 
strong relationship between educational levels and end-of-life attitudes, although 
for patients who desired euthanasia, the percentage of patients with high 
educational levels was around twice as high as for patients with middle or low 
educational levels. With regard to the mental state of patients as mentioned by 
Seale, measures of depression and psychological distress could be interesting in 
follow-up research on end-of-life attitudes. Previous studies investigating the 
associations between the desire for death and major depression have indicated 
the existence of an association.26,29,31,32 A study of Akechi et al., however, did not 
reveal an independent association between major depression and suicidal 
ideation. They argued that psychological distress, rather than a clinical diagnosis 
of major depression, is a more important indicator.33 
In addition to measuring depression and psychological distress, it would be 
interesting to investigate how end-of-life attitudes change over time. Our study 
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describes end-of-life attitudes of patients at just one moment in their disease 
process. But since among dying patients the will to live shows substantial 
fluctuations,34,35 death attitudes may change over time, especially when patients 
suffer from a progressive terminal disease.26,28 Goodall described how three of her 
good friends died and how she saw their attitudes change: denial changed into 
restlessness, suicidal thought changed into an acceptance of palliative medication, 
and depression lifted.23 These descriptions suggest a chronological and 
presumably mutually exclusive progression of end-of-life attitudes in relationship to 
one another. In addition, Jones et al. found that a desire for hastened death in 
cancer patients was incrementally related to the stage of disease.32 It would be 
interesting to investigate whether there indeed exists a chronological relationship 
between progression of disease and end-of-life attitudes of patients who decide on 
oncological treatment or whether a relationship that allows a more fluid 
progression or waxing and waning of attitudes could be more in tune than a 
chronological one. 
Our study stresses the importance of discussing patient norms and values, 
including end-of-life attitudes, not only in the terminal stage of a patient’s disease, 
but already in earlier stages of the disease and treatment process. In all these 
stages patients make important treatment decisions that may be influenced by 
their ideas on the end of life. In medical practice, the generally accepted model 
underlying treatment decision making begins with a set of clinical circumstances 
and choices. The perception of chances of improvement and sometimes also the 
underlying values then would inform attitudes that guide ultimate decision making. 
We suggest that more reflective attention is needed for the end-of-life attitudes of 
patients. Physicians’ attention for philosophical questions about the end of life may 
help to understand a patient’s treatment decision, including refusal of oncological 
treatment. 
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4 The medical practice of patient autonomy and cancer 
treatment refusals: a patients’ and physicians’ perspective  
 
The idea that patients should take up an autonomous position in the decision-making 
process is generally appreciated. However, what patient autonomy means in the case of 
patients who refuse a recommended oncological treatment has not been investigated. 
This study aims to clarify how the concept of patient autonomy can be applied to patients 
who refuse a recommended oncological treatment. Focus questions are: (1) what is 
meant by patient autonomy, i.e. how is this autonomy conceptualized and (2) which 
factors influence patient autonomy. A qualitative study design with in-depth interviews was 
performed. The study sample included 30 cancer patients and 16 physicians. All patients 
had refused a recommended oncological treatment. 
Patient autonomy was revealed to be a comprehensive concept with elaborations on 
‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’ as sub-concepts of patient autonomy. In 
contrast to what is generally believed, decisions of patients to refuse an oncological 
treatment do not so much rely on the medical information about disease and treatment 
options, but are rather inspired by patients’ own experiences or those of close others. The 
medical information and the role of the physician do, however, influence patients’ 
experiences of being free and/or of having a choice. The results show that the extent of 
pressure physicians will exert to persuade the patient to be treated as recommended 
depends on the medical distinction between a curative and a non-curative treatment goal. 
It seems that there exists a shift in respecting patient autonomy, which depends on factors 
like treatment goal. Discussing the respect shift may serve to clarify underlying thoughts 
and principles in the decision-making process for both physicians and patients. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Decision making about adequate cancer treatment has long been an asymmetrical 
process. The physician used his or her skills and knowledge to choose the best 
optional treatments for his or her patient. During the last two decades, it has 
become usual that patients play a more active and autonomous role. Concepts like 
patient autonomy and informed consent have been used to balance physicians’ 
dominance in medical decision making. 
 
4.1.1 Patient autonomy 
 
Nowadays, patient autonomy is of fundamental importance in health care and 
medical ethics. Autonomy is considered to be one of the leading principles of 
medical ethics. At the same time, conceptual confusion and uncertainty continues 
to surround the actual concept of autonomy.1 In medical ethics, different meanings 
have been attached to the concept. Some theories have featured autonomous 
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choice with dominance on self-determination,2,3 while others have questioned this 
conception of autonomy and have stressed a more relational conception.4-7 
According to Feinberg, autonomy can be used to refer to a capacity, an actual 
condition, a character ideal, and a right to sovereign authority.8,9 In addition, 
theories about patient autonomy referring to authenticity10 or identity11 have been 
developed. As Schermer has described: “autonomy is best understood as an 
umbrella notion that can cover different aspects”.1 
 
4.1.2 Informed consent 
 
Central to the interpretation of patient autonomy in clinical practice is the notion of 
informed consent. Informed consent can be defined as the autonomous 
authorisation of a medical intervention by a patient.1 According to Faden and 
Beauchamp, this authorisation is autonomous if it is given intentionally, with 
understanding, and without controlling influences.12 The medical information 
patients receive, is thought to determine patient autonomy in the decision-making 
process. The disclosure of information has even been assumed to be necessary 
for autonomous decision making.2,13 
Laws have been introduced to ensure greater patient control and to reduce 
dominance of physicians, such as the Patient Self-Determination Act in the USA 
(enacted in 1991) or the Dutch Self-Determination Act (WGBO) in 1995.14 
According to the latter act, the physician has to inform the patient before a 
treatment is started. After being informed by a medical expert, the patient can 
make a well-informed and deliberate treatment decision.14,15 If a physician treats a 
patient without having informed consent, this can, according to the Dutch Civil 
Code, be designated as wrongful act for which the physician is liable. 
The relationship between the disclosure of medical information and the 
decision made by the patient has been the subject of many studies.16-20 From 
these studies it appears that patients’ preferences for medical information do not 
automatically imply an autonomous role in the decision-making process.16-18,20 
Followfield even argues that when discussing treatment options, a clear distinction 
needs to be made between patients’ preferences for information and their desire 
for participation in decision making.20 
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4.1.3 Treatment refusals 
 
The medical information patients receive often contains a treatment 
recommendation, reflecting the best medical option for the patient. However, 
patients do not only include medical information and medical deliberations in their 
decision-making process. Their deliberations regarding treatment decisions may 
consist of different factors: “A mixture of feelings, personal circumstances, goals, 
beliefs, thoughts, and calculations” guide the patient in this process.21 Therefore, 
although the majority of the patients readily accepts the recommended treatment, 
some patients do not arrive at the treatment as recommended by the physician. 
The patient’s deliberations may sometimes result in (partial) refusal of (further) 
treatment. 
The physician-patient relationship in medical decision making has frequently 
been studied and discussed.22-28 Treatment refusals and their moral applications 
have often been discussed concerning issues such as Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) 
orders,29 withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (for example, ventilation),30 blood 
transfusions for Jehovah’s Witnesses,31 and coercion in psychiatry.32-34 These 
discussions are often made from the perspective of patient autonomy as 
conflicting with the responsibilities of clinicians. Patient autonomy is also the 
central value cited in defence of honouring refusals based on religious values.31 In 
psychiatry, patient autonomy is also much emphasized to refer to conflicts 
between patients having a right to refuse treatment (as long as the patient does 
not harm others) and physicians being paternalistic in coercing patients.32-34 To our 
knowledge, an exploration of the various moral deliberations of patients and 
physicians during the decision-making process concerning treatment acceptance 
and refusal in oncology has, however, not yet been performed. 
 
4.1.4 The study 
 
It has always been endorsed that physicians should be acquainted with the 
patient’s deliberations and that the physician understands the patient’s motives. 
According to the American Society of Clinical Oncology, modern cancer care 
should accordingly be responsive to the patient’s wishes and be consistent with 
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his or her values.35 But what are those values? And what does it mean for the 
physician to be responsive to the patient’s wishes when the patient refuses a 
recommended treatment with a curative goal? How does this relate to the concept 
of patient autonomy? In other words: what is the practical implication of patient 
autonomy when a patient refuses a recommended oncological treatment? This 
study aims to clarify these questions. By using data from interviews with patients 
and physicians, we focus on two aspects: firstly, we discuss what is meant by 
patient autonomy and how this autonomy is conceptualized, and secondly, we 
elaborate on factors that influence patient autonomy. 
 
4.2 Methods 
 
The present study is based on in-depth interviews with patients and physicians. All 
patients had refused a recommended oncological treatment. In this study, refusal 
means that the patient did not start treatment at all, stopped during treatment, or 
refused a part of a recommended treatment but accepted another part (for 
example, accepted surgery, but refused chemotherapy). A qualitative research 
method has been chosen to explore patients’ deliberations that led to refusal of a 
recommended oncological treatment and to determine physicians’ attitudes to 
treatment refusals. Our study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committees of 
the study sites. All patients gave informed consent. 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
We used a broad definition of refusal, since patients who refuse an oncological 
treatment are difficult to include in a research sample.21 One reason may be that 
after their refusal, they withdraw from the medical circuit and are therefore difficult 
to approach. Another reason may be that patients, after their withdrawal, do not 
want to be involved in medical research anymore, either because they do not want 
to be confronted again with hospitals or doctors, or because they are too ill to be 
interviewed. The patients included in this study form a rather unique sample and 
deserve our gratitude. 
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The patients were asked to participate by general practitioners (n=5), and by 
specialists in a university hospital (n=6) and in five general hospitals (n=2) in the 
Netherlands. Dutch associations for cancer patients were willing to spread 
information about the study. Seventeen patients participating in associations 
announced themselves for participation. The fact that a number of patients were 
obtained from associations for cancer patients may suggest that the patients in the 
study are not representative of the population of patients with cancer. However, 
most of the patients became acquainted with the associations only after they had 
refused the recommended oncological treatment. This indicates that patients’ 
decision making was not influenced by their participation in patient associations. 
Thirty patients were interviewed. Inclusion criteria were: being over the age of 
18, speaking and understanding Dutch language, having cancer, having a life-
expectancy of more than three months, and having refused a recommended 
oncological treatment. All patients announced by physicians or those who 
announced themselves from January 2001 until April 2002 were included in the 
study if they met the inclusion criteria. Since patients participating in associations 
announced themselves for participation, no medical files of these patients were 
available and therefore the stage of disease (TNM-classification) could not be 
retrieved. We included both patients who had refused recommended treatments 
with higher potential benefits (curative treatments) and patients who had refused 
recommended treatments with lower potential benefit (non-curative treatments). 
Patients who are facing a cancer diagnosis with curative opportunities may 
respond differently to their treatment recommendation than those with non-curative 
opportunities. Therefore, the patients were split up into four treatment groups 
(Table 1): (1) refused curative surgery, (2) refused another curative treatment, (3) 
refused non-curative chemotherapy, or (4) refused another non-curative treatment. 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients by treatment group are 
given in Table 2. The mean age of the patients (n=30) was 58 years (range 23-91), 
60% of the sample was female, almost all patients (93%) were white Dutch, and 
57% was married or had a registered partnership. Of the patients who had children 
(83%), 28% had dependent children, and a minority of the patients (37%) had 
grandchildren. Half of the patients had a high educational level (advanced 
vocational/university). The majority of the patients (64%) were patients with 
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mammacarcinoma or gastroenterological cancer (primary cancer of the intestine, 
stomach, oesophagus, or liver). 
 
Table 1 Patients who had refused a recommended oncological 
treatment were split up into four treatment groups 
 
Group  Treatment    n (%) 
 
1  Refused curative surgery    7 (23) 
  (e.g. mammacarcinoma) 
2  Refused curative other treatment   3 (10) 
  (e.g. non-Hodgkin lymphoma) 
3  Refused non-curative chemotherapy 14 (47) 
  (e.g. coloncarcinoma) 
4  Refused non-curative other treatment   6 (20) 
  (e.g. prostatecarcinoma) 
 
 
Due to small numbers in the cells, representing the demographic and clinical 
characteristics of the patients by treatment group, no χ2 tests could be performed 
to test for differences between the different treatment groups. We could, however, 
observe some trends when we compared patients who refused a curative 
treatment (treatment groups 1 and 2) with patients who refused a non-curative 
treatment (treatment groups 3 and 4): firstly, more patients refused a non-curative 
treatment than a curative treatment. Secondly, half of the women refused a 
curative treatment, whereas of the men, only one refused a curative treatment. 
And thirdly, a minority of the patients who were married or had a registered 
partnership refused a curative treatment, whereas half of the single, divorced, or 
widowed patients refused a curative treatment. 
Sixteen physicians were interviewed. We made a selection of eight general 
practitioners and eight (general) oncologists out of all the physicians who 
participated in the study (n=78). To obtain a wide range of different opinions, we 
included younger and older physicians, males and females, physicians with few 
and many years of working experience, and physicians from different settings 
(university hospital and general hospital). Physician characteristics are given in 
Table 3. The mean age of the physicians was 49 years (range 29-60), 31% of the 
sample was female, and the mean number of years of working experience was 18 
years (range 2-29). The interviews were held from May 2002 until October 2002. 
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Table 2 Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients (n=30) split up into four 
treatment groups: (1) refused curative surgery, (2) refused another curative treatment, (3) 
refused non-curative chemotherapy, or (4) refused another non-curative treatment 
 
M (range) Treatment group  n (%) 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
Age   58 (23-91) 
 
Gender 
Male       1   0   9   2 12 (40) 
Female       6   3   5   4 18 (60) 
 
Race 
White Dutch      6   3 13   6 28 (93) 
White other      1   0   1   0   2   (7) 
 
Marital status 
Single/divorced, widowed    5   2   5   1 13 (43) 
Married/registered partnership    2   1   9   5 17 (57) 
 
Children 
No       2   0   3   0   5 (17) 
Yes (not at home)     4   2   8   4 18 (60) 
Yes (at home)      1   1   3   2   7 (23) 
 
Grandchildren 
No        5   2   7   5 19 (63) 
Yes       2   1   7   1 11 (37) 
 
Education 
Primary school/lower level high school   4   1   3   1   9 (30) 
Middle level high school     1   1   3   1   6 (20) 
Advanced vocational/university    2   1   8   4 15 (50) 
 
Cancer diagnosis 
Breast       4   2   2   3 11 (37) 
Gastroenterological     1   0   5   2   8 (27) 
Urological      1   0   1   1   3 (10) 
Gynaecological      0   0   2   0   2   (7) 
Pulmonary      0   0   2   0   2   (7) 
Haematological      0   1   1   0   2   (7) 
Other       1   0   1   0   2   (7) 
 
 
4.2.2 Interview procedure 
 
The patient interviews were carried out at the patient’s home. Each interview 
lasted between 60 and 120 min. We used in-depth interviews. This means that the 
interviews contained some general topics and no close-ended questions.36 The 
interview topics concerned demographic and clinical characteristics of the patient, 
the course of the disease, communication with physicians about the recommended 
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treatment, the attitudes of the patient to the recommended treatment, and future 
perspectives of the patient. The interview topics were formulated after studies of 
relevant literature and observations. During the observational studies, 72 patients 
were observed during their visit to five different oncologists at an oncological 
outpatient clinic in the Netherlands. From these transcripts, aspects that came up 
for discussion between physician and patient and deliberations of patients with 
regard to recommendations for treatment were derived and converted into 
interview topics. 
The physician interviews were carried out in the physician’s office. Each 
interview lasted between 30 and 60 min. The in-depth interview topics concerned 
characteristics of the physician, working experience, curative versus non-curative 
treatments, and palliative care in oncology, physician-patient relationship 
especially concerning treatment decisions, treatment refusals, patient autonomy, 
and physician’s beneficence. The interview topics were formulated after literature 
studies and after raw analysis of the patient interviews. 
 
Table 3 Characteristics of physicians (n=16) 
 
M (range) n (%) 
 
 
Age     49 (29-60) 
 
Gender 
Male       11 (69) 
Female         5 (31) 
 
Profession 
General practitioner       8 (50) 
(General) oncologist       8 (50) 
 
Work experience   18 (2-29) 
 
 
4.2.3 Analysis 
 
All the patient and physician interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. 
Grounded theory methods were used to analyse the interviews. Grounded theory 
is a general methodology for developing theory based on systematically gathered 
and analysed data.37 Grounded theory is considered to be the best available 
method for analysing data when the subject in question is a process and the 
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research questions concern an experience.38 During the analysis, we used 
computer software based on grounded theory (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text 
management, including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, 
and words. After retrieving key materials (quotations), we analysed the quotations 
on whether these could be traced back to patients in one particular treatment 
group (Table 1). No distinction between the four groups could be observed. So, for 
simplicity and clarity, we performed analyses for two groups: patients who refused 
a curative treatment (treatment groups 1 and 2) and patients who refused a non-
curative treatment (treatment groups 3 and 4). In cases where there appeared to 
exist any difference between these two groups, it is described in the results. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Patient autonomy 
 
To be able to discuss patient autonomy in the decision-making process of patients 
who refuse an oncological treatment, it is necessary to explore what is meant by 
patient autonomy and how this autonomy is conceptualized. In our study, we did 
not focus on patient autonomy as a theoretical concept. Instead, we approached 
the concept from the practical point of view based on conceptions of physicians 
and patients in the actual practice of medicine. 
 
Physicians 
Physicians indicated that one could conceptualize patient autonomy in two ways. 
First, patient autonomy defined as a patient who makes decisions. In the second 
conceptualisation, patient autonomy is defined as a patient who defines life 
choices. These two conceptualisations were mentioned either as different or as 
integrated concepts. 
 
Physician 1: … that you are able to make a choice for yourself, give meaning to 
your own life, and make your own decisions. 
 
Physician 2: Well, in the end it is the patient who is empowered to make the 
decision, and can do so as well. 
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Patients 
In the patient interviews, patient autonomy is also represented as ‘making 
decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’. However, the patient interviews show that 
these representations of patient autonomy as ‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life 
choices’ can be further elaborated. In the decision-making process, some patients 
indicated that it was of crucial importance that the decision they made concerned 
their own life and their own body. Patients indicated that only they could make the 
treatment decision, wanted to make that decision, and thought that they had to 
make that decision. 
 
Patient 1: You do have to make a choice, because it’s your decision, and it’s 
about your body. 
 
Patient 2: I think I didn’t care at all what he [husband] thought about it [decision] 
at the time. It may seem very strange, but it’s my life that’s at stake. 
 
Another elaboration was the possibility of patients to choose between options, for 
example, the option of no treatment at all or the option of no life-prolonging 
treatment. 
 
Patient 3: I’m old enough to say, ‘Well, okay, I even have three choices.’ I can 
also choose to say, ‘I don’t have to do anything and I’m going back home.’ 
 
Patient 4: We have to make that choice ourselves. Do I really want to face a few 
miserable months or do I want a few months in which I may feel pain, but not so 
many more problems? You have to be able to make that choice. 
 
Besides choosing for a particular option, some patients found it really important to 
take personal initiatives during their disease, for instance to find their way in 
alternative medicine. Taking personal initiatives was sometimes more appreciated 
than being treated in a passive way, or doing nothing at all. 
 
Patient 5: I knew a Moerman-physician [physician in alternative medicine, TvK]. I 
visited him. (…) I also bought the Houtsmuller-book [book about food health and 
natural food, TvK]. So I could take the initiative again. I think it’s very important to 
be able to do something, not just taking your pills or waiting for your injection in 
the morning, but to do something yourself. 
 
Interestingly, the concept of autonomy appeared not only to be represented as 
elaborations on ‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’. Four values revealed 
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to have a major significance in the process of patients’ decision making: freedom, 
independence, trust, and responsibility. 
(a) Freedom. Some patients, especially those who had refused a curative 
treatment, mentioned that having the freedom to choose a direction they preferred, 
was of great importance in their decision-making process. 
 
Patient 6: … that you could choose, were free to choose, to go in a different 
direction. 
 
Patient 2: I really felt very free with him [physician]. Yes, he explained all the 
options and I was able to choose by myself. 
 
(b) Independence. During their disease, some patients did not want to submit to 
the doctor since they wanted to be independent and wanted to have control about 
what was going to happen. 
 
Patient 7: A nasty feeling, submitting like that. Like I was putting my fate in the 
doctor’s hands and he knows what’s best for me and I just do everything he says. 
(…) Dependence, being nothing at all, yes, it’s keeping control. 
 
(c) Trust. Not trusting the doctor and/or the medical establishment was sometimes 
given as an important reason for patients who indicated that they wanted to make 
their own decisions. 
 
Patient 8: I had gone through such a hard time with the conventional physicians 
over there, that I actually lost all faith in them. 
 
(d) Responsibility. By refusing a treatment, some patients felt that they themselves 
took responsibility for their own life. They felt that if they had accepted the 
recommended treatment, they had given the doctor responsibility. 
 
Patient 2: … and always be the one who thinks that you are largely responsible 
for what you do. So, making choices, getting advice, I’m the one to decide about 
my own life. 
 
Patient 4: My GP says, ‘Nobody has taken responsibility for his own health like 
you have.’ (…) In any event, I don’t think, they have to make me healthy. 
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4.3.2 Factors that influence patient autonomy 
 
After the exploration of what is meant by patient autonomy and how patient 
autonomy is conceptualized, we have studied factors that influence patient 
autonomy in the case of patients who refuse an oncological treatment. 
 
Physicians 
According to the physicians, patient autonomy has a wide range. Although patients 
can often be autonomous, patient autonomy also has its limits. In other words: 
patient autonomy can never be absolute and is pliant. 
 
Physician 3: It [autonomy] is there, but pliant. There’s a lot of it [autonomy], but 
not 100%. 
 
Physician 4: The autonomy goes a long way, but [is] not complete. 
 
From the physician interviews it turned out that five factors influenced patient 
autonomy. Two factors were most mentioned: 
(a) Physicians declared that the medical information about disease and about 
treatment possibilities is of fundamental importance for patient autonomy. A 
patient can only be autonomous when he or she has information that helps to 
grasp the subject about which the patient has to decide. 
 
Physician 5: If you say, ‘On what does it [autonomy] depend?’ Of course it 
depends on the patient’s grasp of the subject: information about his illness, 
information about the treatment. 
 
Physician 6: Autonomy without information is nothing, so it depends an awful lot 
on what kind of information the patient receives, how he receives it, what kind of 
decisions he makes. 
 
Physician 4: How autonomous can a patient be? When all is said and done, it 
depends on the information you receive. 
 
(b) Physicians indicated that they themselves played an important role in the 
patient’s decision-making process. 
 
Physician 3: You wonder what it is that patients base their decisions on. On some 
hope of getting better or on a doctor who says, ‘I would do that if I were you’ or 
something like that. Or that you’re communicating it though not in so many words. 
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Physician 7: Because I know I can direct it and of course I try to do so as little as 
possible, but I still have some influence, at least I think I do. 
 
The influence of the physician appeared to be closely related to the goal of the 
recommended treatment. If the treatment goal is curative and the patient refuses 
treatment, physicians indicated that they are willing to exert more pressure to 
persuade the patient to be treated. If the treatment goal is non-curative, physicians 
declared to exert less pressure and to be more willing to respect patient autonomy. 
 
Physician 2: Well, if patients could just really realize what they may be missing, 
with the treatment they could obtain, if they continue, if they at least know that. 
Then I could accept it [treatment refusal]. And I’m talking particularly about 
palliative treatment. As to a cure, I would always be willing to go a bit further and 
possibly involve some colleagues. 
 
Physician 8: Concerning palliative care, you don’t have to be insistent, because 
it’s a matter of your obligation to explain it clearly, and then the patient together 
with his family decides. Concerning a cure, you have to exert pressure. Of course 
it depends on the chance of a cure. 
 
Other factors mentioned by physicians as influencing patient autonomy were: 
(c) The role of relatives and friends in the patient’s decision-making process. 
Some patients let themselves be treated because the family wants them to. 
 
Physician 5: The family often exerts more pressure than the physician. (…) Then 
not only information and experience play a role, but also just how someone lets 
himself be influenced by his family. 
 
Physician 9: There are people who let themselves be treated only because the 
family wants them to. 
 
(d) The way patients manage the information they receive. Patients understand 
and use the medical information in very different ways in their decision-making 
process. 
 
Physician 5: It also depends to some extent on intelligence, on what you do with 
the information you get. 
 
(e) The disease perception and the experiences with treatment, received by 
patients themselves or close others. Patients may use these experiences as an 
argument to found their decision. 
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Physician 5: Experience also plays a very important role. Imagine, having had a 
friend who died just because he did or did not receive the same treatment. 
 
Patients 
From the patient interviews it turned out that three factors were important in 
influencing patient autonomy: 
(a) Patients’ experiences and knowledge of the experiences of close others with 
cancer and cancer treatments. Most patients referred to their own experiences or 
experiences of others as a source of knowledge of what they could expect from 
being treated or not. These experiences seemed to have highly inspired patients’ 
decision making. 
 
Patient 6: My mother who has been living with cancer for the past 25 years, 
unbelievable perhaps, has also refused any chemo and radiation therapy. But 
every few years a tumour has to be removed again, and she even still does her 
own housekeeping, she’s 83. That is an example for me (…) in any event that 
you can live for so many years, that it doesn’t mean you will die right away. 
 
Patient 8: Besides, two days before I went to my GP, I had buried my friend who 
had been ill for six years. She had undergone all the standard things and suffered 
horribly. She was groaning with pain when I visited her at the hospital and I found 
it just terrible. (…) Afterwards I buried another friend who was also ill for six 
years. (…) I saw these friends of mine. I saw them suffering. (…) And since I 
have witnessed and seen all of that, I think well then perhaps just let me go, but 
don’t torture me. 
 
(b) The influence of relatives, friends, or some professional in the decision-making 
process of the patient. 
 
Patient 9: So if it wasn’t for my GP, I think I would have continued the treatment. 
The GP said, ‘That’s ridiculous. Take a holiday’, he says. ‘If you have the money, 
take a holiday, go to the beach and think about it.’ That was really crucial, 
decisive. 
 
Patient 10: Only that friend who put the idea into my head, I have to give him the 
honour of pushing me in that direction. 
 
Patient 11: ‘I don’t think it’s such a good idea, what do you think? What do you 
think?’ Well, he [another physician] says, ‘I don’t think it’s such a good idea 
either.’ Well, then I made my decision. 
 
Although some patients weighed the opinions of others against their own view, 
others did not. Most of the time, patients described the role of family and friends in 
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a way that suggests that family and friends leave the final decision to the patient 
while supporting every outcome of the decision, i.e. the treatment refusal. 
 
Patient 12: They [family] did see how I felt and I think that they also could see 
what another two courses of chemotherapy would do to me. They supported me, 
so that was okay. 
 
Patient 13: I’ve talked with friends and with my family and they also say, ‘It’s your 
decision.’ 
 
Although patients were not univocal in indicating whether or not others (physicians 
or relatives and friends) had influenced their decision-making process and the 
outcome of that process, the influence of the physician was, however, important to 
patients’ experience of being free to make the decision to refuse a treatment; that 
is in not being forced to undergo treatment. Although most patients indicated that 
they experienced to be free in making their own decision, some patients did not 
have that experience. They felt that the decision took a lot of struggling, or they felt 
that an enormous amount of pressure was exerted on them to accept the 
recommended treatment. 
 
Patient 14: It took an awful lot of struggling (…), it’s a fight with the outside world. 
 
Patient 15: Of course Professor X exerted an enormous amount of pressure on 
me. (…) It was really too much pressure, especially to do the chemo. 
 
(c) As opposed to physicians, patients did not indicate the medical information 
they received about disease and treatment options as an important factor on which 
they relied in their decision to refuse a recommended treatment. Medical 
information did, however, have a serious effect on patients’ experiences of having 
a choice. The possibility not-to-treat was only very rarely presented as an option. 
The absence of the possibility not-to-treat seemed to restrict the idea of having a 
choice. If there existed any choice, patients could choose between treatment 
options. In addition, most of the time, the recommended treatment was presented 
as the standard treatment for that particular disease. Patients, especially those 
who had refused a non-curative treatment, experienced offering a treatment as the 
standard treatment as a restriction of their possibility to choose. 
 
 97
Chapter 4 
Patient 9: They [physicians] say, ‘This is the standard thing, this is what we can 
offer you.’ 
 
Patient 16: That was it, that was standard. (…) But a patient with cancer is his 
own “hands-on” expert and physicians have to pay much more attention to what 
the patient himself experiences. They can learn a lot from their patients, like not 
saying, ‘This is the European standard, these things make up the treatment and 
that’s what you have to do.’ 
 
In contrast to patients who had not experienced a choice, other patients found it 
self-evident that they had a choice, since they had made a decision about their 
own life or body. Some of these patients even indicated that they created their own 
choice since they had acquired their own information and knowledge. 
 
Patient 17: We [patient and husband] created a choice by ourselves by acquiring 
our own information. 
 
Patient 4: We [patient and wife] didn’t have any choice, no (…), but we made our 
own choices. 
 
4.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
It is generally acknowledged that treatment decision making is a difficult process 
for patients and physicians.22,24,39,40 Especially treatment refusals and their moral 
applications appear to be an interesting topic of discussion.29-34 Traditionally, 
physicians have been considered to rely almost exclusively on their own 
judgements about their patients’ needs for treatment, information, and 
consultation. Nowadays, medicine is increasingly confronted with assertions of the 
patient’s right to make an independent judgement about his or her medical fate.2 
The idea that patients should take up an autonomous position in the decision-
making process is appreciated. This study investigates patient autonomy in the 
case of patients who refuse a recommended oncological treatment. 
 
4.4.1 Patient autonomy: a multi-layered modality 
 
In our study, we approached the concept of patient autonomy from a practical 
point of view by using empirical data retrieved from interviews. In line with earlier 
studies,1 our research findings emphasize that there exists no single conception of 
 98 
The medical practice of patient autonomy and cancer treatment refusals 
patient autonomy. In the specific situation of patients who refuse an oncological 
treatment, patient autonomy reveals to be a multi-layered modality. This modality 
is related to ‘making decisions’ and the way patients ‘define life choices’. ‘Making 
decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’ are represented in notions such as deciding 
about your own body, choosing between options, and taking personal initiatives. 
Furthermore, the values of freedom, independence, trust, and responsibility reveal 
to have a major significance with regard to patient autonomy. 
 
4.4.2 Medical information: being free or having a choice to make a 
decision 
 
The relevance of medical information in decision making has increasingly been 
discussed in literature.16-20 It is assumed that the disclosure of information is 
necessary for autonomous decision making.2,13 Accordingly, the physicians in our 
study have the opinion that patient autonomy highly depends on the medical 
information the patient receives about his or her disease and about the treatment 
possibilities. However, our study shows that patient autonomy is not only 
represented by informed patients who decide by weighing the pros and cons of 
medical information, like the informed consent procedure suggests. The results 
show that patients who refuse an oncological treatment do not so much rely on the 
medical information they receive about their disease or treatment options. 
Although patients need medical information to make decisions, this information is 
not an isolated instance. The content of the information is an important factor. 
Patient autonomy and the content of the medical information seem to be related to 
patients’ experience of having the freedom to choose. A patient may not 
experience a possibility to choose whatever he or she prefers, if the possibility not-
to-treat is not presented as an option and if the recommended treatment is 
presented as the standard treatment. 
Over the last decades, studies about patient participation in decision making 
refer to choosing between treatment alternatives.27 Our study shows that patient 
autonomy in its relation to freedom does not automatically imply the possibility to 
select among alternatives. An important distinction can be made between patients 
experiencing a choice and patients having the idea of being free to make a 
decision. A patient who does not experience a possibility to choose, can still have 
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the idea that he or she is free to refuse or accept a recommended treatment if the 
physician does not interfere in the decision-making process. 
We argue that choosing between treatment alternatives is only one side of the 
picture that has been labelled with patient autonomy, namely that of freedom of 
choice. The other side of the picture is freedom without referring to choices, which 
applies to a patient’s experience of being free in the decision-making process. This 
freedom may help the patient to make a decision that fits in his or her experiences 
and perspective of life. Thus, freedom and freedom of choice refer to the 
distinction between being free and having a choice respectively.41 Although the 
results indicate that there exists a difference between patients experiencing a 
choice and patients having the idea of being free to make a decision that is related 
to, respectively, patients who refused a non-curative treatment and patients who 
refused a curative treatment, we argue that this relationship cannot be proved. 
Being free to make a decision cannot be attributed to patients who refuse 
particular a curative or a non-curative treatment since both groups indicated that 
the physician influenced their experience of being free to make the decision to 
refuse a treatment. 
 
4.4.3 Experiences: an important factor influencing patient autonomy 
 
Patients who refuse an oncological treatment are particularly influenced by their 
former experiences or by what they have seen in the disease process of others 
having cancer or being treated for cancer. In line with Huijer and Van Leeuwen,21 
we argue that to view a refusal as an autonomous choice, in which patients are 
informed about the pros and cons of treatment and have to decide by weighing 
them, seems not to be sufficient. Huijer and Van Leeuwen discussed that the 
refusals could be better comprehended in the framework of the patients’ broader 
worldview: personal values, emotions, beliefs and attitudes towards life, suffering, 
and death have been mentioned in this context. 
In line with Silverman et al.,42 we propose that in order to be able to determine 
how the patient perceives the medical information, it is important to check patients’ 
ideas, convictions, and fears about cancer and being treated for it before giving 
further information about prognosis or treatment possibilities. As Tuckett et al. 
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observed in the 1980s, in only 6% of 1302 consultations the patient was asked 
about ideas and explanations about his or her own health status.43 They referred 
to ‘an ideal consultation’ as a meeting between experts: that is, physicians are 
experts in disease and patients are experts in their own experiences of disease. 
According to Weston, a close engagement between physician and patient may not 
always be reached.44 However, it is recognized that it is important that the 
physician and the patient find common ground. Therefore, it is important that 
physicians have certain skills that may help to create a situation in which they give 
the patient the medical information that fits in the patient’s perspectives of life. The 
patient may only then effectively use the medical information in his or her 
treatment decision-making process. 
 
4.4.4 Treatment goal: causing a respect shift 
 
The medical distinction between a curative and a non-curative treatment goal 
strongly influences the extent of pressure physicians will exert to persuade the 
patient to be treated as recommended. Physicians may experience a distressful 
situation if their patient decides not to be treated with treatments which are 
generally considered beneficial or which are laid down in protocols as best 
practice. Even if the physician understands the patient in his or her decision, he or 
she may still experience a kind of inner conflict if the decision does no fit a medical 
rationale.45 Physicians indicated to exert more pressure if patients refuse a 
curative oncological treatment, whereas, if the recommended treatment has a non-
curative goal, physicians declared to exert less pressure and to be more willing to 
respect patient autonomy. Physicians’ willingness to accept patients’ treatment 
decision seems to be conditional. This conditionality is based on the proportionality 
of the decision, on the age of the patient, and, concerning non-curative treatments, 
on the extent of life-prolonging.45 We argue that if the recommendations of the 
physician fit the patient’s perspectives, as described above, the patient may be 
more inclined to accept the recommended treatment. Which, of course, does not 
imply that the physician has always to agree with the patient’s ideas. A physician 
may disagree with the patients’ ideas and may discuss these ideas and still 
respect patient autonomy if the physician at least understands the motives of the 
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patient. In our view, patient autonomy is not respected if the physician simply 
ignores the patient’s motives. 
It is noteworthy that in our study no cut-off point with regard to respecting 
patient autonomy was mentioned. Physicians did not use terminologies such as 
‘do respect’ or ‘do not respect’ patient autonomy; not as a binary possibility of yes 
or no. Instead, physicians used sentences such as ‘being less persuasive’ or 
‘more willing’. Thus, there seems to exist a shift in respecting patient autonomy. 
This respect shift resembles the psychological observable response shift. The 
response shift refers to a change in patient’s perception of disease and depends 
on health changes.46,47 The respect shift refers to a change in the physician’s 
attitude in respecting patient autonomy (or a change in the extent of exerted 
pressure) and depends on treatment goal. The respect shift may depend on other 
factors as well and is an interesting topic for future research. Discussing the 
respect shift may serve to clarify underlying thoughts and principles in the 
decision-making process for both physicians and patients. 
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We discuss how the results of our empirical study on cancer treatment refusal relate to the 
liberal understanding of patient autonomy, to the perspective of an ethic of care, and to 
the approach of patient-centered medicine. We focus on (1) patient autonomy as ‘making 
decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’, (2) the idea of freedom that is attached to patient 
autonomy, and (3) a patients’ and a physicians’ perspective in medical decision making. 
In the context of cancer treatment refusal, patient autonomy can be understood as the 
opportunity to direct one’s own decisions and to direct one’s own life. Respect for patient 
autonomy therefore means both guaranteeing patients’ choices (‘freedom of choice’), and 
asks for respect for the way patients strive for their own individual goals in life (‘freedom of 
being’). The liberal tradition has been criticized for not giving enough attention to a 
patients’ perspective and for only paying attention to the patient’s opportunity to choose. 
Respect for a patients’ perspective is, however, included in the liberal understanding of 
patient autonomy, although indeed not so much emphasized. In addition, the liberal 
tradition is criticized for being too individualistic. Instead, an ethic of care and the 
approach of patient-centered medicine consider a more relational basis of patient 
autonomy. We show that in the context of cancer treatment refusal, the liberal 
understanding of patient autonomy and an ethic of care do not so much diverge as the 
critics suggest, at most a difference in emphasis exists. Combining the two perspectives 
may give optimal directions for a patient-physician relationship in which there is attention 
for choice between treatment alternatives, and for both the patient’s and the medical 
perspective. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Respect for patient autonomy has become an important moral principle in health 
care and is considered to be one of the leading principles in medical ethics. Still, 
much discussion is going on about the meaning and use of the concept of 
autonomy. Many authors have stressed the conceptual confusion and uncertainty 
that continues to surround the meaning of patient autonomy (for an overview, see 
Schermer1). Different meanings have been attached to the concept: the liberal 
tradition has featured autonomous choice with dominance on self-determination2,3, 
while an ethic of care has questioned this conception of autonomy and has 
stressed a more relational conception.4-10 In addition, in psychological literature, 
the approach of patient-centered medicine has stressed the issue of patient 
empowerment and has also discussed directions for interpreting patient 
autonomy.11-14 
Not only different theories, but different medical contexts as well cause 
different understandings of the concept of patient autonomy. In the context of 
treatment refusal, patient autonomy is often discussed concerning issues such as 
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Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders15, withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment16, blood 
transfusions for Jehovah’s Witnesses17,18, and coercion in psychiatry.19-21 To our 
knowledge, patient autonomy in the context of treatment refusal in clinical 
oncology has not yet been extensively discussed. We performed an empirical 
study to investigate what patient autonomy entails in the context of patients who 
refuse recommended oncological treatment. In our study, refusal means that the 
patient does not want to start oncological treatment at all, wants to stop during 
treatment, or refuses a part of a recommended treatment but accepts another part. 
In all of these cases, tension between physician and patient may appear due to 
disagreement on treatment policy. Consequently, questions are raised about the 
position of the patient and the role of the physician in the decision-making process, 
and thus about the meaning and use of the principle of respect for patient 
autonomy. 
In this article, we discuss how the results of our empirical study relate to the 
liberal understanding of patient autonomy, to the perspective of an ethic of care, 
and to the approach of patient-centered medicine. Three topics deserve close 
attention: we focus on (1) patient autonomy as ‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life 
choices’, (2) the idea of freedom that is attached to patient autonomy, and (3) a 
patients’ and a physicians’ perspective in medical decision making. 
 
5.2 Empirical study design 
 
We have approached the concept of patient autonomy from a practical point of 
view by using empirical data retrieved from interviews with patients and 
physicians. A qualitative research method has been chosen to explore (1) patients’ 
deliberations that led to refusal of recommended oncological treatment, (2) 
physicians’ attitudes to treatment refusal, and (3) the position of patient and 
physician in the decision-making process.  
A total of 30 patients (mean age 58 years, range 23-91) were interviewed. The 
inclusion criteria were: (a) age more than 18 years; (b) able to speak and 
understand Dutch; (c) having cancer; (d) life expectancy of more than three 
months; and (e) having refused a recommended oncological treatment. The 
patients were asked to participate by general practitioners (npat=5) and by 
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specialists in a university hospital (npat=6) or in general hospitals (npat=2) in the 
Netherlands. Dutch associations for patients with cancer were willing to spread 
information about the study. Patient members of these associations (npat=17) 
responded themselves to the call to participate. All patients recruited by the 
physicians or those who responded themselves between January 2001 and April 
2002 were included in the study if they met the inclusion criteria. We included both 
patients who had refused a recommended treatment with higher potential benefit 
(curative treatment, npat=10) and patients who had refused a recommended 
treatment with lower potential benefit (non-curative treatment, npat=20). All patients 
gave written informed consent. 
Each patient interview was carried out at the patient’s home. Each interview 
lasted between 60 and 120 minutes. We used in-depth interview techniques. This 
means that the interviews contained some general topics and no close-ended 
questions.22 The interview topics covered demographic and clinical characteristics 
of the patient; the course of the disease; communication with physicians about the 
recommended treatment; the patient’s attitude to the recommended treatment; and 
the patient’s perspectives of the future. The interview topics were formulated after 
examining the relevant literature and undertaking preliminary observational 
studies.23,24 In these studies, 72 patients were observed during their visits to five 
different oncologists at an oncological outpatient clinic in the Netherlands. From 
the transcripts, various aspects of the discussion between physician and patient 
about recommendations for treatment were noted and converted into interview 
topics. 
A total of 16 physicians were interviewed from among the physicians who 
recruited the patients. Eight general practitioners and eight (general) oncologists 
were selected, including younger and older (mean age 49 years, range 29-60), 
male and female physicians with few to many years of working experience, and 
from different settings (general practice, university hospital, and general hospital). 
The interviews were carried out between May and October 2002. 
Each physician was interviewed at his or her office. Each interview lasted 
between 30 and 60 minutes. The interview topics covered the characteristics of 
the physician; working experience; curative versus non-curative treatment and 
palliative care in oncology; the physician-patient relationship, especially 
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concerning treatment decisions; patient autonomy; physician’s beneficence; and 
treatment refusals and their rationality. 
All the patient and physician interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. A 
descriptive qualitative approach was used to analyse the interviews. During the 
analysis, we used computer software (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text management, 
including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, and words. Each 
interview was divided into several segments. The segments were coded and the 
codes were organized into categories and put into a tree-structure. A second 
independent researcher supervised the process of data management. 
 
5.3 ‘Making decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’ 
 
Over the last decades, patient autonomy has received much attention in relation to 
patients having the opportunity to choose. Studies about patient participation in 
decision making almost all refer to choosing between treatment alternatives 
(review by Guadagnoli and Ward25). Also in ethical theory, patient autonomy 
considered as the patient’s opportunity to choose has been given much emphasis: 
the liberal understanding of patient autonomy focuses on patient self-
determination with the underlying idea of a rational and reasonable person who 
makes autonomous decisions. Moreover, patient autonomy is often translated into 
the notion of informed consent, which is directed on patient autonomy as giving 
patients the opportunity to deliberately choose between treatment alternatives. 
Our study corroborates the liberal idea that patient autonomy is related to the 
opportunity to choose. Our results namely show that when patients refuse 
oncological treatment, patient autonomy is related to a patient who makes 
decisions.23 ‘Making decisions’ in this context means that patients want to have the 
opportunity to choose between available treatment options, for example, between 
the options of receiving oncological treatment, no treatment at all, or no life-
prolonging treatment. In this process, the patient-physician relationship plays a 
crucial role, because it encloses a common component between patient and 
physician: the patient wants to have the opportunity to choose between options of 
which the physician informs the patient. 
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Besides ‘making decisions’, our study stresses that patient autonomy in the 
context of cancer treatment refusal relates to a patient who defines life choices.23 
‘Defining life choices’ refers to patients who want to strive for their own individual 
goals in life. This is related to something particular in the patient’s own life and not 
so much to available treatment alternatives. We found that when patients are 
faced with a possible life-threatening disease, they feel that they should have a lot 
of options other than treatment alternatives.23 According to MacDonald, exactly 
this perspective is not enough articulated by the liberal tradition.10 The standard of 
informed consent, for example, requires that patients are suitably informed about 
their prognosis and options, and are allowed to choose among them. Such an 
approach ignores numerous contextual factors that may prevent patients from 
experiencing the possibility of real choice.10 MacDonald uses the feminist work on 
relational autonomy to argue that attention to the social and contextual factors that 
facilitate meaningful autonomous action gives an improved understanding of 
autonomy. This idea is supported by an ethic of care.5-9 Most of the criticism to the 
liberal understanding of patient autonomy stresses that too much attention is 
directed to guaranteeing patients’ choices and patients achieving independence.8-
10 An ethic of care shifts away from achieving independence towards a view that 
seeks meaningful self-direction within a context of interdependence.5-9 
Our study shows that respect for patient autonomy means both guaranteeing 
patients’ treatment choices and asks for respect for the way patients strive for their 
own individual goals in life. In our opinion, this indicates that the liberal tradition 
and an ethic of care do not so much diverge as some suggest. To understand this, 
we first have to explore the patients’ perspective and the ideas on freedom that 
are related to patient autonomy in medical decision making. 
 
5.4 A patients’ perspective 
 
An approach that particularly pays attention to a patients’ perspective, is patient-
centered medicine. An extensive body of literature has emerged on this subject. 
Yet, despite popularity of the concept there is little consensus as to its meaning.11-
14 Here, we hold on to an approach of patient-centered medicine that focuses on 
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“patient participation in clinical decision making by taking into account the patients’ 
perspective, and tuning medical care to the patients’ needs and preferences.”12 
Atkins has discussed a patient-centered approach and has related it to respect 
for patient autonomy.26 She describes that “affective responses are appropriate 
and needed considerations in the case where one must attempt to assume 
another’s perspective in order to respect autonomy.”26 Atkins makes a distinction 
between subjective knowledge (“the subjective character of experience”) and 
objective knowledge (“a phenomenon in terms of universal laws and 
categories”).26 She argues that we cannot objectively know what it is like to be 
another person, no matter how many facts we possess. She particularly pays 
attention to the patient-physician relationship in this process; especially concerning 
respect for the way patients incorporate their personal perspective in medical 
decision making.26 When it comes to respecting patient autonomy, Atkins pleas for 
a place for both medical knowledge and the patients’ perspective. 
In our study, also both objective knowledge and subjective knowledge are 
apparent in medical decision making. The treatment options presented by the 
physician can be seen as objective knowledge. ‘Universal laws and categories’ 
then means ‘generally accepted in medical practice’. Most of the time, physicians’ 
recommendations for treatment are based on a certain consensus in medical 
practice on what is the best treatment for a given diagnosis. Objective knowledge 
thus seems particularly related to ‘making decisions’; a choice between 
recommended treatment options that are commonly available in medical practice. 
On the other hand, subjective knowledge is reflected by the patient’s perspective. 
This perspective consists of considerations and deliberations related to the 
particular situation of the patient. Our results show that this perspective plays a 
key role in medical decision making, especially in the way patients strive for their 
own individual goals in life: most patients who refused oncological treatment 
wanted to define themselves which characteristics, which conditions, and which 
choices best fit their goals in life.23,24,27 For example, for some patients with breast 
cancer, losing a breast played an important role in their decision to refuse surgery. 
Such a decision then is based on an important consideration in the patient’s life: 
keeping her breast, which may reflect values such as identity, dignity, and/or 
integrity. 
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Differences in patients’ perspectives seem to make differences in treatment 
decision. For example, we found that for one patient it is a matter-of-course to visit 
the hospital and to accept a recommended treatment, because this treatment may 
stop the growth of the tumour. Another patient refuses the recommended 
treatment, because he or she just does not want to suffer from all the toxic effects 
of the treatment with the burden and the dependence on others. It is noteworthy 
that to the latter patient the earlier described context of dependence seems to play 
an important role, whereas to the former patient this does not seem to be of 
importance. This suggests that one cannot determine beforehand whether, in 
general, patients appreciate independence or not. Furthermore, it suggests that 
differences in the appreciation of the consequences of the treatment, including 
how the end of life will be, create differences in treatment decision making. It 
seems as if the patient’s own idea of what is in his or her best interest is closely 
related to the patient’s specific history, experiences, and view on what is important 
in life, including on how the patient views the end of life. When patients explain 
why they have made certain treatment decisions, they often refer to experiences 
related to disease and treatment processes of the patient him or herself or of close 
others. These experiences seem to serve as a source of knowledge of what can 
be expected from being treated or not. This knowledge (subjective knowledge 
according to Atkins) strongly influences patients’ decision making. Therefore, in 
our opinion, understanding a patient’s treatment decision includes not only 
understanding a patient’s medical opportunities and prognosis, but includes 
understanding a patient’s perspective as well. 
 
5.5 ‘Freedom of being’ and ‘freedom of choice’ 
 
If patients deliberately want to make treatment decisions and want to consider 
whether the recommended treatment is congruent with their own perspective, the 
concept of freedom is of major importance. Atkins argues that autonomy in the 
liberal tradition is generally understood as the freedom to pursue one’s own 
conception of the good life. She continues to state that this conception does not 
mean that people should be left alone to make of their lives as they choose. 
Instead it means that we should give a place within our collaborative existence for 
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each other’s specific values and differences.26 With this statement, Atkins seems 
to connect a patient-centered approach to an ethic of care. Ethic of care has as its 
central theme the responsibilities we take for ourselves and for each other; a 
relational conception of freedom. So it is not the right to freedom in the sense of 
the right to non-interference; not an ideal of independency in which a good life is a 
life in which we do not need the help or support from anyone else in meeting our 
needs and carrying our life plan.5,6,8 
In our study, most patients who refused oncological treatment wanted to have 
the freedom to choose an option they preferred for themselves. Freedom in this 
sense includes ‘freedom of choice’, i.e. the freedom to have the opportunity to 
choose between available treatment alternatives (including no life-prolonging 
treatment or no treatment at all). On the other hand, it includes ‘freedom of being’, 
in which the patient makes a decision that is congruent with his or her experience 
and perspective of life. For example, a patient who wants no chemotherapy at all 
may experience freedom that is defined by freedom to choose between treatment 
alternatives, but also by freedom that is particularly related to freedom to 
incorporate his or her own perspective in the decision-making process. This 
‘freedom of being’ is also reflected in the observation that some patients find it 
really important to take initiatives during their disease. Taking initiatives can be 
considered as a way to attain or follow individual goals in life. For some patients 
this may imply that they visit another physician for a second opinion, some 
patients try to find their way in complementary medicine, and others visit 
psychosocial support groups. 
Our study suggests that ‘freedom of choice’ is related to the medical 
information patients obtain from their physician. The results show that patients 
sometimes do not experience ‘freedom of choice’ when they have the idea that 
their physician does not present all treatment options or presents a certain 
treatment as the standard and finds it self-evidently that the patient will accept the 
recommendation. This does, however, not mean that by presenting all treatment 
options a patient automatically experiences ‘freedom of choice’. A choice between 
too many options may for some patients result in total chaos and a loss of 
freedom. 
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‘Freedom of being’ is not so much related to medical information, as to the 
physician’s attitude. In our study, for instance, some patients who refused 
treatment did not experience freedom in making their own decision or in having the 
opportunity to strive for their own goals in life. The decision to refuse treatment 
took a lot of struggling and some felt that an enormous amount of pressure was 
exerted on them to accept the recommended treatment.23 These patients did not 
experience ‘freedom of being’ in their decision to refuse a treatment. Other 
patients who refused treatment did experience ‘freedom of being’, because they 
experienced that their physician paid attention to their perspective of life and they 
experienced having the opportunity to exchange personal values and experiences. 
It needs to be noticed that not all patients appreciate the ‘freedom of being’ that is 
described here. Some patients may want the physician to decide for them just on 
the basis of available treatment options. 
The distinction between ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘freedom of being’ seems to 
resemble the distinction between the ideas on freedom as presented by the earlier 
mentioned liberal tradition and ethic of care: the liberal understanding of patient 
autonomy attaches great importance to autonomous choice. An ethic of care 
stresses a more contextual and narrative appreciation in the patient-physician 
relationship. Interestingly, in our study, we found that for most patients, both 
‘freedom of choice’ and ‘freedom of being’ are important. There does not seem to 
exist a difference in emphasis put on one of them, although it is noteworthy that 
particularly in refusing recommended oncological treatment, ‘freedom of being’ is 
often explicitly expressed. Thus, it seems as if the liberal tradition and an ethic of 
care articulate a different aspect of the decision-making process, whereas, for 
patients, both are present. 
 
5.6 A physicians’ perspective 
 
So far, we particularly paid attention to a patients’ perspective in the decision-
making process, but what about the physician? Our study shows that when a 
patient refuses recommended oncological treatment, the physician is faced with 
questions about the background of the patient’s decision, the patient’s arguments, 
the acceptability of the decision, and the patient’s role in the decision-making 
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process.24,27 Physicians evaluate a patient’s situation, they form an idea of what is 
in the patient’s best interest, and decide what is an appropriate treatment decision. 
Our results show that whereas patients base their treatment refusal mainly on 
personal values and experiences, physicians mainly emphasize a medical 
perspective when evaluating a patient’s treatment refusal.23,24,27 This medical 
perspective consists of a coherent system of terminologies, deliberations, and 
expressions that are common in medical practice, for example, the kind of tumour, 
the prognosis, and/or the side effects of a certain treatment.23,24,27 When medical 
decisions are to be made, patients become part of this medical perspective and 
tensions then may develop. 
Nowadays, it is clearly established in medicine, ethics, and law that a 
competent patient has the right to refuse medical treatment. There is no difficulty if 
a patient’s refusal concurs with clinical evaluation, but the issue becomes 
problematic when a patient’s refusal conflicts with medical opinion.28 Tension 
between a patients’ perspective and a medical perspective then becomes visible. 
A patients’ perspective and a medical perspective may show some overlap, but 
patients’ treatment decisions based on personal values and experiences remain 
most of the time outside a medical perspective. Physicians are inclined to evaluate 
reasons to refuse a recommended oncological treatment as ‘good’, ‘rational’, or 
‘sensible’ from a medical perspective. Consequently, patients’ decisions based on 
personal values and experiences are often interpreted as irrational and difficult to 
accept.27 
In addition to a medical perspective, the personal values of the physician may 
play a role in the evaluation of a patient’s decision.24,27 Although from a medical 
point of view, a patient’s decision may not be based on good reasons (since, for 
example, the decision is based on emotions or on arguments that result from a 
false impression of things), a physician may still sympathize with the decision: 
“Why she [patient] does it [refuse treatment] is irrational, but the decision is easy to 
sympathize with, that’s the problem.”24,27 In this case, the physician seems to give 
room for the patients’ perspective on life, leading to respect and understanding 
instead of strengthening the tension between the patients’ perspective and the 
medical perspective. 
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Our study shows that in the physician’s evaluation of the patient’s treatment 
refusal it is important whether the decision concerns curative or non-curative 
treatment (some prefer to make the distinction between curative and palliative 
treatment, but to forego misunderstanding, we call treatment goals curative and 
non-curative29). This distinction is important for two reasons: firstly, in their 
evaluations concerning non-curative treatment refusal, physicians are inclined to 
give more room to the personal values and experiences of the patient compared to 
the evaluation of refusal of a curative treatment. Secondly, physicians will exert 
less pressure to persuade the patient to accept the treatment as recommended in 
case of non-curative treatment compared to refusal of curative treatment. 
Physicians find the degree of rationality of patients’ arguments less important 
when it comes to decisions about non-curative treatment compared to decisions 
about curative treatment.24,27 
We argue that particularly physicians’ respect for the patient’s perspective in 
the decision-making process is crucial for the patient-physician relationship. Most 
of the time, physicians are inclined to interpret respect for patient autonomy 
particularly from the viewpoint of ‘freedom of choice’: freedom determined by 
medical information, by offering treatment alternatives. Physicians’ respect for 
patient autonomy seems often not so much to concern ‘freedom of being’ that 
relates to the patient’s own perspective of life. In our opinion, if the physician pays 
attention to that perspective, then this will contribute to the patient’s feeling of 
being understood and respected, and thus to a better physician-patient 
relationship. If, the other way around, the physician does not respect the patient’s 
perspective in the treatment refusal, he or she is often inclined to persist in 
convincing the patient to accept the treatment.30 The physician may try to convince 
the patient to agree with the doctor’s viewpoint by discussing medical facts in 
order to ensure that the patient understands his or her situation. This seems to 
result in patients experiencing that they are not really free to make their decisions, 
often leading to frustration and miscommunication. 
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5.7 Discussing a patients’ and a physicians’ perspective 
 
As earlier described, the liberal tradition is often criticized for only taking into 
account respect for patients’ autonomous choices. Beauchamp and Childress, 
however, have stated in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics: “To respect an 
autonomous agent is, at a minimum, to acknowledge that person’s right to hold 
views, to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and 
beliefs.”2 This suggests that in the liberal tradition, respect for patient autonomy 
seems also to include respect for a patients’ perspective, including the way 
patients strive for their individual goals in life. Unfortunately, often too much 
attention is directed on the respect for the autonomous choices, instead of 
recognizing a principle of respect for persons, with respect for their autonomous 
choices being simply one of its aspects.31 
Respecting a patients’ perspective seems not always to be consonant with the 
portrayal of respecting a rational and reasonable moral agent, which is the 
underlying idea of the liberal understanding of respect for patient autonomy. 
However, it is important to see that from both a medical perspective and a 
patients’ perspective good reasons and rational arguments can be given for 
refusing oncological treatment. As our study indicates, most of the time, only 
arguments following medical perspective are considered as rational arguments. 
We argue, however, that in order to maintain or develop a patient-physician 
relationship in which open communication has an important place, arguments from 
a patients’ perspective need to be respected, as are arguments from a medical 
perspective. In order to fully respect patient autonomy, physicians need to give 
weight to the patients’ perspective of life and the values belonging to it. Moreover, 
it is important that physicians identify both decisions on curative treatment and 
decisions on non-curative treatment as decisions in which it is important to 
consider a patients’ perspective. 
To understand that patients’ perspective, an ethic of care promotes “a 
particularistic moral epistemology in which attention, contextual and narrative 
appreciation, and communication are considered as elements of moral 
deliberation.”9 This is in line with the approach of patient-centered medicine on 
which Clifton-Soderstrom has given an ethical reflection.32 She calls for a person-
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centered foundation of medical practice and uses the work of Levinas to show how 
the dynamics of the patient-physician relationship forms the basis of medicine: 
“The moral obligation of the physician is imposed by the patient as Other, an 
obligation that is prior to the interpretive framework of medical knowledge.”32 
According to Clifton-Soderstrom, the scientific impersonal facts that are important 
for physicians to have a common set of terms in order to diagnose and treat 
persons, should not preclude narrative practices. The ‘alterity’ of the patient as 
other needs to be recognized. “When one’s alterity is not recognized, persons 
resist medical knowledge, in ways both subtle and overt, because it divest them of 
their unique humanity. […] One way of recognizing patients’ unique humanity is by 
hearing their narrative, or their illness framework, on their own terms.”32 To come 
to a convergence of a medical perspective and a patients’ perspective, and 
consequently to a respect for both ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘freedom of being’, on 
the one hand physicians need not to diverge medical information from a patient’s 
perspective. On the other hand, patients need not resist medical information, but 
need to incorporate the medical information they receive in their own perspective. 
Thus, in the decision-making process, the relational conception of patient 
autonomy earlier mentioned and stressed by an ethic of care seems to be 
relevant: both patient and physician need to make a valuable contribution. Patients 
contribute by expressing their perspective. On the other hand, physicians 
contribute as well: in addition to offering (information about) medical technical 
opportunities, they create the circumstances in which it is easier or more difficult 
for patients to express their perspective. 
Illustrative for this interaction in which both patient and physician contribute, is 
a dialogue between Starr and Zawacki who discuss Katz’s famous book The silent 
world of doctor and patient.33,34 Zawacki remarks that neither the doctor’s world, 
nor the patient’s world is silent. “The worlds of doctor and patient are separate, 
busy, noisy planets. It is the vacuum between them that is silent.”33 Listening and 
dialogue can breach that vacuum as such that doctor and patient may breath the 
air of each other’s world.33 
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5.8 Summary and conclusion 
 
Our results suggest that, in the context of cancer treatment refusal, patient 
autonomy can be understood as the opportunity to direct one’s own decisions and 
to direct one’s own life. For a patient, his or her own perspective, including his or 
her own personal values and experiences, forms the basis of the treatment 
decision. This perspective goes beyond the recommended treatment alternatives 
and can only be known and interpreted by listening to the patient. Respect for 
patient autonomy therefore means both guaranteeing patients’ choices (‘freedom 
of choice’), and asks for respect for the way patients strive for their own individual 
goals in life (‘freedom of being’). In the patient-physician relationship, difference in 
emphasis exists and appears to be problematic: physicians particularly articulate 
‘freedom of choice’ and patients want to be respected in both ‘freedom of choice’ 
and ‘freedom of being’. 
The liberal tradition has been criticized for not giving enough attention to a 
patients’ perspective and for only paying attention to the patient’s opportunity to 
choose. Respect for a patients’ perspective is, however, included in the liberal 
understanding of patient autonomy, although indeed not so much emphasized. In 
addition, the liberal tradition is criticized for being too individualistic. Instead, an 
ethic of care and the approach of patient-centered medicine consider a more 
relational basis of patient autonomy. We showed that in the context of cancer 
treatment refusal, relationality is present in both guaranteeing patients’ choices 
and in respect for the way patients strive for their own individual goals in life. Thus, 
in our opinion, the liberal understanding of patient autonomy and an ethic of care 
do not so much diverge as the critics suggest, at most a difference in emphasis 
exists. Combining the two perspectives may give optimal directions for a patient-
physician relationship in which there is attention for choice between treatment 
alternatives, and for both the patient’s and the medical perspective. Listening and 
dialogue in which both patient and physician are present can reach this. 
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General discussion 
 
This thesis gives an ethical exploration of treatment refusal in clinical oncology. 
The objectives of the study were twofold: firstly, to provide insight into patients’ 
and physicians’ considerations concerning treatment refusal in clinical oncology. 
Secondly, to clarify the concept of patient autonomy in the context of cancer 
treatment refusal. The main research question of the study was: how does the 
concept of patient autonomy take shape in the decision-making process on 
oncological treatment, particularly in cases of treatment refusal? The focus was 
among others on (1) the motives of patients to refuse recommended oncological 
treatment, (2) physicians’ attitudes to treatment refusal, and (3) the position of the 
patient and the role of the physician in the decision-making process, with a special 
focus on issues of patient autonomy. In this general discussion, methodological 
considerations are given, the results of the study are put into perspective, and the 
research question is discussed. 
 
Methodological considerations 
 
Given that one of the central aims of the study was to examine a relatively 
unexplored area, it was decided to use a qualitative approach.1,2 The ability of 
qualitative methods to obtain in-depth information and to generate ‘thick 
descriptions’ of situated experience, seemed to be an ideal way of addressing the 
objectives of the study. The study started with a global formulation of the problem, 
followed by the first observations in an oncological outpatient clinic. Subsequently, 
interviews were carried out and analytical and reflectional activities alternated. 
Important aspects from the interviews were further explored and analysed. The 
results were interpreted and were related to existing theories in the field of 
research. An important characteristic of the study is the relatively open explorative 
research character: it did not use an explicit observational or coding scheme that 
was specified beforehand, the study did not depart from an analytical framework, 
and no hypotheses were tested. The open explorative character has the 
advantage of signalling considerations, attitudes, and related factors that were not 
thought to be present beforehand. Another advantage is that during the interviews 
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the open explorative approach stimulated respondents (patients and physicians) to 
mention all kinds of aspects related to their decision-making process. The 
respondents were not restricted by, for example, a list of considerations that could 
relate to their decision-making process. 
Qualitative studies, like this one, may also show some shortcomings. The 
following issues are discussed here: (1) the selective group of respondents, (2) the 
number of respondents, (3) desirable answers and accounting practice, and (4) 
the absence of a one on one match between patient and physician. 
 
Selective group of respondents 
The group of respondents who participated in the study is a selective group. The 
physicians are not representative of all physicians in the Netherlands who work 
with cancer patients: they were selected from six hospitals and from general 
practices in and near Amsterdam. The patients are not a representative random 
selection of all cancer patients in the Netherlands. In the study almost all patients 
are white Dutch, a large group of patients have high educational levels, a number 
of patients were obtained from associations for cancer patients, only a selection of 
all possible cancer diagnoses is present, and the distribution of cancer diagnoses 
in the study is not the same as it is in the Dutch cancer population (for instance, 
men with lung cancer are underrepresented). Moreover, a bias may have occurred 
in that patients who talk more easily about their disease are probably also earlier 
inclined to respond to the call to participate. This bias is likely to be present both in 
the group of patients recruited by physicians and in the group of patients from the 
patient associations. Related to this response bias, a gender bias may have 
occurred: more women than men participated in the study. 
Because the study is based on a selective group of respondents, the ability to 
generalize the results to larger populations is limited. The results still can be 
considered as paving the way for further large-scale studies. The group of 
respondents was diverse enough for the purpose to explore and observe 
interesting differences between the respondents. At the same time, the group of 
respondents was compact enough to reach data satisfaction3 using qualitative 
methodology: at the end of the study (during the last interviews), no new 
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information on the subject of interest was yielded. Data satisfaction is important 
when making use of qualitative research methods.1-3 
 
Small numbers 
The number of respondents in the study (30 patients who had refused treatment, 
22 patients who had accepted treatment, and 16 physicians) is sufficient for 
qualitative research methods to reach data satisfaction.3 Still, for quantitatively 
based conclusions the numbers are small. An important limitation of working with a 
small number of respondents is that explanatory conclusions cannot be drawn. 
The present study did not strive to be explanative. The study describes 
observations and interprets them. To prevent subjective interpretations, all 
interviews were audio-taped and transcribed, the analysis was structured by using 
computer software (Kwalitan 5.0), and a second independent researcher 
supervised the process of data management. 
Another limitation of the study due to the small numbers is that patients were 
split up into groups only on the basis of the goal of the recommended treatment 
(curative or non-curative). We could not use other characteristics to split up 
patients into groups. In future research with larger populations of patients, it may 
be interesting to stipulate differences between men and women in the context of 
cancer treatment refusal, because men and women are known to have different 
styles of coping with a distressing situation.4 Moreover, women are known to be 
more active in medical decision making than men.5 In addition to differences 
between men and women, it is interesting to know more about the decision-
making process of patients who refuse treatment from the beginning compared to 
those who begin treatment and choose to stop, and to know more about patients 
who refuse all treatment compared to those who refuse only a part of a 
recommended treatment. 
 
Desirable answers and accounting practice 
Results of studies that make use of interviews may be influenced by respondents 
who give desirable answers or by respondents who give motives for their 
decisions that are influenced by accounting practice. In answering the questions 
raised by the interviewer, respondents may give answers that are not exactly 
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conform how they really acted or conform the motives that really played an 
important role in their decision-making process. Respondents may want to justify a 
decision they made on the basis of feelings or intuition. Consequently, they may 
not tell the real reasons for their decision and motivate their decision with, for 
example, arguments that are supported by a majority of the population. A possible 
reason for this is that these arguments are more easily put into words, are simpler 
to understand, or that others will ask less difficult questions. The real motivation for 
the respondent’s decision may then be different from what the respondent has put 
forward. Qualitative interview techniques provide the possibility to verify the 
respondent’s answers. In the present study, the respondent was, for example, 
asked to give an example or description that was applicable for his or her situation. 
Moreover, the interviewer was trained to recognize desirable answers or 
accounting practices. If desirable answers or accounting practices were 
recognized, those were related to answers given by the respondent earlier in the 
course of the interview and discussed with the respondent. 
 
No patient-physician match 
Finally, the study can be criticized for not having linked the patient and physician 
interviews to each other. Mostly, not the attending physician of a patient who 
participated in the study was interviewed. For a sound history of the decision-
making process between a particular physician and patient it would have been 
better to have a one on one match between patient and physician. In the present 
study, we did not strive to have information that was particularly related to the 
decision-making process of the patient’s attending physician. We strived to have 
the patient interviews as confidential as possible. We wanted to assure the patient 
that no information from the interview would be discussed with the attending 
physician. Hence, the patient could be stimulated to speak openly about all kinds 
of aspects related to the decision-making process, including the patient-physician 
relationship. To increase confidentiality, the interviews were carried out at a place 
where the patient preferred to be interviewed and anonymity in analysis and 
publication was guaranteed. 
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Discussion 
 
In the following section, the results of the study are put into perspective. Moreover, 
the main research question of the study is discussed: how does the concept of 
patient autonomy take shape in the decision-making process on oncological 
treatment, particularly in cases of treatment refusal? 
 
The patient-physician encounter 
The starting point for treatment decision making in clinical oncology is the 
encounter between the patient and the physician. The patient-physician 
relationship is shaped by the goals of that encounter, both the goals of the 
physician and the goals of the patient. These goals are multi-faceted. The goals of 
the physician are directed to provide good medical care: cure the patient or, when 
cure is not possible, provide palliative care. The other person in the encounter is 
the patient, who also has his or her own goals, both health-related goals and 
broader goals in life, as well as values and preferences. The goals of physician 
and patient may show overlap, but may sometimes also be incompatible (Chapter 
2). The reasons why patients refuse an oncological treatment are divers. Both 
medical and personal considerations seem to play a role in the patient’s decision-
making process. For example, patients find it important not to be ill due to the 
treatment, to stay in control, not to spend valuable time in the hospital (Chapter 2), 
or they emphasize reasons related to their end of life (Chapter 3). Acceptance or 
refusal of oncological treatment corresponds to different end-of-life attitudes of 
patients (Chapter 3). The study shows that physicians mainly emphasize the 
medical perspective when evaluating patients’ treatment refusals: the kind of 
tumour, the prognosis, and/or the side effects of treatment (Chapter 2). The 
differences in perspective between patient and physician sometimes result in 
tension. 
 
The patients’ perspective 
In medical decision making, taking into account the patient’s perspective is not 
always easy: each person forms his or her own conception of what is a good life 
and each person has the freedom to put the choices that arise from that 
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conception into effect, provided those choices do not harm others. This is the 
twofold basis of autonomy described in this thesis, namely as ‘making decisions’ 
(freedom of choice) and ‘defining life choices’ (freedom of being, Chapter 4 and 5). 
Making decisions entails the patient’s opportunity to choose between available 
treatment options and is related to the medical information patients obtain from 
their physician. Defining life choices refers to patients who want to strive for their 
own individual goals in life and is related to the physician’s attitude: the way the 
physician pays attention to the patient’s perspective of life and whether or not the 
physician exerts pressure on the patient to accept the recommended treatment. 
Since each person can form his or her own conception of what is a good life 
and accordingly makes decisions, it seems as if autonomy can only be valued 
within the particularity of each situation; based in an understanding of where that 
autonomy is derived from: the patient’s goals and personal conception of what is a 
good life. This personal conception may not always be in accordance with a 
medical perspective on what is best for the patient. Differences in ideas on what is 
best for the patient may then result in tension around the patient-physician 
encounter. Tension that may arise between a patient’s own individual perception 
of what is best for him or her and a more generalized perception of what is 
generally seen as good in medical practice (Chapter 2). 
The tension between patient and physician results among others from 
differences in the standards of rationality that patients and physicians use in the 
decision-making process (Chapter 2). Physicians mainly use goal-oriented 
rationality based on a general moral point of view while patients mainly use value-
oriented rationality based on a circumstantial basis. It has been shown that 
patients’ treatment decisions based on personal values and experiences fall most 
of the time outside a medical perspective and are judged by physicians as 
irrational. If physicians give more emphasis to value-oriented rationality, a 
consensus between the value-oriented approaches of patient and physician may 
emerge. That consensus may lead to a better understanding of the patient’s 
decision and acceptance by the physician. It has been discussed that the issue 
concerning differences in the standards of rationality used, is less problematic if 
physicians interpret good reasons to refuse a recommended oncological treatment 
from both a medical and a patients’ perspective based on specific values (Chapter 
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2). This touches on the approach of moral reasonability as described by Scanlon.6 
Scanlon argues that a rational person is, first of all, a reasoning person – one that 
has the capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved by reasons, and hence have 
judgment-sensitive attitudes. Irrationality occurs when a person recognizes 
something as a reason but fails to be affected by it. For example, when a person 
fails to do something even though he or she judges there are good reasons to do 
it.6 The failure to give weight to considerations of one’s own well-being is generally 
considered as the prime example of irrationality. Scanlon argues that the question 
is not whether a certain action or desire of a person is irrational, but whether it is 
open to rational criticism. Does a person have reasons or not. The reasonableness 
of a belief or an action may be assessed relative to the person’s beliefs at the time 
and the reasons he or she sees as relevant. A belief or action is mostly judged 
unreasonable relative to the way a person is reasoning from a shared body of 
information and conception of the relevant considerations or relative to the way 
that person is ignoring facts or reasons.6 
Concerning cancer treatment refusal, patients are often said to ignore facts or 
reasons. For example, the study shows that patients are said to make a 
disproportional decision since the burdens of treatment (e.g., loss of hair and/or 
nausea) do not outweigh the benefits (e.g., life-prolonging or cure). Consequently, 
physicians are inclined to provide patients with medical information about side 
effects and the consequences of not having treatment, whereas patients may have 
non-medical motives to refuse treatment (Chapter 2). In line with Katz7, we argue 
that insufficient attention is given to the unconscious and irrational motivations of 
behaviour. Physicians and patients must engage in conversations in which the 
patient’s and the physician’s perspective are discussed. 
To improve the quality of care, physicians should understand their patients’ 
perspective. This raises many challenges for physicians. Practical concerns 
include time pressure and difficulties in eliciting perspectives from patients who 
may be hesitant to make treatment decisions.8 These are compounded by a deficit 
of appropriate information to support patients’ decisions.8 The healthcare sector 
has used a range of methods to identify the perspectives of patients. Examples 
are questionnaires with the physician, shared decision-making models, focus 
groups with patients to include their views in clinical guidelines, and surveys 
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among patients to provide feedback to care providers.9 Many of the methods 
mentioned have not been shown to be valid or effective.9 The evaluation of 
specific methods to obtain the perspectives of patients therefore requires further 
research. Moreover, in medical training increased emphasis needs to be given to 
communicative skills and to stimulating a positive attitude towards psychosocial 
and existential issues present in the patients’ perspective. In addition, patients 
themselves need to be encouraged to take an active part in their decision-making 
process by raising questions and discussing issues that are important to them. 
 
Balancing medical information 
Physicians are increasingly encouraged to involve patients in treatment decisions, 
recognizing patients as experts with their unique knowledge of their own health 
and their preferences for treatments, health states and outcomes.8,10 Increased 
patient involvement is an important part of quality improvement since it has been 
associated with improved health outcomes and enables physicians to be more 
accountable to the public.8,11 However, this involvement also poses challenges for 
physicians.8 It is not always easy to give attention to a patients’ perspective. One 
cannot rely on protocols, a general standard, or something that is common to do. 
The physician needs to investigate why the patient takes an ‘illogical’ position 
(Chapter 2) and has continuously to anticipate on the particularity of the patient’s 
situation: what kind of patient is the patient who visits the physician, which 
experiences with disease and treatment takes the patient with him or her? Kodish 
and Post argued that physicians should respond to the individualized needs of 
each patient.12 Whether this is feasible in medical practice remains unclear in their 
work. What seems to be feasible is an exploration of those individualized needs of 
patients. The results of this study show that in the decision-making process on 
oncological treatment, it is important that physicians first explore the patient’s 
perspective, before giving further medical information (Chapter 4). This entails that 
patients’ own goals in life, their ideas about the end of their life (Chapter 3), and 
preferences concerning medical treatment and the provision of information are 
discussed. In other words, patients need to be approached as experts. According 
to Shaw and Baker, “all patients are experts, however uninformed or misinformed 
they may be about health issues. Patients’ expertise is valuable because by 
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understanding the patient’s views and situations, the doctor is better equipped to 
identify a solution that will lead to a successful outcome, however defined”.13 
The exploration of the patient’s perspective requires that the physician 
ensures that the patient correctly understands his or her situation with regard to 
the disease the patient is suffering from and the treatment opportunities that are 
available. Therefore, the ideas of patients about having cancer and being treated 
need to be clarified. In decision making, patients often rely on what they have 
heard and seen about having cancer and being treated. In these experiences, they 
often seem to mix up ideas about diseases and treatment (Chapter 2 and 4). 
Physicians then need to clarify that, for example, breast cancer is different from 
intestinal cancer and that chemotherapy for the former is also different from 
chemotherapy for the latter. Only when those misconceptions are exposed and 
discussed, the information given to patients will be properly precipitated, resulting 
in informed patients who are able to make decisions. 
The study shows that it is of crucial importance that in providing information to 
patients, the various goals of treatment and care are clarified. That clarification is 
an indication for patients to know in which phase of the disease they are (Chapter 
1), it influences the grade of toxicity of a treatment that is acceptable for the 
physician and for the patient (Chapter 1), and it strongly influences physicians’ 
attitudes towards treatment refusal (Chapter 1, 2, 4). Clearness about treatment 
goals stimulates a good communication between patient and physician. Another 
reason is that close consideration of used terminologies contributes to 
transparency in the cooperation between physicians. Every physician will then 
provide the same information to the patient. 
In clinical oncology, however, the distinction between curative and palliative 
treatments seems to be problematic (Chapter 1). For example, often the physician 
knows very well what he or she means using the term ‘palliative’, but the word 
‘palliative’ may be interpreted in a more favourable way by patients (see also the 
studies of The et al.14 and Koedoot15). Miscommunication and misunderstanding 
about the goal of the recommended treatment being curative or palliative may 
result in tension during the patient-physician encounter. Calling treatment goals 
non-curative instead of palliative seems to be one solution of the problem of 
miscommunication and misunderstanding (Chapter 1). However, the distinction 
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between curative and non-curative treatments then still is problematic. For some 
physicians and patients the distinction will remain a grey area: a lot of 
uncertainties exist about the curative effects of certain treatment and/or about the 
cut-off point of calling a treatment curative or non-curative. In such cases, 
communication mostly concerns scientific uncertainties and/or how to interpret 
percentages. On the other hand, if treatment goals are clear, some patients may, 
for example, insist on their belief of the curative opportunities of the treatment, 
although they receive non-curative treatment. For physicians, it is very hard to 
evaluate whether they should continue in those cases to repeat that the goal is 
non-curative. The hope of the patient may after all positively influence the disease 
process and should not be swept away. Physicians need to balance the obligation 
to be honest with an equally important duty to cultivate hope.12 
A related balancing process can be observed in the presentation of treatment 
options to a patient as such that he or she is able to deliberately make a choice 
(freedom of choice, Chapter 4 and 5). The present study shows that patients find it 
important to have the opportunity to choose between treatment options; between, 
for example, the option not-to-treat. Patients who refused treatment indicated not 
to have the opportunity to choose when the recommended treatment was 
presented as the standard treatment or when the option not-to-treat was not 
presented as an option. However, in giving patients the opportunity to choose, 
physicians must balance the amount of information that is provided to patients: too 
little information may cause that patients do not experience the opportunity of real 
choice, and too much information may cause chaos, leading also to a difficult 
decision-making process. 
In the above, it is the physician who is able to set limits to the provision of 
information. The physician judges the situation and may, for example, in some 
cases decide that not much emphasis should be given to the fact that a treatment 
is non-curative. Sometimes, the physician makes a selection in the information 
that is provided to the patient, because by giving too much information, the patient 
may be overwhelmed and may not be able to handle the situation anymore. 
Consequently, the physician’s considerations with regard to the provision of 
information and his or her way of providing information may determine the freedom 
the patient has in the decision-making process (Chapter 4 and 5). 
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Interestingly, nowadays, in medical practice, there are new developments in 
the patient-physician encounter. Patients more and more gather information from 
the internet and visit their physician with this information in mind. For example, 
patients ask for treatments that are developed or are already in use in other 
countries. In these cases, physicians are not able anymore to set limits to the 
provision of information. It would be interesting to investigate what patient 
autonomy entails if patients, instead of refusing oncological treatment, claim 
oncological treatment they found on the internet. Treatment decision-making 
processes will then shift from the physician as gatekeeper of medical information 
towards the physician as gatekeeper of medical treatment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results show that in the decision-making process on oncological treatment 
patient autonomy takes shape in the way patients make decisions and define their 
own life choices. In this context, patient autonomy is related to the way physicians 
take into account a patients’ perspective (freedom of being) and to the way 
physicians provide medical information (freedom of choice). An important condition 
for patient autonomy to flourish in the fullest way possible is that patients’ personal 
values, experiences, ideas (including those about the end of life), convictions, and 
fears, are discussed and medical information is tuned to the patient’s perspective. 
Only then patients can deliberately make an informed decision that is congruent 
with their own perspective of life. Concerning the incorporation of a patients’ 
perspective and the provision of medical information, clearly a multitude of 
challenges exist for the physician. The physician balances hope with the obligation 
to be honest, the obligation of giving all information with the risk of causing chaos, 
and the physician balances the patient’s own individual perception of what is best 
for him or her with a more generalized perception of what is generally seen as 
good in medical practice. Particularly when a patient refuses recommended 
oncological treatment it may be difficult to balance the concept of patient 
autonomy with the desire to provide optimal medical care. 
A physicians’ response to treatment refusal needs to honour all ethical aspects 
of the unique context of the interaction between the physician and the patient: the 
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purpose of health care and treatment, the benefits and burdens of treatment, and, 
last but not least, the patient’s perspective. A wise response to refusal of 
recommended oncological treatment can thus only be found in the particularity of 
each situation. Giving a patients’ perspective a more prominent role in medical 
decision making asks for a role of the physician that is directed at both the medical 
opportunities in decision making and at getting insight into patients’ motives for 
certain treatment decisions. Making a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ statement about the irrationality 
of the decision to refuse the recommended treatment is not the solution. It may 
only result in a strengthening of the tension between patient and physician. 
Exploring the patient’s perspective, asking what the expectations of the 
recommended treatment are and discussing these expectations seem to be more 
in line with a patient-physician relationship in which there is respect and 
understanding. This makes treatment decision making a unique balancing process 
instead of a ‘slam-dunk’. 
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Decision making in clinical oncology: an ethical exploration of cancer 
treatment refusal 
 
This thesis gives an ethical exploration of treatment refusal in clinical oncology. 
The objectives of the study were twofold: firstly, to provide insight into patients’ 
and physicians’ considerations concerning treatment refusal in clinical oncology. 
Secondly, to clarify the concept of patient autonomy in the context of cancer 
treatment refusal. The main research question of the study was: how does the 
concept of patient autonomy take shape in the decision-making process on 
oncological treatment, particularly in cases of treatment refusal? The focus was 
among others on (1) the motives of patients to refuse recommended oncological 
treatment, (2) physicians’ attitudes to treatment refusal, and (3) the position of the 
patient and the role of the physician in the decision-making process, with a special 
focus on issues of patient autonomy. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1 describes the indistinctness and misunderstandings surrounding the 
use of the term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology. When discussing the start, 
continuation, or finish of treatment, it is for both physician and patient important to 
know what the goal of a certain treatment is. Therefore, it is necessary to know 
what is meant with the used terminologies. The objective was to clarify the term 
‘palliative’ in clinical oncology. 
The results show that in clinical oncology, the term ‘palliative’ is used in two 
ways. Firstly, to describe palliative treatments and care as described in the 
palliative care definition of the World Health Organization. Those treatments are 
directed at pain and symptom relief. Secondly, in clinical oncology, the term 
‘palliative’ is used to describe non-curative tumour-directed treatments. Those 
treatments are directed at both symptom relief and at controlling the underlying 
disease, but may also have side effects. Both approaches of the term ‘palliative’ 
appear to be mixed up, whereas, clear differences between the two approaches 
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can be distinguished. Diversity in treatment goals and effects make the use of the 
term ‘palliative’ in clinical oncology disputable. The contamination of the term 
‘palliative’ with the inflicted symptoms of toxicity of oncological treatments and 
possible worsening conditions of quality of life is problematic. The transition from 
curative to palliative treatment may be obscured when symptom-oriented palliative 
treatments are in fact tumour-directed. Moreover, the fact that the same anti-
cancer treatments can be given to patients with palliative or curative intention is 
confusing. 
In Chapter 1, it is concluded that if we want to define an oncological treatment 
as palliative, then side effects endangering quality of life should be avoided. 
Although a non-curative oncological treatment may be palliative, to forego 
miscommunication, goals should be called non-curative. Clarity about the term 
‘palliative’ in clinical oncology is of crucial importance for the treatment decision-
making process. Close consideration of the use of the term ‘palliative’ will help to 
clarify the various goals of treatment and care in oncological practice. This 
stimulates a good communication with the patient. Furthermore, close 
consideration of used terminologies contributes to clearness in the cooperation 
between physicians. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
In Chapter 2, physicians’ evaluations of patients’ decisions to refuse oncological 
treatment are discussed. Often a physician’s evaluation of a patient’s treatment 
refusal is directed to the question: is the patient’s decision rational or not? The 
actual standards of rationality in these cases, however, are not clear. The question 
therefore arises: on what basis do physicians distinguish between their patients’ 
rational and irrational arguments? The objective of this chapter was to gain insight 
into the standards of rationality that physicians use when evaluating patients’ 
treatment refusals. 
The results show that patients base their treatment refusals mainly on 
personal values and/or experience. Physicians mainly emphasize the medical 
perspective when evaluating patients’ treatment refusals. From a medical 
perspective, a patient’s treatment refusal based on personal values and 
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experience is generally evaluated as irrational and difficult to accept, especially 
when it concerns a curative treatment. Physicians have different attitudes towards 
non-curative treatments and have less difficulty accepting a patient’s refusal of 
these treatments. Thus, an important factor in the physician’s evaluation of a 
treatment refusal is whether the treatment refused is curative or non-curative. 
Physicians mainly use goal-oriented rationality and patients mainly value-
oriented rationality, but in the case of non-curative treatment refusal, physicians 
give more emphasis to value-oriented rationality. A consensus between the value-
oriented approaches of patient and physician may then emerge, leading to the 
patient’s decision being understood and accepted by the physician. The 
physician’s acceptance is crucial to his or her attitude towards the patient: if a 
physician does not accept the treatment refusal, he or she is often inclined to 
persist in convincing the patient to accept the treatment. This results in patients 
experiencing that they are not really free to make their decisions, leading to 
frustration and miscommunication. If a physician does accept a patient’s treatment 
refusal, this will contribute to the patient’s feeling of being free to decide, to be 
understood and respected in his or her decision, and thus contribute to a better 
physician-patient relationship. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Patients’ decisions on accepting or refusing oncological treatment are influenced 
by several factors. A factor that needs more understanding concerns the end-of-
life attitude of the patient. Chapter 3 discusses patients’ attitudes regarding death 
and dying in relation to their treatment decision. 
Seven end-of-life attitudes were distinguished: fighting death, avoiding death, 
fearing death, fearing dying, making (funeral) arrangements, controlling death, and 
accepting death. A majority of the patients who had refused treatment also 
accepted death. They particularly focused on the end of their life. A majority of the 
patients who had accepted treatment fought against death or avoided death. They 
focused on how to stay alive and how to define life choices. They regarded their 
treatment as life-prolonging and death-postponing. Having a social network 
seemed to be important in accepting treatment. Accepting or refusing treatment 
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appeared not to be related to fear of death or fear of dying. A desire for 
euthanasia, however, appeared to be related to fear of dying. Both patients who 
refused and who accepted treatment mentioned euthanasia. Patients desired 
euthanasia because they wanted to stay in control and did not want to be 
dependent on physicians. 
In Chapter 3, it is concluded that acceptance or refusal of oncological 
treatment corresponds to different end-of-life attitudes of patients. Knowledge of 
the end-of-life attitudes of a patient in an early stage of disease may help 
physicians to understand patients’ decisions regarding oncological treatment. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the principle of patient autonomy. Nowadays, the idea that 
patients should take up an autonomous position in the decision-making process is 
generally appreciated. Chapter 4 aimed to clarify how the concept of patient 
autonomy can be applied to patients who refuse a recommended oncological 
treatment. Focus questions were: (1) what is meant by patient autonomy, i.e. how 
is this autonomy conceptualized and (2) which factors influence patient autonomy. 
The results show that patient autonomy was revealed to be a comprehensive 
concept with elaborations on ‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life choices’ as sub-
concepts of patient autonomy. In contrast to what is generally believed, decisions 
of patients to refuse an oncological treatment do not so much rely on the medical 
information about disease and treatment options, but are rather inspired by 
patients’ own experiences or those of close others. The medical information and 
the role of the physician do, however, influence patients’ experiences of having a 
choice (‘freedom of choice’, dependent on the information given to the patient) 
and/or being free (‘freedom’ without referring to choices, but dependent on the 
intervention of physicians in the decision making process). The results show that 
the extent of pressure physicians will exert to persuade the patient to be treated as 
recommended depends on the medical distinction between a curative and a non-
curative treatment goal. It seems that there exists a shift in respecting patient 
autonomy, which depends on factors like treatment goal. It is suggested that 
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discussing the respect shift may serve to clarify underlying thoughts and principles 
in the decision-making process for both physicians and patients. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 offers a more comprehensive, ethical-philosophical elaboration on 
patient autonomy. It is discussed how the results of the empirical study on cancer 
treatment refusal relate to the liberal understanding of patient autonomy, to the 
perspective of an ethic of care, and to the approach of patient-centered medicine. 
The focus was on (1) patient autonomy as ‘making decisions’ and ‘defining life 
choices’, (2) the idea of freedom that is attached to patient autonomy, and (3) a 
patients’ and a physicians’ perspective in medical decision making. 
In the context of cancer treatment refusal, patient autonomy can be 
understood as the opportunity to direct one’s own decisions and to direct one’s 
own life. Respect for patient autonomy therefore means both guaranteeing 
patients’ choices (‘freedom of choice’), and asks for respect for the way patients 
strive for their own individual goals in life (‘freedom of being’). In the patient-
physician relationship, difference in emphasis exists and appears to be 
problematic: physicians particularly articulate ‘freedom of choice’ and patients 
want to be respected in both ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘freedom of being’. The 
liberal tradition has been criticized for not giving enough attention to a patients’ 
perspective and for only paying attention to the patient’s opportunity to choose. 
Respect for a patients’ perspective is, however, included in the liberal 
understanding of patient autonomy, although indeed not so much emphasized. In 
addition, the liberal tradition is criticized for being to individualistic. Instead, an 
ethic of care and the approach of patient-centered medicine consider a more 
relational basis of patient autonomy. It is shown that in the context of cancer 
treatment refusal, relationality is present in both guaranteeing patients’ choices 
and in respect for the way patients strive for their own individual goals in life. 
Chapter 5 concludes to state that in the context of cancer treatment refusal, 
the liberal understanding of patient autonomy and an ethic of care do not so much 
diverge as the critics suggest, at most a difference in emphasis exists. Combining 
the two perspectives may give optimal directions for a patient-physician 
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relationship in which there is attention for choice between treatment alternatives, 
and for both the patient’s and the medical perspective. 
 
General discussion 
 
In the general discussion, some methodological considerations are given, which 
focus on the open explorative character and on some shortcomings of the 
qualitative study. The open explorative character has the advantage of signalling 
considerations, attitudes, and related factors that were not thought to be present 
beforehand. Another advantage is that during the interviews, the open explorative 
approach stimulated respondents (patients and physicians) to mention all kinds of 
aspects related to their decision-making process without being restricted by, for 
example, a list of considerations that could relate to their decision-making process. 
Qualitative studies, like this one, may also show some shortcomings. Discussed 
are: (1) the selective group of respondents, (2) the number of respondents, (3) 
desirable answers and accounting practice, and (4) the absence of a one on one 
match between patient and physician. 
Furthermore, the results of the study are put into perspective and the main 
research question of the study is discussed: how does the concept of patient 
autonomy take shape in the decision-making process on oncological treatment, 
particularly in cases of treatment refusal? The focus is on the patient-physician 
encounter as the starting point for treatment decision making in clinical oncology. 
In the decision-making process on oncological treatment patient autonomy takes 
shape in the way patients make decisions and define their own life choices. In this 
context, patient autonomy is related to the way physicians provide medical 
information (freedom of choice) and to the way physicians take into account a 
patients’ perspective (freedom of being). Difficulties and challenges concerning the 
provision of information to patients and concerning taking into account a patients’ 
perspective are discussed and suggestions for future research and medical 
training are given. 
It is concluded that concerning the provision of medical information and 
concerning taking into account a patients’ perspective, clearly a multitude of 
challenges exist for the physician. A physicians’ response to treatment refusal 
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needs to honour all ethical aspects of the unique context of the interaction 
between the physician and the patient: the purpose of health care and treatment, 
the benefits and burdens of treatment, and, last but not least, the patient’s 
perspective. A wise response to refusal of recommended oncological treatment 
can thus only be found in the particularity of each situation. This makes treatment 
decision making a unique balancing process instead of a ‘slam-dunk’. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Besluitvorming in de klinische oncologie: een ethische exploratie van de 
beslissing van patiënten om af te zien van een oncologische behandeling 
 
In dit proefschrift wordt een ethische exploratie beschreven van de beslissing van 
patiënten om af te zien van een oncologische behandeling. Het doel van het 
onderzoek was tweeledig: ten eerste om de overwegingen van arts en patiënt 
betreffende het afzien van een oncologische behandeling inzichtelijk te maken. 
Ten tweede om het concept patiënten autonomie in de context van patiënten die 
afzien van een oncologische behandeling te verhelderen. De belangrijkste 
onderzoeksvraag was: hoe krijgt het concept patiënten autonomie gestalte in het 
besluitvormingsproces betreffende een oncologische behandeling, met name 
wanneer patiënten afzien van behandeling. De aandacht was onder meer gericht 
op (1) de redenen van patiënten om van een aanbevolen oncologische 
behandeling af te zien, (2) de houding van de arts ten aanzien van de beslissing 
van patiënten om af te zien van een oncologische behandeling, en (3) de positie 
van de patiënt en de rol van de arts in het besluitvormingsproces, met speciale 
aandacht voor onderwerpen die te maken hebben met de autonomie van de 
patiënt.  
 
Hoofdstuk 1 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijft onduidelijkheden en misverstanden rondom het gebruik van 
de term ‘palliatief’ in de oncologische praktijk. Wanneer er gesproken wordt over 
het beginnen, doorgaan of stoppen van een behandeling is het voor arts en patiënt 
belangrijk te weten wat het doel van een bepaalde behandeling is. Daarom is het 
noodzakelijk om goed voor ogen te hebben wat er bedoeld wordt met de gebruikte 
terminologieën. Er is gepoogd de term ‘palliatief’ in de klinische oncologie te 
verhelderen. 
De resultaten laten zien dat de term ‘palliatief’ in de klinische oncologie op 
twee manieren wordt gebruikt. Ten eerste om palliatieve behandelingen en zorg 
aan te duiden zoals beschreven in de definitie van de World Health Organization. 
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Deze behandelingen zijn gericht op pijn- en symptoombestrijding. Ten tweede 
wordt de term ‘palliatief’ in de klinische oncologie gebruikt voor niet-curatieve op 
de tumor gerichte behandelingen. Deze behandelingen zijn gericht op 
symptoombestrijding en op het controleren van de onderliggende ziekte, maar 
kunnen ook bijwerkingen hebben. Beide benaderingen blijken door elkaar te 
worden gebruikt, terwijl er duidelijke verschillen bestaan. De verscheidenheid in 
behandelingsdoeleinden en -effecten maken het gebruik van de term ‘palliatief’ 
discutabel. Het is problematisch dat de term ‘palliatief’ wordt geassocieerd met 
symptomen van toxiciteit en met een mogelijke verslechtering van kwaliteit van 
leven. De overgang van curatieve naar palliatieve behandeling wordt onduidelijk 
wanneer op symptomen gerichte palliatieve behandelingen in feite op de tumor 
gerichte behandelingen zijn. Bovendien is het verwarrend dat een zelfde 
oncologische behandeling een curatief of een palliatief doel kan hebben. 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt geconcludeerd dat wanneer we een oncologische 
behandeling palliatief willen noemen, bijwerkingen die de kwaliteit van leven in 
gevaar brengen, dienen te worden vermeden. Ook al kan een niet-curatieve 
oncologische behandeling palliatief zijn, om miscommunicatie te voorkomen, zou 
het doel van de behandeling als niet-curatief moeten worden aangeduid. 
Helderheid over de term ‘palliatief’ in de klinische oncologie is een belangrijke 
vereiste voor het besluitvormingsproces. Een weloverwogen gebruik van de term 
‘palliatief’ kan helpen bij het verhelderen van de verscheidene doeleinden van 
behandeling en zorg in de oncologische praktijk. Dit stimuleert een heldere 
communicatie met de patiënt. Verder draagt het bij aan duidelijkheid in de 
samenwerking tussen artsen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt ingegaan op oordelen van artsen over de beslissing van 
patiënten om af te zien van een oncologische behandeling. Het oordeel van de 
arts betreft vaak de vraag of de beslissing van de patiënt rationeel is. Echter, de 
standaarden van rationaliteit in deze gevallen zijn niet helder. De vraag is daarom 
op grond waarvan artsen onderscheid maken tussen rationele en irrationele 
argumenten van patiënten. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk was inzicht te krijgen in de 
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standaarden van rationaliteit die artsen gebruiken wanneer zij oordelen over de 
beslissing van patiënten om af te zien van een behandeling. 
De resultaten laten zien dat artsen voornamelijk een medisch perspectief 
benadrukken wanneer zij de beslissing van patiënten om af te zien van een 
behandeling beoordelen. Voor een arts is het belangrijk of de 
behandelingsbeslissing een curatieve of een niet-curatieve oncologische 
behandeling betreft. Patiënten baseren hun beslissing om af te zien van een 
oncologische behandeling voornamelijk op persoonlijke waarden en ervaringen. 
Vanuit een medisch perspectief worden beslissingen van patiënten die gebaseerd 
zijn op persoonlijke waarden en ervaringen over het algemeen als irrationeel 
beoordeeld en moeilijk te accepteren, met name wanneer het een curatieve 
behandeling betreft. Artsen hebben een andere houding ten aanzien van niet-
curatieve behandelingen. Zij hebben dan minder moeite om de beslissing van 
patiënten te accepteren. 
Artsen gebruiken met name een doelgeoriënteerde rationaliteit en patiënten 
met name een waardegeoriënteerde rationaliteit. Wanneer patiënten afzien van 
een niet-curatieve behandeling zijn artsen geneigd de waardegeoriënteerde 
rationaliteit meer te benadrukken. Een consensus tussen de waardegeoriënteerde 
benadering van arts en patiënt kan dan optreden, met als gevolg begrip en 
acceptatie van de arts voor de beslissing van de patiënt. De acceptatie van de arts 
is cruciaal voor zijn of haar houding ten opzichte van de patiënt: wanneer een arts 
de beslissing van de patiënt niet accepteert, zal de arts geneigd zijn de patiënt te 
overtuigen de aanbevolen behandeling te ondergaan. Hierdoor kunnen patiënten 
ervaren dat ze niet echt vrij zijn om te beslissen, wat kan leiden tot frustratie en 
miscommunicatie. Wanneer een arts de beslissing van de patiënt wel accepteert, 
zal dit bijdragen aan de beleving van de patiënt vrij te zijn om te beslissen, te 
worden begrepen en gerespecteerd in de beslissing, en zal dit dus bijdragen aan 
een betere arts-patiënt relatie. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 
 
Beslissingen van patiënten over het accepteren of afzien van een oncologische 
behandeling worden beïnvloed door verscheidene factoren. Een factor die meer 
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aandacht behoeft, is de attitude van de patiënt ten aanzien van het einde van het 
leven. In hoofdstuk 3 worden de attitudes van patiënten ten aanzien van de dood 
en ten aanzien van het overlijden beschreven in relatie tot hun 
behandelbeslissingen. 
Zeven attitudes ten aanzien van het einde van het leven werden 
onderscheiden: vechten tegen de dood, vermijden van de dood, angst voor de 
dood, angst voor het overlijden, regelingen treffen (begrafenis), controle over de 
dood en het accepteren van de dood. Het merendeel van de patiënten dat had 
afgezien van een behandeling, accepteerde de dood. Deze patiënten richtten zich 
voornamelijk op het einde van het leven. Het merendeel van de patiënten dat de 
aanbevolen behandeling had geaccepteerd, vocht tegen de dood. Deze patiënten 
richtten zich op hoe in leven te blijven en hoe invulling te geven aan hun leven. Zij 
zagen de behandeling als levensverlengend en als uitstel van de dood. Het 
hebben van een sociaal netwerk bleek belangrijk te zijn bij het accepteren van de 
behandeling. Het accepteren of afzien van behandeling bleek niet gerelateerd te 
zijn aan angst voor de dood of aan angst voor het overlijden. Echter, een wens 
voor euthanasie bleek wel gerelateerd te zijn aan angst voor het overlijden. Zowel 
patiënten die afzagen van behandeling als patiënten die de aanbevolen 
behandeling accepteerden, spraken over euthanasie. Patiënten hadden een wens 
voor euthanasie omdat ze controle wilden houden en niet afhankelijk van artsen 
wilden zijn.  
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt geconcludeerd dat het accepteren of afzien van 
behandeling correspondeert met verschillende attitudes van patiënten ten aanzien 
van het einde van het leven. Kennis van deze attitudes in een vroeg stadium van 
de ziekte kan artsen helpen de beslissing van patiënten betreffende oncologische 
behandelingen te begrijpen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op het principe van de autonomie van de patiënt. Over het 
algemeen wordt tegenwoordig aangenomen dat patiënten een autonome positie 
dienen in te nemen bij behandelingsbeslissingen. Hoofdstuk 4 had tot doel te 
verhelderen hoe het concept patiënten autonomie gestalte krijgt bij patiënten die 
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afzien van een aanbevolen oncologische behandeling. De belangrijkste vragen 
waren: (1) wat wordt er verstaan onder patiënten autonomie, en (2) welke factoren 
zijn van invloed op patiënten autonomie. 
De resultaten laten zien dat patiënten autonomie een veelomvattend concept 
is met uitwijdingen op opvattingen van patiënten autonomie als ‘het nemen van 
beslissingen’ en ‘het invullen van je eigen leven’. In tegenstelling tot wat over het 
algemeen wordt aangenomen, blijken patiënten die afzien van een behandeling bij 
hun beslissing niet zozeer te steunen op de medische informatie over ziekte of 
behandelingsmogelijkheden, maar worden ze geïnspireerd door hun eigen 
ervaringen en die van hun naasten. De medische informatie en de rol van de arts 
beïnvloeden wel de beleving van de patiënt een keuze te hebben (‘keuzevrijheid’, 
afhankelijk van de informatie die aan de patiënt is verstrekt) en de beleving vrij te 
zijn om te beslissen (‘vrijheid’ zonder referentie aan keuzen, maar afhankelijk van 
de inmenging van artsen in het besluitvormingsproces). De resultaten laten zien 
dat de mate van druk die een arts op de patiënt uitoefent om zich te laten 
behandelen zoals aanbevolen, afhankelijk is van het onderscheid tussen het 
curatieve of niet-curatieve doel van de behandeling. Er lijkt een verschuiving op te 
treden in het respecteren van de autonomie van de patiënt welke afhankelijk is 
van factoren zoals het doel van de behandeling. Er wordt gesuggereerd dat 
discussie over deze verschuiving voor arts en patiënt opheldering kan geven over 
de onderliggende gedachten en principes van het besluitvormingsproces. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een meer ethisch-filosofische uiteenzetting van het concept 
patiënten autonomie. Er wordt beschreven hoe de relatie is tussen de resultaten 
van de empirische studie en het liberale idee van patiënten autonomie, het 
zorgethisch perspectief op patiënten autonomie en de patient-centered medicine 
benadering van patiënten autonomie. De aandacht is gericht op (1) autonomie als 
‘het nemen van beslissingen’ en ‘het invullen van je eigen leven’, (2) het idee van 
vrijheid dat verbonden is met patiënten autonomie, en (3) het perspectief van arts 
en patiënt in de medische besluitvorming. 
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In de context van patiënten die afzien van behandeling, kan de autonomie van 
de patiënt worden beschouwd als de mogelijkheid om te beslissen en de 
mogelijkheid het eigen leven gestalte te geven. Het respecteren van de autonomie 
van de patiënt betekent daarom het waarborgen van een keuzemogelijkheid voor 
de patiënt (‘keuzevrijheid’) en vraagt om respect voor de manier waarop de patiënt 
zijn of haar eigen individuele levensdoelen nastreeft (‘zijnsvrijheid’). Het lijkt 
problematisch dat arts en patiënt verschillen in de hoeveelheid aandacht die wordt 
besteed aan ‘keuzevrijheid’ en aan ‘zijnsvrijheid’: artsen benadrukken met name 
de ‘keuzevrijheid’ van patiënten en patiënten willen gerespecteerd worden in hun 
‘keuzevrijheid’ en in hun ‘zijnsvrijheid’. De liberale traditie wordt bekritiseerd op het 
niet rekening houden met het perspectief van de patiënt. De liberale traditie zou 
zich alleen maar richten op het waarborgen van een keuzemogelijkheid voor de 
patiënt. Echter, in de liberale traditie komt ook het respecteren van het perspectief 
van de patiënt naar voren, maar dit wordt inderdaad niet erg benadrukt. Verder 
wordt de liberale traditie bekritiseerd op een te individualistisch idee van patiënten 
autonomie. In plaats daarvan beschouwen het zorgethisch perspectief en de 
patient-centered medicine benadering een meer relationele basis van patiënten 
autonomie. Er wordt aangetoond dat deze relationaliteit aanwezig is bij zowel het 
waarborgen van een keuzemogelijkheid voor de patiënt als bij het respecteren van 
de manier waarop de patiënt zijn of haar eigen levensdoelen nastreeft. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt geconcludeerd dat betreffende het afzien van 
behandeling, het liberale idee van patiënten autonomie en het zorgethisch 
perspectief niet zover uiteenlopen als door sommige critici wordt gesuggereerd. Er 
bestaat hooguit een verschil in welke aspecten er worden benadrukt. Het 
combineren van de twee perspectieven kan richtinggevend zijn voor een arts-
patiënt relatie waarin er aandacht is voor de keuze tussen behandelings-
alternatieven en voor het patiënten en het medische perspectief. 
 
Discussie 
 
In de discussie wordt ingegaan op enkele methodologische overwegingen. Deze 
hebben betrekking op het open exploratieve karakter van de studie en op enkele 
tekortkomingen van de studie. Het open exploratieve karakter van de studie heeft 
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als voordeel dat overwegingen, attitudes en hieraan gerelateerde factoren konden 
worden gesignaleerd zonder dat deze vooraf bedacht waren. Een ander voordeel 
is dat gedurende het interviewen, respondenten (artsen en patiënten) 
gestimuleerd werden om allerlei aspecten van het besluitvormingsproces te 
noemen zonder dat zij beperkt werden door bijvoorbeeld een lijst met 
overwegingen die mogelijkerwijs te maken hadden met het besluitvormingsproces. 
De studie kende ook enkele tekortkomingen. Er wordt ingegaan op: (1) de 
selectieve groep van respondenten, (2) het aantal respondenten, (3) het geven 
van wenselijke antwoorden of het willen rechtvaardigen van beslissingen, en (4) 
de afwezigheid van een één op één match tussen patiënt en arts. 
Vervolgens worden de resultaten van de studie in perspectief geplaatst en 
wordt ingegaan op de onderzoeksvraag: hoe krijgt het concept patiënten 
autonomie gestalte in het besluitvormingsproces betreffende een oncologische 
behandeling, met name wanneer patiënten afzien van behandeling. Er wordt 
aandacht besteed aan de arts-patiënt relatie als beginpunt van 
behandelingsbeslissingen in de klinische oncologie. In het besluitvormingsproces 
over oncologische behandelingen krijgt patiënten autonomie gestalte door de 
manier waarop patiënten beslissingen nemen en hun eigen leven invullen. In deze 
context is patiënten autonomie gerelateerd aan de manier waarop de arts de 
patiënt informeert (‘keuzevrijheid’) en gerelateerd aan de manier waarop de arts 
rekening houdt met het perspectief van de patiënt (‘zijnsvrijheid’). Moeilijkheden en 
uitdagingen met betrekking tot het geven van informatie aan patiënten en met 
betrekking tot het rekening houden met het perspectief van de patiënt worden 
uiteengezet en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek en voor de medisch opleiding 
worden gegeven. 
Er wordt geconcludeerd dat het geven van informatie en het rekening houden 
met het perspectief van de patiënt duidelijk een aantal uitdagingen voor de arts 
met zich meebrengen. De arts dient rekening te houden met alle ethische 
aspecten van de unieke context waarin de interactie tussen arts en patiënt 
plaatsvindt: het doel van de geneeskunde en van de behandeling, de voor- en 
nadelen van de behandeling, en last but not least, het perspectief van de patiënt. 
Een verstandige reactie op de beslissing van patiënten om af te zien van een 
aanbevolen behandeling dient rekening te houden met de bijzonderheid van de 
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situatie. Dit zorgt ervoor dat het nemen van behandelingsbeslissingen een uniek 
proces van afwegen is in plaats van een ‘slam-dunk’. 
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Het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift had ik niet kunnen uitvoeren zonder 
de medewerking en steun van een aantal mensen. Aan hen wil ik graag deze 
laatste regels besteden. 
Allereerst wil ik mijn dank betuigen aan alle patiënten die ik heb mogen 
interviewen. Patiënten die geheel belangeloos hun ervaringen met mij wilden 
delen, die soms met moeilijke aspecten van hun ziekte- en behandelingstraject 
werden geconfronteerd en toch voor mij probeerden te verwoorden wat hun 
overwegingen, ervaringen, gedachten en gevoelens waren. Het interviewen van al 
deze mensen was voor mij een enorme ervaring. De herinnering eraan heb ik, 
vooral tijdens de moeilijkere perioden van het schrijven, als een bijzondere 
stimulans ervaren om dit proefschrift af te ronden. 
Tevens wil ik alle artsen bedanken die betrokken waren bij het includeren van 
patiënten voor het onderzoek. Ook ben ik veel dank verschuldigd aan de artsen 
die voor mij de tijd namen om hun ervaringen met vaak moeilijke 
behandelingsbeslissingen te delen. Zij vertelden mij over afgebakende grenzen en 
grijze gebieden in de geneeskunde, over hun professionele en persoonlijke 
dilemma’s en over hun overwegingen en argumenten met betrekking tot patiënten 
die afzien van behandeling. Deze interviews hebben ertoe bijgedragen dat ik 
interessante inzichten heb verworven die vaak verder reikten dan het onderzoek 
beschreven in dit proefschrift. 
Graag wil ik mijn woord van dank richten aan Evert van Leeuwen, mijn 
promotor. Evert, jij bent degene geweest die me wegwijs heeft gemaakt in de 
medische ethiek. De vele (koffie)gesprekken die we voerden, zal ik me nog lang 
blijven herinneren. Ook al leverden de gesprekken met jou, waarin hoofd- en 
bijzaken soms moeilijk te scheiden waren, zo nu en dan gevoelens van 
hopeloosheid op, ze resulteerden ook vaak in bruikbare ideeën. 
Naast Evert, wil ik Berna van Baarsen, mijn directe begeleider en co-promotor, 
bedanken. Berna, na het afronden van je eigen promotieonderzoek stapte je 
zonder veel moeite direct in het volgende promotieonderzoek. Jij wist mij met 
behulp van een heus rollenspel de beginselen van het interviewen bij te brengen. 
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Later zorgden jouw immer gedegen commentaren bij de stukken die ik schreef 
voor vele interessante discussies over structuur en opbouw van de artikelen. 
Een promotie kan natuurlijk niet plaatsvinden zonder lees- en 
promotiecommissie. Graag wil ik prof.dr. J.J.M. van Delden, dr. W. Gerritsen, 
prof.dr. J.C.J.M. de Haes, dr. K. Hoekman, mr.dr. A-M. The, prof.dr. M.A. Verkerk 
en prof.dr. G. van der Wal bedanken voor de tijd en aandacht die zij hebben 
besteed aan het doorlezen en becommentariëren van het manuscript. 
Van de mensen uit de lees- en promotiecommissie ben ik speciale dank 
verschuldigd aan Klaas Hoekman. Klaas, jij zorgde voor de contacten in de 
ziekenhuizen, je was een belangrijke schakel tussen ‘theorie en praktijk’. Via jouw 
contacten heb ik veel artsen zover kunnen krijgen dat ze in hun schaarse tijd ook 
nog aandacht aan mijn onderzoek wilden besteden. 
Voor het vragen van de huisartsen die aan de studie hebben meegewerkt, ben 
ik dank verschuldigd aan Gerrit Kimsma en Frans Meijman. 
De mensen uit de onderzoeksgroepen waarin ik participeer(de), wil ik 
bedanken voor het meedenken over en het bediscussiëren van het onderzoek: het 
Landelijk Overleg Ethiek en Palliatieve Zorg (LOEP), de EMGO-groep Quality and 
End-of-Life Studies (QUEST), de Nivel-groep Provider-Patient Interaction (PPI), de 
onderzoeksgroep Empirisch Onderzoek in de Palliatieve Zorg en ten slotte de 
Onderzoeksschool Wetenschap, Technologie en Moderne Cultuur. 
Ook Annemiek Nelis wil ik op deze plek bedanken voor de inspirerende 
gesprekken die we hebben gevoerd. Ik vind het nog steeds jammer dat ik niet 
meer even bij je kan binnenlopen om je verfrissende ideeën over het onderzoek te 
horen. 
Van de oude afdeling Metamedica wil ik verder de ‘junioren’ Max, Krista en 
Sofie bedanken voor de gezellige bijeenkomsten onder de noemer 
‘juniorenoverleg’. Het was fijn om in de eerste twee jaar van het promotietraject 
het wel en wee van het promovendusleven met jullie te kunnen delen. 
Astrid, mijn promotiemaatje en paranimf wil ik hier ook graag bedanken. 
Samen waren wij ‘de promovendi van Evert’. We gingen in de Panda of de Coupé 
naar WTMC in Enschede en op ‘zorgethiek week’ in Soesterberg (met tussendoor 
ons uitstapje naar de film The Gladiator). Ook de tennisweek in Tunesië was een 
leuk uitstapje samen. Zo hebben zich heel wat wilde ideeën ontwikkeld over te 
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schrijven artikelen en uit te voeren onderzoek. Leuk dat je mijn paranimf wil zijn en 
succes met het afronden van je eigen boekje en je opleiding in de psychiatrie. 
Al mijn kamergenoten van D321 wil ik vanaf deze plek bedanken voor de 
gezellige tijd die we samen hebben gehad. Met de kamergenoten van het eerste 
uur zijn het voornamelijk de borrels die me zijn bijgebleven. Later moest er vooral 
hard worden gewerkt en waren jullie een goede uitlaatklep voor al mijn twijfels en 
frustraties. Martine, mijn allerlaatste kamergenoot en paranimf, ik wil je hier 
speciaal bedanken voor je enthousiaste manier van meedenken in de laatste fase 
van mijn promotietraject. Succes met je onderzoek en je opleiding tot kinderarts. 
Maak er iets moois van! 
De collega’s van mijn huidige werkplek in Utrecht wil ik graag bedanken voor 
de aanmoedigingen die de laatste zware loodjes iets lichter maakten. Het was fijn 
om van een aantal van jullie nog wat feedback te krijgen waardoor nog enkel 
puntjes op belangrijke i’s terecht zijn gekomen. 
Ten slotte zijn de allerlaatste woorden van dank voor Kiki, mijn lieve vriendin. 
De afgelopen tijd was en bleef jij voor mij een grote steun, ondanks alle 
promotieperikelen. Bedankt voor je geduld en in het bijzonder de vele uren die je 
naar mij hebt willen luisteren. Ik ben je heel dankbaar. 
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